Smith v. Kijakazi

District Court, E.D. Missouri·Decided June 29, 2023·No. 4:22-cv-00172·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

HAZEL S., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 4: 22 CV 172 JMB ) KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM This action is before the court for judicial review of the final decision of the defendant Commissioner of Social Security denying the application of plaintiff Hazel M. Smith for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, 1381-1385. The parties have consented to the exercise of plenary authority by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons set forth below, the final decision of the Commissioner is reversed and remanded.

I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff was born in 1976. She alleged an October 7, 2019 disability onset date when she was 43 years old. She filed her applications on October 7, 2019, alleging disability due to lupus, rheumatoid arthritis, and osteoarthritis. (Tr. 170-78.) Her applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, and she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Tr. 102-06, 110.) On November 24, 2020, following a hearing, an ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (Tr. 11-20.) The Appeals Council denied review. (Tr. 1-5.) Thus, the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. II. ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD The Court adopts the parties’ facts as set forth in their supporting briefs. (Docs. 21- 22.) These facts, taken together, present a fair and accurate summary of the medical record and testimony at the evidentiary hearing. The Court will discuss specific facts in detail where relevant to this appeal. III. DECISION OF THE ALJ On November 24, 2020, following a hearing, an ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. At step one of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 7, 2019, her alleged onset date. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments that included degenerative joint disease, rheumatoid arthritis, Raynaud’s disease, sacroiliac joint dysfunction and bursitis of the left hip, osteoarthritis of the feet, and obesity. (Tr. 13.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in or medically equal to one contained in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1. (Tr. 14.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform “sedentary” work as defined under the regulations. She was also limited to “frequent operation of hand controls bilaterally; frequent handling and fingering bilaterally; occasional climbing of ramps and stairs; never climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequent balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; and no concentrated exposure to extreme cold or extreme heat.” (Tr. 15.) At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work (PRW). Relying on vocational expert testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments would not preclude her from performing work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, including work as a document specialist, addresser, and nut sorter. (Tr. 19-20.) Consequently, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (Tr. 20.)

- 2 - IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court’s role on judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision is to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings applied the relevant legal standards to facts that are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Pate-Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 942 (8th Cir. 2009). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Id. In determining whether the evidence is substantial, the court considers evidence that both supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s decision. Id. As long as substantial evidence supports the decision, the Court may not reverse it merely because substantial evidence exists in the record that would support a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2002). To be entitled to disability benefits, a claimant must prove she is unable to perform any substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that would either result in death or which has lasted or could be expected to last for at least twelve continuous months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D), (d)(1)(A); Pate-Fires, 564 F.3d at 942. A five-step regulatory framework is used to determine whether an individual is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987) (describing five-step process). Steps one through three require the claimant to prove: (1) she is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) she suffers from a severe impairment; and (3) her condition meets or equals a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(iii). If the claimant does not suffer from a listed impairment or its equivalent, the Commissioner’s analysis proceeds to steps four and five. Step four requires the Commissioner to consider whether the claimant retains the RFC to perform PRW. Id.; § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). The claimant bears the burden of demonstrating she is no longer able to return to her PRW. Pate-Fires, 564 F.3d at 942. If the Commissioner determines the claimant cannot return - 3 - to her PRW, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show the claimant retains the RFC to perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). V. DISCUSSION Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in failing to properly evaluate the medical opinions of treating rheumatologist Joshy Pathiparampil, M.D., and medical consultants Richard Tipton, M.D., and Kevin Threlkeld, M.D. She also argues the ALJ erred in evaluating her credibility. This court agrees. 1. Medical Opinion Evidence Plaintiff applied for benefits after March 27, 2017, and therefore the ALJ applied the new set of regulations for evaluating medical evidence. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017) (technical errors corrected by 82 Fed. Reg. 15,132 (Mar. 27, 2017)). The revised regulations redefine how evidence is categorized, including “medical opinion” and “other medical evidence,” and how an ALJ will consider these categories of evidence in making the RFC determination. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a), 404.1520c.

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