Smith v. Kendall

Michigan Supreme Court

Smith v. Kendall

9 Mich. 241, 1861 Mich. LEXIS 22

CourtMichigan Supreme Court

DecidedJuly 11, 1861

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 9 Mich. 241 (Smith v. Kendall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Smith v. Kendall, 9 Mich. 241, 1861 Mich. LEXIS 22 (Mich. 1861).

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Opinions

Manning J.:

The instrument for $793.98, it is argued, is not a promissory note, because it is payable with current exchange on New York. It calls for $793.98, if paid in the city of New York; if paid elsewhere it calls for that amount with such additional sum, called exchange, as will make the amount where paid equivalent to $793.98 in the city of New York.

A promisory note must be for the payment of a certain sum of money. Exchange varies from time to time, and might have been more or less when the $793.98 were to be paid than when the instrument was given. Is this fluctuation, to which exchange is subject, such a contingency or uncertainty as the rule requiring a note to be for a sum certain was intended to guard against? We think not. Bills of exchange and promissory notes are commercial instruments, and to facilitate commerce, are subject to certain rules of law not applicable to other contracts. These rules should be liberally construed, and in such a way as to effect the object had in view. Exchange is an incident to bills for the transmission of money from one place to another. Its nature and effect are well understood in the commercial world; and merchants having occasion to use ^heir funds at their place of business, sometimes make the [243]*243currency at that point the standard of payments made to them by their customers at a different point. Such is the design of the instrument before us; and we believe such instruments are considered by commercial men to be promissory notes. In Pollard v. Herries, 3 B. & P. 335, P. deposited a sum of money with H. in Paris, and took H’s note “payable in Paris, or at the choice of the bearer at the Union Bank in Dover, or at H’s usual residence in London, according to the course of exchange upon Paris.” This instrument was declared on as a promissory note, and spoken of and treated by both counsel and court as a promissory note. It is called a promissory note by the reporter, and treated as such by Mr. Chitty in his treatise on Bills of Exchange, pp. 232, 424. In Leggett v. Jones, 10 Wis. 34, a written promise to pay a sum of money “with exchange on New York,” was held to be promissory note.

There is nothing in the other objection. The note was endorsed by Ely, Brown & McConnell, and every indorsee is the asignee of the endorser. The judgment must be affirmed with costs.

Martin Ch. J., concurred.

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Manning J.:

The instrument for $793.98, it is argued, is not a promissory note, because it is payable with current exchange on New York. It calls for $793.98, if paid in the city of New York; if paid elsewhere it calls for that amount with such additional sum, called exchange, as will make the amount where paid equivalent to $793.98 in the city of New York.

A promisory note must be for the payment of a certain sum of money. Exchange varies from time to time, and might have been more or less when the $793.98 were to be paid than when the instrument was given. Is this fluctuation, to which exchange is subject, such a contingency or uncertainty as the rule requiring a note to be for a sum certain was intended to guard against? We think not. Bills of exchange and promissory notes are commercial instruments, and to facilitate commerce, are subject to certain rules of law not applicable to other contracts. These rules should be liberally construed, and in such a way as to effect the object had in view. Exchange is an incident to bills for the transmission of money from one place to another. Its nature and effect are well understood in the commercial world; and merchants having occasion to use ^heir funds at their place of business, sometimes make the [243]*243currency at that point the standard of payments made to them by their customers at a different point. Such is the design of the instrument before us; and we believe such instruments are considered by commercial men to be promissory notes. In Pollard v. Herries, 3 B. & P. 335, P. deposited a sum of money with H. in Paris, and took H’s note “payable in Paris, or at the choice of the bearer at the Union Bank in Dover, or at H’s usual residence in London, according to the course of exchange upon Paris.” This instrument was declared on as a promissory note, and spoken of and treated by both counsel and court as a promissory note. It is called a promissory note by the reporter, and treated as such by Mr. Chitty in his treatise on Bills of Exchange, pp. 232, 424. In Leggett v. Jones, 10 Wis. 34, a written promise to pay a sum of money “with exchange on New York,” was held to be promissory note.

There is nothing in the other objection. The note was endorsed by Ely, Brown & McConnell, and every indorsee is the asignee of the endorser. The judgment must be affirmed with costs.

Martin Ch. J., concurred.

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Bluebook (online)

9 Mich. 241, 1861 Mich. LEXIS 22, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-kendall-mich-1861.

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