Smith v. O'Neal Steel, Inc.

Supreme Court of Georgia

Smith v. O'Neal Steel, Inc.

171 S.E.2d 519, 225 Ga. 778, 1969 Ga. LEXIS 643

CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

DecidedNovember 6, 1969

Docket25438

StatusPublished

Cited by9 cases

This text of 171 S.E.2d 519 (Smith v. O'Neal Steel, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Smith v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 171 S.E.2d 519, 225 Ga. 778, 1969 Ga. LEXIS 643 (Ga. 1969).

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Opinion

Grice, Justice.

We granted the application for certiorari in this case to consider and determine whether that portion of Georgia Laws 1966, page 343 {'Code Ann. § 24-113.1), commonly known as the “Georgia long arm statute,” which provides that the courts of this State may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who “commits a tortious act within this State . . .” confers jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation whose negligent act outside this State causes injury within this State. The Court of Appeals held that it did not.

*779 Argued October 14, 1969 Decided November 6, 1969 Rehearing denied December 4, 1969. Adams, O’Neal, Steele, Thornton, Hemingway & McKinney, Robert S. Slocumb, Hardy Gregory, Jr., for appellant. Smith, Cohen, Ringel, Kohler, Martin & Lowe, Sam F. Lowe, Jr., Robert W. Beynart, Jones, Cork, Miller <fe Benton, Ed L. Benton, for appellee.

We deemed the question to be of gravity and importance, and particularly so because it has been decided diversely in other jurisdictions but had not been ruled upon by this court.

However, this court has decided in Bauer International Corp. v. Cagle’s, Inc., 225 Ga. 684, that the word “nonresident” as used in the original statute (Ga. L. 1966, p. 343, supra) did not include corporations, and that the amendment of 1968 (Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1419, 1420; Code Ann. § 24-117), which defines “nonresident” to include certain foreign corporations, does not apply to a cause of action arising prior to the effective date of the amendment, which was April 12, 1968. The cause of action in the instant case, according to the record, arose prior thereto, on November 3, 1966.

In view of the above, the question upon which the application for certiorari was granted is now moot. Therefore, we must remand the case to the Court of Appeals for its further disposition in the light of the Bauer case, supra.

Remanded to the Court of Appeals.

All the Justices concur, except UndercoVer, J., who dissents.

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Grice, Justice.

We granted the application for certiorari in this case to consider and determine whether that portion of Georgia Laws 1966, page 343 {'Code Ann. § 24-113.1), commonly known as the “Georgia long arm statute,” which provides that the courts of this State may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who “commits a tortious act within this State . . .” confers jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation whose negligent act outside this State causes injury within this State. The Court of Appeals held that it did not.

*779 Argued October 14, 1969 Decided November 6, 1969 Rehearing denied December 4, 1969. Adams, O’Neal, Steele, Thornton, Hemingway & McKinney, Robert S. Slocumb, Hardy Gregory, Jr., for appellant. Smith, Cohen, Ringel, Kohler, Martin & Lowe, Sam F. Lowe, Jr., Robert W. Beynart, Jones, Cork, Miller <fe Benton, Ed L. Benton, for appellee.

We deemed the question to be of gravity and importance, and particularly so because it has been decided diversely in other jurisdictions but had not been ruled upon by this court.

However, this court has decided in Bauer International Corp. v. Cagle’s, Inc., 225 Ga. 684, that the word “nonresident” as used in the original statute (Ga. L. 1966, p. 343, supra) did not include corporations, and that the amendment of 1968 (Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1419, 1420; Code Ann. § 24-117), which defines “nonresident” to include certain foreign corporations, does not apply to a cause of action arising prior to the effective date of the amendment, which was April 12, 1968. The cause of action in the instant case, according to the record, arose prior thereto, on November 3, 1966.

In view of the above, the question upon which the application for certiorari was granted is now moot. Therefore, we must remand the case to the Court of Appeals for its further disposition in the light of the Bauer case, supra.

Remanded to the Court of Appeals.

All the Justices concur, except UndercoVer, J., who dissents.

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171 S.E.2d 519, 225 Ga. 778, 1969 Ga. LEXIS 643, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-oneal-steel-inc-ga-1969.

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