Smith v. Martin

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAMES RAYMOND, Lead No. 1:18-cv-00307-DAD-JLT 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL OF CRAWFORD 14 WARREN MARTIN, SMITH PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT AND GRANTING MOTION FOR PARTIAL 15 Defendant. DISMISSAL OF A.J.C. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 16 No.: 1:18-cv-1526-DAD-JLT (Doc. No. 16) 17 INGRID CRAWFORD SMITH, et al., No.: 1:19-cv-01302-DAD-JLT (Doc. No. 9) 18 Plaintiffs,

19 v.

20 CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, et al., 21 Defendants. 22

23 A.J.C., 24 Plaintiff, 25 v. 26 CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, et al., 27 Defendants. 28 1 The three above-listed actions were filed by purported heirs of decedent Augustus Joshua 2 Crawford for claims related to his alleged wrongful death and have been consolidated for all 3 purposes, including trial. Order Consolidating Cases (Doc. No. 26), Crawford Smith v. City of 4 Bakersfield, No. 1:18-cv-01526-DAD-JLT (E.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2019); Order Consolidating Cases 5 (Doc. No. 20), A.J.C. v. City of Bakersfield, No. 1:19-cv-01302-DAD-JLT (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 6 2020). 7 Pending before the court are two motions to dismiss brought by defendants City of 8 Bakersfield, Bakersfield Police Department, Chief Lyle Martin, and Warren Martin, filed on 9 March 5, 2019 in the Crawford Smith action and on November 26, 2019 in the A.J.C. action.1 10 (Crawford Smith, Doc. No. 16; A.J.C., Doc. No. 9.) On April 2, 2019, the Crawford Smith 11 plaintiffs filed an opposition to that motion. (Crawford Smith, Doc. No. 27.) Although 12 represented by the same counsel as the Crawford Smith plaintiffs, plaintiff A.J.C. initially failed 13 to respond to the motion. (A.J.C., Doc. No. 17.) A minute order issued by the court on January 14 16, 2020, granted plaintiff A.J.C. until February 5, 2020 to file opposition to defendants’ motion 15 to dismiss. (A.J.C., Doc. No. 19.) On February 6, 2020, plaintiff A.J.C. filed a statement of non- 16 opposition as to the sole contention of defendants’ motion. Statement of Non-Opposition (Doc. 17 No. 79), Raymond et al. v. Martin et al., 1:18-cv-00307-DAD-JLT (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2020). 18 Defendants did not file a reply. 19 Pursuant to General Order No. 617 addressing the public health emergency posed by the 20 coronavirus pandemic, the court takes this matter under submission to be decided on the papers, 21 without holding a hearing. 22 BACKGROUND 23 Crawford Smith plaintiffs, Ingrid Crawford Smith and A.C., filed their complaint on 24 November 3, 2018 (Crawford Smith, Doc. No. 1), and plaintiff A.J.C. filed her complaint on 25 September 16, 2019 (A.J.C., Doc. No. 1). Both actions were filed by purported heirs, and 26

27 1 The court notes that defendants Chief Lyle Martin and Warren Martin are parties only to the motion filed in Crawford Smith v. City of Bakersfield, No. 1:18-cv-01526-DAD-JLT. 28 1 successors in interest, of decedent Augustus Joshua Crawford and assert similar claims related to 2 his alleged wrongful death. In the Crawford Smith action, plaintiff Ingrid Crawford Smith alleges 3 that she is the parent of decedent Crawford and that plaintiff A.C. is a child of decedent 4 (Crawford Smith, Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 4), and in the A.J.C. action, plaintiff A.J.C. alleges that she is 5 also a child of decedent Crawford (A.J.C., Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 4). 6 A. The Crawford Smith Action 7 The following allegations of the complaint are taken as true for the purposes of resolving 8 the pending motion. On November 4, 2017, decedent Augustus Joshua Crawford was killed in an 9 officer-involved shooting near the 1800 block of Planz Road in Bakersfield, California. 10 (Crawford Smith, Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 14.) On that day, Bakersfield Police Officers initiated a traffic 11 stop of a vehicle in which decedent Crawford was a passenger. (Id. at ¶ 15–16.) The driver 12 stopped the vehicle, and decedent Crawford exited and began running away from the officers. 13 (Id.) While decedent Crawford was running, the officers shot decedent in the back multiple 14 times. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Decedent Crawford was fatally wounded, and his cause of death was 15 ultimately determined to be as a result of multiple gunshot wounds. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Defendant 16 Bakersfield Police Officer Warren Martin was later identified as one of the officers involved in 17 the shooting. (Id. at ¶ 16.) 18 Plaintiffs assert that decedent Crawford was not armed, “made no aggressive movements, 19 no furtive gestures, and no physical movements which would suggest to a reasonable officer that 20 he had the will or the ability to inflict substantial bodily harm against any individual,” and further 21 that he posed no threat to officers or the public. (Id. at ¶¶ 17–19.) At the time, decedent Crawford 22 was twenty years old, unmarried, and had children. (Id. at 2.) 23 Based on the foregoing, the Crawford Smith plaintiffs bring four claims against 24 defendants2 City of Bakersfield, Bakersfield Police Department, Chief of Bakersfield Police Lyle 25 Martin, Officer Warren Martin, and additional, as-yet-unidentified Doe officer defendants 26 allegedly involved in the shooting for the following: (1) wrongful death; (2) excessive force in 27 2 On November 13, 2019, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of County of Kern, which was 28 previously a named defendant in the Crawford Smith action. (Doc. No. 62.) 1 violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 wherein plaintiffs also allege a municipal liability claim brought 2 pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); (3) violation of 3 California Civil Code § 43, 52.1 and California Constitution, Article 1, §13; and (4) assault and 4 battery, which was brought solely against defendant Officer Warren Martin and the Doe 5 defendants. 6 B. The A.J.C. Action 7 In her complaint plaintiff A.J.C. pleads nearly identical factual allegations as those 8 alleged in the Crawford Smith complaint. (Compare Crawford Smith, Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 14–21 9 with A.J.C., Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶13–20.) Plaintiff A.J.C. asserts three claims against defendants City 10 of Bakersfield, Bakersfield Police Department, and additional, as-yet-unidentified Doe officer 11 defendants allegedly involved in the shooting for the following: (1) wrongful death; (2) excessive 12 force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 wherein plaintiff also alleges a municipal liability Monell 13 claim; and (3) assault and battery, brought solely against the Doe officer defendants. 14 C. Defendants’ Motions 15 Defendants’ motion in Crawford Smith seeks dismissal on the grounds that: (1) because 16 City of Bakersfield has been sued, the Bakersfield Police Department and Chief Lyle Martin 17 should be dismissed as redundant defendants; (2) Chief Martin and Warren Martin are improperly 18 sued in their official and individual capacities; (3) plaintiffs cannot premise their wrongful death 19 claim on allegedly negligent hiring, training, and/or supervision, to the extent they are attempting 20 to do so; (4) plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action fails because there is no private right of action 21 under Article 1, section 13 of the California Constitution; and (5) plaintiffs’ Third Cause of 22 Action also fails because it is impermissible to allege a derivative claim under California Civil 23 Code § 52.1. 24 Defendants’ motion in A.J.C. seeks dismissal on the sole ground that to the extent the 25 plaintiff’s wrongful death claim includes a theory related to negligent hiring, training, and 26 supervision, the claim fails because municipalities cannot be held directly liable as to such a 27 claim absent a special relationship. (Doc. No. 9-1 at 2–5.) 28 The court will address each of these claims in turn below. 1 LEGAL STANDARD 2 The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal 3 sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 4 1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 5 sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 6 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to 7 relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A 8 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 9 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 10 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 11 In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the 12 court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light 13 most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. 14 United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). It is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff 15 “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways 16 that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of 17 Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 18 In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court is permitted 19 to consider material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint, documents that are not 20 physically attached to the complaint if their authenticity is not contested and the plaintiff’s 21 complaint necessarily relies on them, and matters of public record. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 22 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001). 23 ANALYSIS 24 A. Motion to Dismiss in the Crawford Smith Action 25 1. Whether defendants Bakersfield Police Department and Chief Lyle Martin should be dismissed as redundant 26 27 In their motion, defendants argue that this court should dismiss the Bakersfield Police 28 Department and Chief Lyle Martin as redundant defendants because plaintiffs have named the 1 City of Bakersfield as a defendant. (Doc. No. 16-1 at 3–4.) Defendants contend that defendant 2 Chief Martin should be entirely dismissed from this action because “[he] had no direct 3 involvement in any incident involving Plaintiffs’ Decedent and Plaintiffs have not alleged any 4 facts or circumstances from which the Court could find Chief Martin directly liable for any 5 damage sought by Plaintiffs.” (Id. at 4–5.) Defendants additionally argue that defendant 6 Bakersfield Police Department must be dismissed because it is not considered a “person” within 7 the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 4.) 8 In their response, plaintiffs seem to suggest both that dismissal for redundancy is optional 9 because the case law uses the word “may” and, separately, that defendants ignore case law 10 holding it is improper to dismiss a municipal officer who is also sued in his individual capacity. 11 (Doc. No. 27 at 5–7.) Plaintiffs further argue that the complaint sufficiently alleges a claim 12 against defendant Chief Martin because they have alleged he directed and ratified the shooting 13 and killing of decedent Crawford, in violation of decedent’s civil rights. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiffs do 14 not address whether defendant Bakersfield Police Department should be dismissed. 15 Lawsuits brought against a government official in an individual capacity “seek to impose 16 personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law.” 17 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). However, a suit against a government official in 18 his official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the local government entity. Ctr. for Bio- 19 Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 799 (9th Cir. 2008). The 20 Ninth Circuit has found that when both a government official and his local government entity are 21 named, “and the officer is named only in an official capacity, the court may dismiss the officer as 22 a redundant defendant.” (Id.); see also Autotek Inc. v. Cnty. of Sacramento, No. 2:16-cv-01093- 23 KJM-CKD, 2017 WL 3149923, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2017); Rivas v. Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., 24 619 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 25 In this action, plaintiffs bring claims against Chief Lyle Martin in both his individual and 26 official capacity (Doc. No. 16-1 at 5) as well as claims against the Bakersfield Police Department. 27 Plaintiffs here do not dispute that defendant Bakersfield Police Department should be dismissed 28 and have objected only to a full dismissal of Chief Martin as a defendant. (Doc. No. 27 at 5–7.) 1 The court concludes that the claims against defendants Bakersfield Police Department and 2 Chief Lyle Martin, in his official capacity, are redundant and should be dismissed. At the 3 pleading stage, the court is to construe the allegations of the complaint as true and in the light 4 most favorable to plaintiff. See Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73. Even so, here the court finds that 5 plaintiff has not adequately alleged a claim against defendant Chief Lyle Martin in his individual 6 capacity. Plaintiffs’ allegations related to defendant Chief Martin’s conduct are merely 7 conclusory recitations of the elements of the claims3 and fail to support any claim against him in 8 his individual capacity. However, plaintiffs will be granted leave to amend only as to their claims 9 brought against defendant Chief Martin in his individual capacity, in order to attempt to cure the 10 deficiency noted above, should they desire to do so in good faith. 11 2. Whether defendants Chief Lyle Martin and Officer Warren Martin are improperly sued in their official and individual capacities 12 13 Defendants argue that plaintiffs have wrongfully sued defendants Chief Martin and 14 Officer Warren Martin in both their official and individual capacities. (Doc. No. 16-1 at 5.) 15 Defendants assert that generally when a plaintiff seeks damages against an individual officer, the 16 suit is against the officer in his individual capacity, and it is only in the event an injunction is 17 sought that an officer should be sued in his official capacity. (Id.) Thus, they argue that any

18 3 For example, while the complaint alleges defendant Chief Martin directed and ratified the 19 shooting and killing of decedent Crawford, in violation of decedent’s civil rights (Doc. No. 27 at 6), it fails to allege what he specifically did to direct or ratify defendant Warren Martin’s actions. 20 “[A] local government may be held liable under § 1983 when the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority or such an official ratified a 21 subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Lucas v. Cnty. of Fresno, No. 1:18-cv-01488-DAD-EPG, 2019 WL 7370418, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2019)(citing 22 Clouthier v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 591 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010), 591 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th 23 Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016)). The required ratification can be shown by a superior officer’s decision to exculpate 24 alleged misconduct based on the findings of a noticeably flawed investigation. Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 647 (9th Cir. 1991). However, a policymaker’s “knowledge of an 25 unconstitutional act does not, by itself, constitute ratification.” Weisbuch v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 119 F.3d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1997). Moreover, “a policymaker’s mere refusal to overrule a 26 subordinate’s completed act does not constitute approval.” Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 27 (9th Cir. 1999). Rather, “[t]he policymaker must have knowledge of the constitutional violation and must make a ‘conscious, affirmative choice’ to ratify the conduct at issue.” Garcia v. City of 28 Imperial, No. 08CV2357 BTM(PCL), 2010 WL 3911457, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2010). 1 claims against either defendant Chief Lyle Martin or defendant Officer Warren Martin should be 2 brought against them only in their individual capacities alone. (Id. at 6.) 3 Plaintiffs argue that it is unclear from defendants’ briefing whether they seek dismissal of 4 defendants Chief Martin and Officer Warren Martin in their individual or official capacities but, 5 in any event, that neither the claims against defendant Chief Lyle Martin nor defendant Officer 6 Warren Martin in their individual capacities should be dismissed. (Doc. No. 27 at 6, 6 nn.1–2.) 7 As outlined above, plaintiffs’ claims against defendant Chief Lyle Martin will be 8 dismissed with leave to amend only as to claims brought against him in his individual capacity. 9 For the same reasons, the court concludes that plaintiffs’ claims brought against defendant 10 Warren Martin in his official capacity are duplicative of those brought against the City of 11 Bakersfield. While somewhat unclear, defendants do not appear to challenge the sufficiency of 12 plaintiffs’ claims brought against defendant Officer Warren Martin in his individual capacity. In 13 any case, the court finds plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged claims against defendant Officer 14 Warren Martin in his individual capacity by alleging that he was responsible for the shooting and 15 killing of decedent Crawford, in violation of decedent’s civil rights. 16 In summary, the claims brought against defendant Officer Warren Martin in his official 17 capacity are found by the court to be redundant of the claims brought against defendant City of 18 Bakersfield and will be dismissed. However, the claims brought against him in his individual 19 capacity are sufficiently alleged and will not be dismissed. 20 3. Whether plaintiffs may plead a wrongful death claim based on allegedly negligent hiring, training, and/or supervision 21 22 Defendants next ask this court to dismiss the portion of plaintiffs’ wrongful death claims 23 brought against the defendants City of Bakersfield, the Bakersfield Police Department, and Chief 24 Lyle Martin based on alleged negligent hiring, training and/or supervision of officers, to the 25 extent such a claim has been brought. (Doc. No. 16-1 at 6.) Defendants argue municipalities may 26 not be held liable for alleged negligent training hiring, and/or supervision of police officers 27 because there is neither a statutory basis under California law to hold an entity directly liable for 28 negligence, nor may they be held so under a vicarious liability theory because there is no special 1 relationship with the plaintiffs creating a duty “to protect plaintiff from injuries at the hands of 2 others . . ..” (Id. at 7–8.) 3 Plaintiffs respond that they do not seek to hold the municipalities directly liable for 4 negligent training, hiring, and/or supervision of officers because they agree there is no statutory 5 basis upon which to do so. (Doc. No. 27 at 7.) Rather, plaintiffs clarify they do wish to hold 6 defendants City of Bakersfield and Bakersfield Police Department vicariously liable under 7 provisions of California law providing for respondeat superior liability of public entities and that 8 pursuant to those provisions their claims are not subject to dismissal. 9 Because the court has already concluded that defendants Bakersfield Police Department 10 and Chief Lyle Martin in his official capacity should be dismissed from this action, the court will 11 analyze this issue only as to defendant City of Bakersfield. Under California law and pursuant to 12 the doctrine of respondeat superior, public entities, such as municipalities, may be held 13 vicariously liable for torts committed by their employees that arise within the scope of 14 employment, unless the employee is immune from liability. Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2; Robinson 15 v. Solano Cnty., 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002) (“California . . . imposes liability on 16 counties under the doctrine of respondeat superior for acts of county employees; it 17 grants immunity to counties only where the public employee would also be immune.”) (citing 18 Scott v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. App. 4th 125, 139–40 (1994)); see also Mary M. v. City of 19 Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 3d 202, 208 (1991) (“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an 20 employer may be held vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee within the scope of 21 employment.”) 22 Defendants have not argued they are entitled to immunity as to this claim, and California 23 law is clear that officers are not entitled to immunity when they use unreasonable force in 24 effecting an arrest, as plaintiffs have alleged here. See Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1016 (“California 25 denies immunity to police officers who use excessive force in arresting a suspect.”); Burns v. City 26 of Redwood City, 737 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“These [immunity] provisions 27 plainly do not apply, however, to officers who use unreasonable force in effecting an arrest.”); 28 Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d 202, 215 (“[A] governmental entity can be held vicariously liable when a 1 police officer acting in the course and scope of employment uses excessive force or engages in 2 assaultive conduct.”); Scruggs v. Haynes, 252 Cal. App. 2d 256, 264 (1967) (“California cases 3 have consistently held that a peace officer making an arrest is liable to the person arrested for 4 using unreasonable force.”). 5 At this stage of the litigation, the court must draw all reasonable inferences from the facts 6 alleged in favor of the plaintiffs. Here, the facts as alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint, if proven, 7 would not establish that defendants are entitled to immunity. Accordingly, defendant City of 8 Bakersfield’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim based on alleged negligent 9 hiring, training and/or supervision of officers, will be denied. 10 4. Plaintiffs’ Claim under Cal. Const., Article 1, Section 13 11 Defendants next argue that plaintiffs’ claim brought under Article 1, Section 13 of the 12 California Constitution fails as a matter of law because there is no private right of action available 13 under that provision. (Doc. No. 16-1 at 8.) Plaintiffs concede that this section of the California 14 Constitution does not confer a private right of action for damages and they have withdrawn any 15 claim for violation of Section 13, requesting that the mention of Section 13 be stricken from their 16 third cause of action. (Doc. No. 27 at 8.) However, plaintiffs make clear that they continue to 17 pursue their claims brought under the Bane Act, Section 52.1 of the California Civil Code. (Id.) 18 In light of plaintiffs’ voluntary withdrawal of this claim, defendants’ motion to dismiss it 19 will be denied as moot.4 20 5. Crawford Smith Plaintiffs’ Claim under Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 21 Finally, defendants argue that to the extent plaintiffs allege a derivative claim under the 22 Bane Act this claim fails as a matter of law because only a survival claim is permissible. (Doc. 23

24 4 The court notes that plaintiffs’ third cause of action is premised an alleged violation of the Bane Act, stemming from an alleged violation of Article 1, Section 13 of the California Constitution. 25 Section 13 provides “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a warrant may not 26 issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place 27 to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.” Cal. Const. art. I, § 13. The Bane Act requires plaintiffs to specify a constitutional violation in order to state a claim for liability under 28 the act. Johnson v. Shasta Cnty., 83 F. Supp. 3d 918, 935 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (citing cases.) 1 No. 16-1 at 8–9.) 2 Plaintiffs respond that their complaint specifically alleges that this claim is only brought 3 as a survival claim, and not as a derivative claim, citing the portion of their complaint alleging 4 “[this] cause of action is brought on behalf of decedent AUGUSTUS CRAWFORD by and 5 through his successors in interest, Plaintiffs . . ..” (Doc. No. 27 at 8–9) (citing Crawford Smith, 6 Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 53.) Plaintiffs further clarify that “[they] do not and did not intend in the filing of 7 their Complaint . . . to allege a Bane Act claim for violation of their own rights.” (Doc. No. 27 8 at 9.) 9 The court finds that, as clarified in their opposition to the pending motion, plaintiffs have 10 alleged only a survival claim under the Bane Act, and thus, defendants’ motion to dismiss any 11 derivative claim brought under the Bane Act will be denied. 12 B. A.J.C. Motion 13 1. Whether municipalities may be held directly liable for negligent training, hiring, and/or supervision 14 15 As discussed above, defendants City of Bakersfield and Bakersfield Police Department’s 16 seek dismissal of plaintiff’s wrongful death claim to the extent that claim includes a claim of 17 negligent hiring, training, and supervision against them under a vicarious liability theory. (A.J.C., 18 Doc. No. 9-1 at 1–2.) Defendants argue in this regard that a municipality cannot be held directly 19 liable as to such a claim absent a special relationship. (Id.) 20 In a statement of non-opposition to the granting of this motion, plaintiff A.J.C. notes that 21 allegations regarding the negligent hiring, training, or supervision by defendants appears solely in 22 paragraph 29 of plaintiff’s complaint, and that plaintiff is not opposed to that line of the complaint 23 being stricken. (Raymond, Doc. No. 70 at 2.) 24 Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted. 25 CONCLUSION 26 For the reasons stated above: 27 1. Defendants’ motion for partial dismissal (Doc. No. 16) filed in Crawford Smith v. City 28 of Bakersfield, No. 1:18-cv-01526-DAD-JLT is granted in part: 1 i. Defendant Bakersfield Police Department is dismissed; 2 ii. Claims brought against defendants Chief Lyle Martin and Warren 3 Martin in their official capacity are dismissed; 4 ili. Claims brought against defendant Chief Lyle Martin in his individual 5 capacity is dismissed with leave to amend; and 6 2. Defendants’ motion for partial dismissal (Doc. No. 16) filed in Crawford Smith v. City 7 of Bakersfield, No. 1:18-cv-01526-DAD-JLT is denied in all other respects. 8 3. Defendants’ motion for partial dismissal (Doc. No. 9) filed in A.J.C. v. City of 9 Bakersfield, No. 1:19-cv-01302-DAD-JLT is granted; 10 4. The member cases, Crawford Smith v. City of Bakersfield, No. 1:18-cv-01526-DAD- 11 JLT, and A.J.C. v. City of Bakersfield, No. 1:19-cv-01302-DAD-JLT, are to remain 12 administratively closed while the consolidated action proceeds as Raymond v. Martin, 13 No. 1:18-cv-00307-DAD-JLT; 14 5. Plaintiffs are directed to file any amended complaint authorized by this order, if any, 15 no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this order; 16 6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to administratively close the motions pending in the 17 Crawford Smith v. City of Bakersfield, No. 1:18-cv-01526-DAD-JLT and □□□□□ v. 18 City of Bakersfield, No. 1:19-cv-01302-DAD-JLT actions. 19 | IT IS SO ORDERED. me □ | Dated: _-Mareh 31, 2021 Vila A Drag 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12