Smith v. New York Central Rail Road

29 Barb. 132, 1859 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 159
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 7, 1859
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 29 Barb. 132 (Smith v. New York Central Rail Road) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. New York Central Rail Road, 29 Barb. 132, 1859 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 159 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1859).

Opinion

By the Court, Hogeboom, J.

By the principles of the common law the responsibility of common carriers was very severe. They were liable for all losses, except those occurring by the act of G-od, or the enemies of the country. Possessing in some respects a public character or employment, they were held incapable, so long as they acted in that capacity, of divesting themselves of their common law responsibilities. After a time the rule was to some extent relaxed, and they were allowed by public notice brought home to their customers, to lessen, in some respects, the degree of their responsibility. But this was [136]*136for a long time a vexed question in the courts, and has never obtained in this state. The law is well settled to the contrary of such a right. (19 Wend. 234, 251. 1 Kern. 490.)

Nevertheless it was felt that the rule, in many cases, operated harshly, and was not altogether adapted to the demands of an expanded commerce. Common carriers finding themselves foiled by the courts in attempting to restrict their liability by a public notice, resorted to another expedient—that of making a special contract with the owner or shipper of the goods for a diminished risk. The right to do this was for a time disputed, but it gradually obtained a foothold in the courts, and may be .now regarded as firmly established. (1 Kern. 490. 14 Barb. 524. 13 id. 353.) ■

But even this right has been held, on principles of public policy, not to be without qualification. A carrier of goods cannot stipulate for absolute exemption from all liability. He cannot covenant against his own fraud or willful misconduct. (4 Seld. 375. 13 Barb. 360.) And it is said, in some cases, that he cannot covenant against his own gross negligence. (13 Barb. 360. 7 Hill, 533.) The principle is, that undertaking to carry, he must do all that common prudence requires' to carry safely. He undertakes a task, and he must perform it. He is not to be permitted to lay aside that degree of care and precaution which good faith and a proper sense of the importance of his trust, and the value of the property committed to his charge, require at his hands. (4 Seld. 375.)

And yet it is possible that as respects the carriage of goods, where no principle of public policy is violated, and where it may be rationally supposed that a keen sense of self interest will protect parties from improvident contracts, a common carrier may be regarded as authorized to make any special agreement he can fairly succeed in making with his customer, for a qualified risk, always excepting agreements for indemnity against his own fraud or willful misconduct.

A somewhat different rule obtains in regard to carriers of human beings. They are not in the strict sense, perhaps not in any just sense, of the term denominated common carriers. (15 N. Y. Rep. 446. Story on Bailm. § 498.)

[137]*137The common law imposes upon the carriers of passengers the duty of transporting them with the highest degree of care and precaution. They are not, as common carriers are, absolute insurers (within the limitation above mentioned) for the ■ safe delivery of their passengers at the point of. their destination ; but they are bound to exercise the utmost care and the most rigid precaution. (1 Duer, 233. 16 Barb. 353.)

Very slight negligence will make them liable to an action. They are charged with the care of human life, and it is right that they should be held to a most rigid responsibility. Nevertheless it is quite certain, under the modern decisions, that as in the case-of carriage of goods, this responsibility may be restricted; not by a public notice posted or published; not by a notice brought home to the knowledge of the passenger himself, for that is still regarded as only the act of one party; but by a special agreement. (6 How. U. S. R. 344. 26 Barb. 641.) It seems to be settled, in deference to the great principle of allowing parties to make their own contracts, where no rule of public policy or of positive law is violated, that parties may contract for a less burdensome obligation upon the carrier of passengers than is imposed by the principles of the common law. (26 Barb. 641. 1 Kern. 490. 14 Barb. 524.)

It does not seem to be expressly settled how far this restriction may be carried. It is generally conceded that it cannot be carried to the extent of relieving the carrier against the consequences of his own fraud or willful misconduct. (Cases before cited.) And I do not think it ought to be permitted to relieve him against the fraud or misconduct of his servants or employees. It has been suggested by an eminent judge, that it might be permitted to cover this latter ground. (Per Gardiner, J., in Wells v. St’m Nav. Co., 4 Seld. 381.) But I think the argument unsound. It would be trifling with human life. Principles of public policy—a proper regard for the safety of the subject and the citizen—in my opinion, forbid the application of such a rule, or the concession of such a power. Perhaps, also, a party should not be allowed to bargain for absolving a carrier of passengers from gross negligence ; and by that, in this connexion, I mean a degree of negligence which [138]*138amounts to fraud or criminality, and implies a reckless disregard, of human life, and the absence of proper moral sentiments.

■ Making these exceptions, I am not prepared to say that parties may not, if they do it understandingly, stipulate to relieve the carrier to any extent upon which they may deliberately agree, from the common law obligations of his contract, and from any degree of negligence to which the passenger, with a full consciousness of his rights, may consent.

We come now to the consideration of the contract itself, its nature and effect. Having ascertained what the parties might lawfully do, let us see what in point of fact they did do. I think the judge at the creuit was right in saying that Ward was not, in the strict sense of the term, a gratuitous passenger. If .the compensation paid was professedly for the transportation of the stock, it involved the condition that a person was to be permitted to ride along to take care of them.' This was indispensable, and a convenience to both parties. It was a part of the contract. The agreement was, that the persons riding free, to take charge of the stock, do so at their own risk of personal injury, from whatever cause.” This language, it must be confessed, is very broad and comprehensive, and yet, by the argument of the defendants’ counsel, it is conceded that it has limitations. It is admitted that it does not cover injuries arising from the fraud or the willful misconduct of the defendants. But this, it will be said, is a limitation imposed by law, and not by the agreement .of the parties. I think it is by both; for the law will neither suffer it to be done, nor presume that the parties intended it. We must put ourselves in the place of the parties, and see what ¡they really intended. Was this clause designed to cover any risk arising from the misconduct of the carrier, either from his willfulness or his negligence ? Negligence is the omission of care.

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Bluebook (online)
29 Barb. 132, 1859 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 159, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-new-york-central-rail-road-nysupct-1859.