Smith v. McGill

12 F.2d 32, 1926 U.S. App. LEXIS 3152
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedApril 2, 1926
DocketNo. 7048
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 12 F.2d 32 (Smith v. McGill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. McGill, 12 F.2d 32, 1926 U.S. App. LEXIS 3152 (8th Cir. 1926).

Opinion

MUNGER, District Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court. This suit was brought to cancel an oil and gas lease. There was a decree for the defendants and the plaintiff J. T. Smith has appealed. The parties will be referred to as they were designated in the court below. The plaintiffs alleged that they had acquired the title of the original lessor, and claimed that the original lessee had failed to comply with the conditions of the lease by finding gas or oil in paying quantities within the term of the lease, and that they had declared a forfeiture of it. The lessee claimed that it found gas in paying quantities, and had complied with the provisions of the lease. The lease granted to the lessee the oil deposits and natural gas in or under the land, with the right to extract and remove it, and incidental rights connected with such operations. The term stated was “ten years, and as much longer as oil or gas is found in paying quantities.” The lessee agreed to pay the lessor, as royalty, 12% per cent, of the gross proceeds of all crude oil extracted from the land. The lease contained provisions with reference to gas wells, as follows:

“The lessee shall pay as royalty on each gas producing well $300 per annum in advance, to be calculated from the date of commencement -of utilization: Provided, however, in the case of gas wells of small volume, when the rock pressure is 100 pounds or less, the parties hereto may, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, agree upon a royalty, which will become effective as a part of this lease: Provided, further, that in cases of gas wells of small volume, or where the wells produce both oil and gas, or oil and gas and salt water, to such an extent that the gas is unfit for ordinary domestic purposes, or where the gas from any well is desired for temporary use in connection with drilling and pumping operations on adjacent or nearby tracts, the lessee shall have the option of paying royalties upon such gas wells of the same percentage of the gross proceeds from the sale of gas from such wells as is paid under this lease for royalty on oil. The lessor shall have the free use of gas for domestic purposes in his residence on the lease premises, provided there be surplus gas, produced on said premises over and above enough to fully operate the same. Failure on the part of the lessee to use a gas-producing well, which cannot profitably be utilized at the rate herein prescribed, shall not work a forfeiture of this lease so far as the same relates to mining oil; but, if the lessee desires to retain gas-producing privileges, the lessee shall pay a rental of $100 per annum, in advance, calculated from date of discovery of gas, on each gas-producing well, gas from which is not marketed, or not utilized otherwise than for operations under this lease. Payments of annual gas royalties shall be made within 25 days from the date such royalties become due; other royalty payments to be made monthly on or before the 25th day of the month succeeding that for which such payment is to be made, supported by sworn statements.”
“Upon the violation of any of the substantial terms and conditions of this lease, the Secretary of the Interior (or lessor, in event restrictions are removed as provided in paragraph 12 hereof) shall have the right, at any time after 30 days’ notice to the lessee, specifying the terms or conditions violated, to declare this lease null and void, and the lessor shall then be entitled and authorized to take immediate possession of the land.”

The 10-year period, mentioned in the lease, expired December 24, 1522. This suit was begun April 25, 1923. The lessee drilled one well on the land, which was begun in May 1922, and was finished in September, 1922, in which no oil nor gas was found. The expense of drilling this well was about $34,-000. Another well was begun about November, 1922-, At a depth of 1,200 feet gas was found, and an experienced oil operator testified that the flow was about 750,000 cubic feet, for which there was a market at the rate of 10 cents per 1,000 cubic feet. An oil company, which had a .pipe line in the vicinity, laid a line to connect with this well, and purchased the gas. The gas had to be piped about 4 miles. The oil company purchased the gas from this well for the months of December, 1922, and January and February, 1923, but about February 28th it was discovered that the gas was not feeding into the pipe line because of lack of pressure. The gas could then have been sold to a drilling well that was near, but, instead of doing this-[34]*34the lessee about March 6th began to drill the well to a greater depth, and about May 24, 1923, at a depth of 3,400 feet, a flow of oil was found, at a rate of about 250 barrels per day. The well had continued to produce at a profitable rate to the time of trial.

On March 6,1922, when the lessee started to deepen the well, there was 300,000 feet of gas in the well, which was blown off before the drilling operations proceeded. The superintendent of the lessee, who managed this well, testified that, when the deepening of the well began, he considered the well as a paying proposition; that there was a market for gas from the well around that locality for a drilling well, but that it would not have been profitable to market the gas locally at that time, as it would have required extra equipment. The cost of deepening the well was about $50,000. One of the plaintiffs testified to his opinion that this was not a paying gas well; but this opinion was based on the theory that a well could not be said to be a paying one, unless it not only paid a profit over the expense of operation, but also paid a profit on the investment. The other plaintiff also gave it as his opinion that a gas well producing 750,000 cubic feet was not a paying gas well, but said that he did not know what amount should be considered to be a paying gas well. Apart from this difference of opinion as to what constitutes a paying gas well, there was no dispute in the evidence. The lessee tendered to the plaintiffs, the successors to the lessor’s rights, $300 about December 1, 1922, as payment of the royalty provided by the lease for a gas-producing well, but the payment was refused, because the plaintiffs did not consider the well as producing gas in paying quantities. At the time of refusing this proffered payment, the plaintiffs notified the lessee that the plaintiffs were informed that the gas well was not producing oil or gas in paying quantities, and that, if the condition was the same at the end of the term of the lease, the plaintiffs would expect the lessee to vacate the premises.

One of the plaintiffs refused to join in this appeal, and an order of severance was made, so that this appeal is prosecuted by the other plaintiff. The claim of the appellant is that a decree should have been entered canceling the lease, because the evidence showed that the lessee was not finding oil in paying quantities as the lease required; In support of this claim, appellant asserts that gas was not being found in paying quantities, unless the well was paying the lessee a profit over the operating expenses, and that gas was not only being found, but was being produced, so as to pay the lessee this measure of profit. In the construction of leases of this nature, a distinction has generally been recognized between a covenant by the lessee to pay the lessor an amount proportioned1 to the oil which is produced, and a covenant to pay the léssor a fixed sum as a periodic rental for a gas well.

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Related

Brooks v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co.
77 F.2d 965 (Eighth Circuit, 1935)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
12 F.2d 32, 1926 U.S. App. LEXIS 3152, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-mcgill-ca8-1926.