Smith v. Lore

29 S.W.2d 91, 325 Mo. 282, 1930 Mo. LEXIS 610
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedJune 3, 1930
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 29 S.W.2d 91 (Smith v. Lore) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Lore, 29 S.W.2d 91, 325 Mo. 282, 1930 Mo. LEXIS 610 (Mo. 1930).

Opinions

The petition is to determine title and for partition of a lot in Kirksville, Adair County, 160 acres of farm land in Knox County and 360 acres of farm land in Scotland County. The plaintiffs are the heirs of Julia Lore, deceased, being her brother, three sisters, and three sets of nephews and nieces who are children of three deceased brothers. The defendant, Edna Lore, is the widow of Madison Lore, or "M" as he is called in the record, only child of the said Julia Lore. He predeceased her, intestate, in November, 1918, leaving no lineal descendants. His father had died theretofore, so his mother, Julia, was his sole heir under Section 332, Revised Statutes 1909, subject to the dower rights of the defendant Edna; and when Julia thereafter died in January, 1926, her collateral kin, aforesaid, became her heirs.

M. Lore died owning the lot in Kirksville, the 160 acres in Knox County and 200 acres of land in Scotland County. The remaining 160 acres in that county was owned by him and his mother together, each having an undivided half interest. So the plaintiffs claim all the land above mentioned by inheritance from Julia Lore, but concede to the defendant Edna a dower interest in all of it except the half interest in the Scotland County 160 acres which did not belong to Madison. There was no administration *Page 285 on Madison's estate, and at the time this suit was filed Edna had not elected to take a half interest in his real and personal estate under Sections 321 and 323, Revised Statutes 1919.

The answer of Edna Lore adversely claimed the whole title to all the land involved except the half interest in the 160 acres in Scotland County which Julia had owned. This, it was conceded, belonged to the plaintiffs as heirs of Julia.

The basis of the defendant Edna's claim is this. She alleges that when Madison died he and his mother, Julia, were partners in farming and stock raising on the 520 acres of land which figures in this case, and about 280 acres of other land not involved herein which belonged to Julia alone. It is Edna's pleaded contention that upon the death of her husband, Madison, she was preparing to return to her parental home, when Julia proposed to her that if she would remain and continue the aforesaid partnership arrangement, she (Julia) would give her (Edna) all the real and personal property Madison owned when he died. In other words, Edna was to step into Madison's shoes and have the same interest in the partnership and the land used by the partnership and the Kirksville lot that he had owned.

The answer charges that the foregoing contract was fully carried out by both parties up to the death of Julia, except that Julia, through neglect or oversight, failed to convey Madison's land to Edna by deed or will; and it is therefore prayed that the agreement be specifically enforced against Julia's heirs, the plaintiffs. As to the 160 acres of land in Scotland County in which Madison had only an undivided half interest, and in which the plaintiffs inherited the other half interest, the answer joins in praying partition of that tract — but in accordance with Edna's alleged rights under her contract. A further claim was made in the answer that Madison advanced $1200 of the purchase price of Julia's half interest in this 160 acres, and a lien against the same was prayed accordingly; but that claim was not sustained by proof and was abandoned, we may say, so we shall not refer to it again.

By their reply the plaintiffs denied the contract set up in the answer, and pleaded the Statute of Frauds. The court found the issues for the plaintiffs and adjudged Edna Lore's only interest to be a dower with a right to elect to take a one-half share in fee in lieu of dower, under the statutes. Subject to this dower right the title was decreed in the plaintiffs and partition was ordered in accordance with their interests as heirs of Julia. This decree was entered on December 31, 1926, and by the terms thereof the defendant Edna was required to exercise her option to take election dower by February 21, 1927. Under coercion of this order she did elect to take a half interest in fee within the time fixed, and the court thereupon made a further order appointing commissioners *Page 286 to set out the dower interest and partition the remainder. From this interlocutory decree the defendant Edna has appealed.

As the case is submitted here, practically the only question for decision is whether the oral contract pleaded and relied on by the appellant Edna Lore was sufficiently established by the evidence. Indeed we may go further and say there is no controversy about the fact that Julia Lore, deceased, and Edna Lore did enter into some contract whereby the partnership arrangement theretofore existing between Julia and Madison was continued after Madison's death with Edna as his successor in the enterprise. Under the contract she succeeded to his interest in the partnership personalty — there is no doubt about that. The only question is whether she got, as well, the real estate he owned.

The fact is abundantly established that when Madison died the partnership owed notes at the bank amounting to over $7,000. There was sufficient livestock on hand, mostly cattle, to meet this indebtedness, and it was later paid off, but it took hard work on the farm to do it and to keep the business going. The record shows without contradiction that for seven or eight years between 1918 and 1926 Edna, and Julia too, for that matter, toiled like a slave. She waded in the mud in gum boots feeding hogs and cattle. The evidence is that she assisted in dehorning cattle; treating steers that had been dehorned; put caustic medicine on steers that had the lump jaw; mended harness; and on one occasion pulled, or attempted to pull, a cow out of the mud with wagon and team.

So, with clear and satisfying proof that there was some kind of a partnership contract between Julia and Edna which was fully performed by Edna, under which she got Madison's personalty, we shall examine the evidence with a view to ascertaining what the terms of the contract were, and whether it entitled her to Madison's real estate also. The plaintiffs did not put on any evidence to disprove the contract. They contend simply that the showing made by the appellant Edna was insufficient. Edna was incompetent as a witness on the main questions at issue, under Section 5410, Revised Statutes 1919, because Julia, the other party to the alleged contract was dead. She was used only to identify certain partnership book accounts.

II. T. Drake was county assessor in 1919. He assessed the property of Julia and Edna Lore. Julia told him they were carrying on the partnership just the same as it had been and that Edna was taking Madison's share. His property belonged to her. Madison had died in November, 1918, not long theretofore. The witness was asked if he assessed their land and ascertained whether there was any change in ownership. His answer was in the affirmative, and the inference is that he meant to say Edna was getting Madison's land as well as his personal property, though *Page 287 the witness's testimony on this point is not as clear as it might be.

George W. Rudy assessed the partnership in 1920. The two women told him they were partners and made out a partnership list. The testimony of this witness does not disclose whether the real estate in controversy was expressly mentioned in this conversation, but tax receipts introduced in evidence showing the taxes on the land paid in 1921, 1922 and 1925 were assessed to Julia and Edna jointly and were paid by the partnership.

Charles Shumate was Deputy U.S. Internal Revenue Collector in 1919. He called on the two Lore women to check over a return made for the year 1918.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
29 S.W.2d 91, 325 Mo. 282, 1930 Mo. LEXIS 610, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-lore-mo-1930.