Smith v. Knowlton

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 9, 2025
• Docket: 24-3208
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 9 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LAWRENCE CHRISTOPHER SMITH, No. 24-3208 D.C. No. 1:18-cv-00851-JLT-BAM Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

D. KNOWLTON, California Correctional Institution at Tehachapi,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Jennifer L. Thurston, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 19, 2025**

Before: SILVERMAN, HURWITZ, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Lawrence Christopher Smith appeals pro se from

the district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force. We have

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Williams v. Paramo,

775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Smith failed

to exhaust his administrative remedies or raise a genuine dispute of material fact as

to whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. See Ross

v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642-44 (2016) (explaining that an inmate must exhaust

such administrative remedies as are available before bringing suit and describing

limited circumstances under which administrative remedies are effectively

unavailable); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (proper exhaustion requires

“using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency

addresses the issues on the merits)” (emphasis, citation, and internal quotation

marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Smith’s motions for

sanctions because Smith failed to establish any basis for the requested sanctions.

See Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003)

(setting forth standard of review).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Smith’s motion for

reconsideration because Smith failed to set forth any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist.

No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.

2 24-3208 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration).

We reject as unsupported by the record Smith’s contention that the district

court was biased against him.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Smith’s motion “to be excused from brief standards” (Docket Entry No. 27)

is granted. All other pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

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