UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TODD SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 22-cv-322 NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, d/b/a AMTRAK,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Todd Smith was diagnosed with late-stage colon cancer in November 2020, while
employed as a manager at Defendant Amtrak. Amtrak initially permitted Plaintiff to work
remotely during the COVID pandemic as an immunocompromised cancer patient undergoing
treatment. But Amtrak rescinded that permission after nearly three months, instead requiring
Plaintiff to take unpaid leave during his chemotherapy. Because he had not received medical
clearance to return to on-site work when his leave ended, Amtrak fired him.
Amtrak moves for summary judgment on all counts of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 1–18, ECF No. 23-2 (“Def.’s Mot.”). For the reasons below, the court
will DENY Amtrak’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed by the parties. Amtrak hired Plaintiff as a manager in
a work equipment shop in Wilmington, Delaware, on November 28, 2016. Def.’s Stmt. of
Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 1, ECF No. 23-1 (“Def.’s SUF”); Pl.’s Stmt. of Gen. Issues of
Material Fact ¶ 1, ECF No. 24-1 (“Pl.’s SUF”). Four years later, in November 2020, Plaintiff was
Page 1 of 16 diagnosed with late-stage colon cancer. Def.’s SUF ¶ 4; Pl’s SUF ¶ 2. He began receiving
radiation and chemotherapy that left him immunocompromised at the height of the COVID-19
pandemic. Pl.’s SUF ¶ 2; see Def.’s SUF ¶ 5.
When he received his diagnosis, Plaintiff spoke with his supervisor, Senior Manager of
Work Equipment, James Miller, who permitted Plaintiff to work from home temporarily. Def.’s
SUF ¶ 5; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 3. Miller did so to accommodate Plaintiff’s medical treatment and avoid
exposing him to COVID-19. Def.’s SUF ¶ 5; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 3. Plaintiff worked remotely from
November 2020 to January 2021. Def.’s Ex. E at 21:4-11, ECF No. 23-7; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 3. During
those nearly three months, another manager, Steve McGill, assisted with any on-site tasks, such as
critical lifts or injuries, that Plaintiff could not perform remotely. Def.’s SUF ¶ 6; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 4.
Amtrak revoked Plaintiff’s remote work arrangement in January 2021, claiming that
McGill would be working in the field and could no longer take care of Plaintiff’s on-site tasks.
Def.’s SUF ¶¶ 9–10; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 5. On January 21, 2021, Plaintiff requested unpaid medical leave
to complete his treatment. Def.’s SUF ¶ 11; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 6. Attached to his request was a doctor’s
certification stating that Plaintiff (1) was undergoing chemotherapy treatment, (2) would be having
surgery in the future, and (3) was estimated to need continuous time off from November 2, 2020,
through July 15, 2021. Def.’s Ex. 7 at 1–4, ECF No. 23-3 (“Def.’s Ex. 7”). On February 19,
Amtrak responded to Plaintiff’s request by letter, informing him that: 1) Plaintiff had exhausted
his leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act on January 24, 2) Amtrak would only extend
his leave if it did not pose “an undue hardship to the company” but would “immediately” post his
position in the meantime “[d]ue to both the critical safety oversight and management” his job
required. Def.’s Ex. 8 at 1, ECF No. 23-3.
Page 2 of 16 In the same letter, Amtrak provided Plaintiff three options, all of which required a medical
clearance for Plaintiff to return to work: (1) If Plaintiff received medical clearance before Amtrak
extended an offer to his replacement and could perform the essential functions of his job, it would
rehire him; (2) If Plaintiff received clearance but could not perform the essential functions of his
position, then Amtrak would “consider” him for “reassignment to open positions for which” he
was “qualified”; (3) If he was not cleared by the time of Amtrak’s offer to his replacement, Amtrak
would fire him. Id.
Months later, on April 7, Amtrak sent Plaintiff a letter giving him until April 22 to submit
a medical clearance and keep his job. The letter stated:
Due to both the critical safety oversight and management of M/W equipment maintenance and repair activities provided by your position, after April 22, 2021 we will not be able to hold your position open through your expected return to work date. . . To that end, we will allow you to remain on leave, but your position will be posted on April 22, 2021. If you are cleared by Amtrak’s Medical Director to return to work before we extend an offer to a candidate for the Manager Work Equipment Shop position, you will have the opportunity to return to your position at that time[.]
Def.’s SUF ¶ 13.
On April 30, Plaintiff informed Amtrak that he anticipated returning to work on June 1,
without a medical clearance. Def.’s SUF ¶ 15; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 8. On May 25, before Plaintiff could
so return, Amtrak awarded his job to someone else. Def.’s SUF ¶ 16; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 9.
On June 1, Plaintiff filed a complaint with Amtrak alleging disability discrimination.
Def.’s SUF ¶ 18; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 10. Two days later, on June 3, Amtrak internally designated him as
“ineligible for rehire,” meaning that Plaintiff could not be hired for future Amtrak jobs. Pl.’s SUF
¶ 46; Pl.’s Ex. 12 at 1, ECF No. 25-12. It then fired him. Def.’s SUF ¶ 19; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 11. Plaintiff
completed his last cancer treatment in June 2021. Def.’s SUF ¶ 20; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 12.
Page 3 of 16 On February 7, 2022, Plaintiff sued in this court under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”). Compl. ¶¶ 35–49, ECF No. 1. (“Compl.”).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). While the
court must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor, the non-moving party
“may not rest upon [the] mere allegations or denials of his pleading but must present affirmative
evidence showing a genuine issue for trial.” Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Disability Discrimination (Count I)
“The ADA prohibits discrimination against an employee “on the basis of disability[.]” 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a). “[T]he two basic elements of a disability discrimination claim are that (i) the
plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because of the plaintiff’s disability.” Adeyemi
v. District of Columbia, 525 F.3d 1222, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 2008). A “discrimination or retaliation
claim brought under the ADA can rest on a ‘motivating factor’ causation analysis—meaning that
the claim can be sustained if discriminatory animus is merely one of several factors that
precipitated the adverse employment action.” Drasek v. Burwell, 121 F. Supp. 3d 143, 154 (D.D.C.
2015); but see Haughton v. District of Columbia, 819 F. App’x 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“Whether
the ADA incorporates by cross-reference to Title VII the latter’s motivating-factor standard
remains an open question in this circuit.”).
If a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the burden then
shifts to the defendant to “articulate some ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’ for the action
challenged.” Walden v. Patient-Centered Outcomes Rsch. Inst., 304 F. Supp. 3d 123, 133 (D.D.C. Page 4 of 16 2018) (quoting Giles v. Transit Employees Fed. Credit Union, 794 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
When an employer makes such a showing, “the district court need not—and should not—decide
whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case.” Brady v. Off. of Sergeant at Arms, 520
F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). Instead, “the question on summary
judgment becomes whether, based on the totality of the parties’ evidence, a reasonable jury could
determine that the defendant’s proffered explanation was pretext for discrimination.” Conn v. Am.
Nat’l Red Cross, 149 F. Supp. 3d 136, 143 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing Brady, 520 F.3d at 494–95).
Defendant first argues that Amtrak’s June 3 termination letter, reiterating that a medical
clearance was required for him to return to work, is not direct evidence of disability discrimination.
Def.’s Mot. at 9.
In Amtrak’s letter, James Miller wrote:
“The [April 7] letter advised that if a[] [replacement] offer was made prior to you being medically cleared to return to work, you would be separated from employment with Amtrak. We have selected a suitable candidate to fill this position and, as of this date, you have not been medically cleared to return to work. Therefore, effective 6/03/2021[], your employment with Amtrak is terminated.”
Pl.’s Ex. 11 at 1, ECF No. 25-11 (“Pl.’s Ex. 11”). Plaintiff asserts that “Amtrak’s avowed
rational[e] for its actions [] rested, at least in part, on [his] disability.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 10, ECF No.
24 (“Pl.’s Opp’n”). The court agrees.
Direct evidence of discrimination can exist if “the actions of a discriminatory supervisor
[]feed into and causally influence the decisionmaker’s ultimate determination.” Steele v. Mattis,
899 F.3d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 2018). For example, if a supervisor’s actions reflect an “open
hostility” to an employee based on “stereotypes and prejudices” about their protected trait, then
that is sufficient. Id. at 951. If the evidence “does not establish bias without the need for additional
Page 5 of 16 inference,” however, then it is not direct, but circumstantial evidence. Waggel v. George
Washington Univ., 957 F.3d 1364, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
Here, the letter shows, at a minimum, that Amtrak was not “supportive of” Plaintiff’s
“medical leave” or his possible “transition back to work on a part-time basis.” Baskerville v. CBS
News Inc., 18-cv-2522, 2022 WL 612608, at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2022). As Plaintiff notes, other
courts have held that conditioning termination on a medical clearance can be direct evidence of
disability discrimination. Pl.’s Opp’n at 11 n.1. 1
Amtrak contends that it fired Plaintiff due to “safety” and “equipment maintenance
requirements.” Def.’s Reply in Further Support of its Mot. for Summ. J. at 15, ECF No. 26 (“Def.’s
Reply”). That reasoning was referenced in Plaintiff’s termination letter. Miller (who initially
allowed Plaintiff to work remotely during his treatment) wrote: “By letter dated April 7, 2021, you
were advised that your position of Manager Work Equipment Shop was to be posted on April 22,
2021 due to the critical business needs of the organization.” Pl.’s Ex. 11 at 1. Amtrak thus argues
that Plaintiff’s sole focus on the letter’s medical clearance language is misguided. Def.’s Reply at
15.
Affording all reasonable inferences to Plaintiff, however, the court need only conclude that
his disability was a motivating factor in Amtrak’s decision to fire him. Drasek, 121 F. Supp. 3d
at 154 (explaining that the ADA requires a motivating factor causation standard). There is
sufficient evidence here to support that conclusion. Amtrak clearly stated in its letter that because
1 See, e.g., White v. Nucor Corp., 148 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1324 (D. Utah 2015) (holding that a “termination letter that stated [the plaintiff] was being terminated because his doctor had not released him to perform the lifting requirements of the welder position” was direct evidence of discrimination); Lovell v. Champion Car Wash, LLC, 969 F. Supp. 2d 945, 949 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) (holding that a termination letter stating “[s]ince you cannot perform your job duties as needed, I am going to have to release you, for medical reasons, from employment” constituted direct evidence of discrimination).
Page 6 of 16 Plaintiff “ha[d] not been medically cleared to return to work” by June 3, it “therefore” “terminated”
him. Pl.’s Ex. 11 at 1. And Plaintiff’s medical clearance was not in his control, but that of his
physician, who determined when Plaintiff’s chemotherapy no longer impeded his ability to work
in person.
Although the D.C. Circuit has not yet addressed this precise scenario, the Second Circuit
has held that when an employer explicitly states that it is firing an employee for being on medical
leave, that is direct evidence of disability discrimination. In Porter v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock
Medical Center, 92 F.4th 129, 150 (2d Cir. 2024), the employer, when asked during a staff meeting
why the plaintiff “was being terminated rather than retained,” responded that the plaintiff was “on
disability.” Id. The Second Circuit held that such a response was “direct evidence” that the
employer fired plaintiff “in whole or in part” because of her disability. Id.
To Amtrak’s point, its termination letter gave another reason for terminating Plaintiff—its
“critical business needs” requiring his return to work by a specific date. Pl.’s Ex. 11 at 1; Def.’s
Reply at 15. But as the Second Circuit stated, when an employer reveals that its termination
decision rests in any way on a disability, that “virtually precludes a ruling as a matter of law that
disability has played no role.” Porter, 92 F. 4th at 151; Alston v. District of Columbia, 770 F.
Supp. 2d 289, 293 (D.D.C. 2011) (distinguishing between a sole and a motivating factor for
disability discrimination).
Accordingly, the court will deny Amtrak summary judgment on Plaintiff’s disability
discrimination claim.
B. Retaliation (Count III)
Under the ADA, a retaliation claim requires that: (1) plaintiff “engaged in protected
activity”; (2) plaintiff “was subjected to adverse action by the employer”; and (3) “there existed a
causal link between the adverse action and the protected activity.” Smith v. District of Columbia, Page 7 of 16 430 F.3d 450, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Assuming
Plaintiff has made a prima facie case for retaliation, he is again subject to the McDonnell Douglas
burden shifting framework that the court described in Section III.A—meaning the burden then
shifts to Amtrak to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action challenged.
411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973). If Amtrak does so, Plaintiff must then point to evidence to show
that Amtrak’s proffered explanation was nonetheless a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804.
Plaintiff contends that Amtrak retaliated against him after he filed his disability complaint
by not trying to reassign him, failing to rehire him, declaring him ineligible for rehire, and then
firing him. 2 Pl.’s Opp’n at 22–24. In response, Amtrak first argues that Plaintiff failed to raise a
prima facie case because Amtrak contemplated hiring Plaintiff’s replacement before he filed his
disability complaint. See Def.’s Mot. at 16–18.
The court need not address whether Plaintiff has raised a prima facie case. Indeed, “asking
whether” Plaintiff “satisfied his prima facie burden is an unnecessary and improper ‘sideshow’”
“at this stage of litigation.” Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted). Once the employer asserts a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, it “has
done everything that would be required . . . if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie
2 Amtrak contends that Plaintiff cannot recast his retaliation claim in his Opposition, as his Complaint limited the retaliation to just his termination. Def.’s Reply at 17. But Amtrak relies on an inapposite case in which a party failed to raise an entire claim in their complaint, rather than explaining the basis for their claim during litigation, as Plaintiff does here. See Kilpatrick v. Paige, 193 F. Supp. 2d 145, 158 (D.D.C. 2002). Amtrak is correct, however, that the Complaint does allege Plaintiff’s termination as the sole basis for retaliation. Compl. ¶ 47. This court can, however, sua sponte permit a party leave to amend when it attempts to later supplement an allegation with evidence that arose out of the transaction or occurrence. Abraha v. Colonial Parking, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 3d 37, 39 (D.D.C. 2018) (permitting leave to amend when a plaintiff attempted “to expand the claims that they [were] asserting”). It will therefore allow Plaintiff to amend his Complaint to include the extra bases for his retaliation claim and provide Amtrak “an opportunity to raise any prejudice that would result therefrom.” Id. at 41.
Page 8 of 16 case,” so “whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant.” U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983).
Amtrak next argues that it “terminated [Plaintiff] for the legitimate reason that he was
unable to work in person, on-site for an extended period of time, and Amtrak needed his position
filled for safety reasons.” Def.’s Mot. at 18.
Plaintiff, however, satisfies his burden of raising a pretextual, retaliatory inference. First,
he points out that before he filed his disability complaint on June 1, Amtrak had inquired about
interviewing him for other positions within the company. In fact, Plaintiff’s disability complaint
states, and Amtrak does not dispute, that James Miller called him on June 1, “saying that he wanted
to interview” Plaintiff “for some filing positions.” Pl.’s Ex. 17 at 3, ECF No. 25-17 (“Pl.’s Ex.
17”); Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Stmt. of Genuine Issues ¶ 41, ECF No. 26-3 (“Def.’s SUF Resp.”) (not
disputing that the call took place). Miller’s call contradicts Amtrak’s February 19 letter, which
stated that Plaintiff would only be considered for other positions within Amtrak if he submitted a
medical clearance and could not perform the essential functions of his position. Def.’s Ex. 8 at 1,
ECF No. 25-8 (“Def.’s Ex. 8”). Two days after Miller’s call, and Plaintiff’s disability complaint,
Amtrak fired Plaintiff without ever interviewing him for another position, as Miller had mentioned.
Def.’s SUF ¶ 19; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 11. Amtrak also designated Smith as “ineligible for rehire,” meaning
it would not offer him future employment for any position. Pl.’s Ex 13 at 56:22-57:19, ECF No.
25-13; Pl.’s Ex. 12 at 1, ECF No. 25-13 (“Pl.’s Ex. 12”).
Amtrak contends that Plaintiff’s retaliation argument solely rests on temporal proximity.
Def.’s Mot at 16–18. But as is the case here, when “the two events are very close in time,” a strong
causation argument exists. Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Pl.’s Ex.
12 at 1; Def.’s SUF ¶ 19; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 11. Courts have found causation where the adverse action
Page 9 of 16 is within three months of the protected activity. See McIntyre v. Peters, 460 F. Supp. 2d 125, 133
(D.D.C. 2006) (stating that “[t]his Court has often followed a three-month rule to establish
causation on the basis of temporal proximity alone” when considering a summary judgment
motion). Therefore, at the very least, a “close-in-time relationship between Plaintiff’s protected
activity and the adverse action[s]” is a factor in support of a pretextual retaliatory inference.
Crowley v. Perdue, 318 F. Supp. 3d 277, 289 (D.D.C. 2018).
To be sure, “positive evidence beyond mere [temporal] proximity” is required to rebut an
employer’s legitimate, non-retaliatory explanations for an adverse employment action. Waggel,
957 F.3d at 1376 (quoting Minter v. District of Columbia, 809 F.3d 66, 71–72 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff proffers the testimony of two Amtrak employees, who confirmed that the only reason that
Amtrak offered Plaintiff’s job to a replacement was because Plaintiff had not “been cleared to
return to work.” Pl.’s Ex. 13 at 28:14, ECF No. 25-13 (“Pl.’s Ex. 13”); Pl.’s Ex. 9 at 45:6–9, ECF
No. 25-9 (“Unfortunately” Plaintiff “was not medically cleared to return to work within the
designated time frame and, therefore, his employment” “was separated”). Moreover, although
Angelo Schiavello could not recall who decided to designate Plaintiff as ineligible for future hire,
she confirmed that the decision was discretionary. See Pl.’s Ex. 13 at 57:10–12 (“[W]hen a
separation is done in the system,” designating as ineligible for rehire someone is a separate “check
box that’s checked[.]”); id. at 57:13–15 (stating that she did not “recall” “who made the decision
that Mr. Smith should be ineligible for rehire”).
Because Plaintiff evinces a retaliatory pretext that a reasonable jury could find, the court
will deny Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Count III.
C. Failure to Accommodate (Count II)
“[T]o prevail on a claim for failure to accommodate, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1)
they are a qualified individual with a disability; (2) their employer had notice of their disability; Page 10 of 16 and (3) their employer denied [their] request for a reasonable accommodation.” Pappas v. District
of Columbia, 513 F. Supp. 3d 64, 86 (D.D.C. 2021). In the D.C. Circuit, failure to accommodate
claims are not subject to the burden-shifting framework. See Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1185–
86 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (explaining that the McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply to
reasonable accommodation claims because such claims are assessed under the “application of
traditional burdens of proof”).
i. Qualified Individual
Amtrak challenges whether Plaintiff satisfies the first legal element of a failure to
accommodate claim. Def.’s Mot. at 12. A “qualified individual” is an individual with a disability
“who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Amtrak argues
that Plaintiff was not a qualified individual because his job as manager of a work equipment shop
essentially required his physical presence. Because he was medically incapable of working on-
site as of June 2021, and had additional surgeries in August 2021, he could not perform the
essential functions of his job. Def.’s Mot. at 12.
But Plaintiff never conceded that he was medically incapable of working in person. On
April 30, in response to Amtrak’s April 7 letter, he stated that he anticipated returning to work in
June. Def.’s SUF ¶ 15; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 8. Indeed, he testified that he and his doctor’s “goal” was that
he return to work by June 23, at the latest. Pl.’s Ex. 1 at 160:1–3, ECF No. 25-1 (“Pl.’s Ex. 1”).
To ensure he was able to do so, Plaintiff cancelled his monthly chemo treatments for July. Id. at
161:3. And Plaintiff’s surgeries in July and August 2021 were not related to his cancer treatment.
Id. at 53:10 (testifying that he was treated after June 2021 for “two abdominal blockages”).
Because conceivably Plaintiff could have worked in July and August 2021, remote or otherwise,
Page 11 of 16 he was therefore a qualified individual. Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (If a
disabled employee “can perform [her essential] functions without reasonable accommodation, so
much the better–she is, of course, still qualified.” (emphasis removed)).
ii. Reasonable Accommodation
Amtrak also challenges whether Plaintiff’s accommodation requests were reasonable, and
if so, whether they would have caused undue hardship. Def.’s Mot. at 13. To “defeat a . . . motion
for summary judgment,” a plaintiff “need only show that an ‘accommodation’” he requested
“seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases,” or that “special circumstances”
rendered it reasonable. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401, 405 (2002) (citation
omitted). “Once the plaintiff has made this showing, the defendant/employer then must show
special (typically case-specific) circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the particular
circumstances.” Id. at 402. “‘Undue hardship’ constitutes ‘an action requiring significant
difficulty or expense.’” Leiterman v. Johnson, 60 F. Supp. 3d 166, 180 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A)). “The Supreme Court has held that an accommodation which causes
anything ‘more than a de minimis cost’ to the employer’s business constitutes an ‘undue’
hardship.’” E.E.O.C. v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 112, 117 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977)).
a. Remote Arrangement
Amtrak argues that Plaintiff’s accommodation request was unreasonable because allowing
him to work remotely longer than the nearly three months it originally permitted would “eliminate
the essential functions” of his job. Def.’s Mot. at 13. The court disagrees.
Miller permitted Plaintiff to work remotely for three months without apparent disruption.
Def.’s Ex. E at 21:4-11; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 3. McGill covered Plaintiff’s in-person duties during that
Page 12 of 16 time. Def.’s SUF ¶ 6; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 4. Moreover, Plaintiff coordinated his schedule with Miller to
ensure that he had coverage when he was unavailable. Pl.’s SUF ¶ 14; Def.’s SUF Resp. ¶ 14.
Plaintiff’s tasks mainly were administrative, and he could perform those responsibilities remotely.
Pl.’s SUF ¶¶ 13–14; Def.’s SUF Resp. ¶ 13. Only when McGill was called back into the field did
Amtrak find Plaintiff’s remote arrangement no longer feasible. Def.’s SUF ¶¶ 9–10; Pl.’s SUF
¶ 5.
An employee’s request for an indefinite remote work accommodation may be unreasonable
or pose an undue hardship. But when an employer initially approves an accommodation request,
and then revokes it without notification or sufficient explanation, that appears far less “reasonable
as applied, i.e., ‘on the particular facts’ of the case.” Taylor v. Rice, 451 F.3d 898, 908 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (citation omitted).
Amtrak claims that it would have suffered undue hardship in extending Plaintiff’s remote
work arrangement, because it would have had to hire another employee to perform the functions
of two jobs and incurred “lost efficiency, higher costs, or both.” Def.’s Mot. at 15. But, as Miller
testified, having one employee cover for another is not “all that big an inconvenience” for Amtrak.
Pl.’s Ex. 3 at 35:13-19, ECF No. 25-3; Def.’s Mot. at 14. Thus, the court finds that there is
sufficient evidence from which a juror could find that Plaintiff made a reasonable accommodation
request, and that Amtrak would not have suffered undue hardship by permitting it.
b. Medical Leave of Absence
After Amtrak revoked Plaintiff’s remote work arrangement, on January 21, 2021, Plaintiff
requested just under six months of medical leave to complete chemotherapy, to conclude on July
15, 2021. Pl.’s SUF ¶ 6; Def.’s SUF ¶ 11. Amtrak approved his request until April 22, and told
Page 13 of 16 Plaintiff that he would be replaced if he did not return to work by that date. Def.’s Ex. 8 at 1;
Def.’s SUF ¶ 13; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 7.
Amtrak argues that Plaintiff’s July request was unreasonable because Plaintiff never
provided any medical documentation to substantiate his anticipated return to work date. Def.’s
Mot. at 14–16. But as of January 21, 2021, Amtrak was on notice that Plaintiff was undergoing
cancer treatment at least until July 15. Def.’s SUF ¶ 11.
Moreover, Plaintiff tried to comply with Amtrak’s April 22 deadline. He chose to
accelerate his cancer treatment. Pl.’s SUF ¶¶ 24–28; Def.’s SUF Resp. ¶¶ 24–28. He even decided
to forego his July cancer treatment, given Amtrak’s April medical clearance deadline. Pl.’x Ex. 1
at 161:3. On April 30, 2021, Plaintiff notified Amtrak that he could return to work on June 1. Pl.’s
SUF ¶¶ 8–9; Def.’s SUF Resp. ¶ 9. 3 Yet Amtrak offered Plaintiff’s job to someone else on May
25, 2021, just days before he was prepared to return to work. Def.’s SUF ¶ 16; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 9.
Amtrak is correct that Plaintiff did not provide a medical clearance by April 22. But the
ADA requires a “‘flexible give-and-take’ between employer and employee ‘so that together they
can determine what accommodation would enable the employee to continue working.’” Ward v.
McDonald, 762 F.3d 24, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 805
(7th Cir. 2005)). In Ward, the D.C. Circuit made clear that the reasonableness of a medical
clearance deadline turns on whether the employer “promptly respond[s]” to the request, meets with
3 Although Plaintiff told Amtrak that he could return to work by June 1, 2021, he testified that his (as well as his doctor’s) “goal” was to return by June 23. Pl.’s Ex. 1 at 160:1–3.
Page 14 of 16 the employee “on several occasions to discuss the request,” and seeks “more information from”
the “physician to help them determine an appropriate accommodation.” Id. at 34.
Amtrak did not engage in the “give-and-take” described in Ward. Amtrak does not contend
that it requires a medical clearance from every employee seeking to return from medical leave.
But even if it did, Amtrak’s April 22 remote work accommodation for Plaintiff’s medical condition
was not the result of an iterative process with Plaintiff. Amtrak neither met with Plaintiff nor
requested medical documentation from Plaintiff’s physician before denying his July 15 request.
Nor does the record show that Amtrak sought more information from Plaintiff’s physician on April
30, when Plaintiff informed Amtrak that he would be available to return to work by June 1.
Instead, Amtrak chose April 22 as its deadline for unexplained “critical safety oversight and
management” reasons. Def.’s SUF ¶ 13.
Nothing in the ADA supports such a take-it-or-leave-it position. Plaintiff did not wait for
Amtrak to request more medical information to substantiate his accommodation request. Cf. Ward,
762 F.3d at 34 (holding that if an employee fails to respond to the employer’s request for more
information, the employee is “author of her misfortune,” and the employer cannot be held liable
for failing to accommodate); see also Stewart v. St. Elizabeths Hosp., 589 F.3d 1305, 1307–09
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment for the employer on a failure to accommodate
claim because plaintiff voluntarily quit after the employer requested that “she complete[]
paperwork” documenting her disability). He voluntarily supplied it on January 21, 2021. Pl.’s
Page 15 of 16 SUF ¶ 6; Def.’s SUF ¶ 11. It was then Amtrak’s responsibility to utilize such information for
further meetings with Plaintiff and his physician to formulate an appropriate accommodation.
Furthermore, for the reasons stated in supra Section III.C.b, the court also does not find
that extending Plaintiff’s medical leave until July 15 would have caused it undue hardship.
Accordingly, the court will deny Amtrak summary judgment on Plaintiff’s failure-to-
accommodate claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Amtrak’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. A corresponding
order will follow shortly.
Date: September 23, 2025
Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge
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