Smith v. Randall

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Smith v. Randall

667 So. 2d 992, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 1029, 1996 WL 60817

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedFebruary 14, 1996

DocketNos. 95-1114, 95-1115

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 667 So. 2d 992 (Smith v. Randall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Smith v. Randall, 667 So. 2d 992, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 1029, 1996 WL 60817 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The defendants below, Gregory Smith, et al., appeal from two non-final orders denying their motions to transfer venue to Pasco County based on improper venue and forum non conveniens. We reverse.

In Vance v. Minton, 444 So.2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), this court examined the venue statutes and concluded that the venue privilege attaches only when the action is “commenced.” In the instant case, as in all others, the cause of action commenced when the plaintiff filed her initial complaint in the Circuit Court for Dade County. Although the plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint, the defendants properly raised their defense of improper venue through the first responsive pleading they filed, their answer to the amended complaint. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140(b); Gross v. Franklin, 387 So.2d 1046, 1048 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).

Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1993) states that “[ajctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” When examining the initial complaint against these standards, it is clear that venue is improper in Dade County. None of the defendants reside here, the cause of action did not accrue here, and there is no property in litigation that is located in this county. In contrast, venue is proper in Pasco County because it is where the cause of action accrued. Pearson v. Wallace Aviation, Inc., 400 So.2d 50 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).

The order denying the defendants’ motion to transfer venue to Pasco County is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for the entry of an order transferring this cause.

Since the determination of this issue is dispositive, we do not need to address the other order appealed by the defendants.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

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PER CURIAM.

The defendants below, Gregory Smith, et al., appeal from two non-final orders denying their motions to transfer venue to Pasco County based on improper venue and forum non conveniens. We reverse.

In Vance v. Minton, 444 So.2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), this court examined the venue statutes and concluded that the venue privilege attaches only when the action is “commenced.” In the instant case, as in all others, the cause of action commenced when the plaintiff filed her initial complaint in the Circuit Court for Dade County. Although the plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint, the defendants properly raised their defense of improper venue through the first responsive pleading they filed, their answer to the amended complaint. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140(b); Gross v. Franklin, 387 So.2d 1046, 1048 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).

Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1993) states that “[ajctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” When examining the initial complaint against these standards, it is clear that venue is improper in Dade County. None of the defendants reside here, the cause of action did not accrue here, and there is no property in litigation that is located in this county. In contrast, venue is proper in Pasco County because it is where the cause of action accrued. Pearson v. Wallace Aviation, Inc., 400 So.2d 50 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).

The order denying the defendants’ motion to transfer venue to Pasco County is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for the entry of an order transferring this cause.

Since the determination of this issue is dispositive, we do not need to address the other order appealed by the defendants.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

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Bluebook (online)

667 So. 2d 992, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 1029, 1996 WL 60817, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-randall-fladistctapp-1996.

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