Smith v. Jasper County Lumber Co.

46 S.W.2d 430
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedFebruary 20, 1932
DocketNo. 2192
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 46 S.W.2d 430 (Smith v. Jasper County Lumber Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Jasper County Lumber Co., 46 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Ct. App. 1932).

Opinion

O’QUINN, J.

Defendant in error sued plaintiffs in error in the district court of Jasper county. It alleged that it was a corporation incorporated under the laws of the state of Louisiana with a permit to do business in the state of Texas, and that its principal office and place of business was at Jasper, Jasper county, Tex., and that it was the owner of all the merchantable timber standing, lying, and being upon five-certain tracts of land fully described in its-petition, with the right until October 31, 1937, to enter upon said lands and cut and remove said timber therefrom. It further alleged that plaintiffs in error about December 20, 1930, entered upon said lands and had cut and removed therefrom approximately 15,000' feet of said timber of the value of $10 per thousand feet and had appropriated same to-their own use and benefit, to its damage $150.

It was further alleged that plaintiffs in error were asserting some character of claim to said timber and were threatening to continue cutting and removing same and to appropriate same to their own use and benefit, and had so notified defendant in .error.

It was further alleged that there was standing and growing upon said lands merchantable timber to the amount of 2,000,000 feet, which was the property of defendant in error, and that same was of the reasonable market value of more than $7,500. It was alleged in-this connection that plaintiffs in error were-not financially able to respond in damages for the value of timber cut by -them, and prayed' for a writ of injunction restraining them from cutting or removing any of said timber, and for judgment for the title and possession of said timber and for damages for the timber-cut.

Plaintiffs in error answered by general denial, and specially, as follows:

[431]*431“By way of special answer defendants represent to the court that on the 31st day of October, 1922, they executed and delivered to A. J. Peavy, trustee, a deed to all the merchantable timber then standing, growing and being upon the land described in plaintiffs’ petition, in consideration of the payment of $1.00 and other good and valuable considerations ; that by way of mesne conveyances the Jasper County Lumber Company acquired whatever right and title that was conveyed by defendants by said deed to A. J. Peavy, trustee. That in said deed the following provisions were made:
“ T. It is understood and agreed that the grantee, his successors or assigns, shall have fifteen years from the date hereof in which to cut and remove said timber from said above described tract of land.
“ ‘2. It is further understood and agreed that after the entry upon said land and the cutting and removal of said timber therefrom by the grantee, his successors or assigns, all of the right, title and interest whatsoever of grantee, his successors or assigns, shall revert to grantors, their heirs or assigns, except the right-of-way privileges herein conveyed.
“ ‘3. It is further understood and agreed that when said grantee, his successors or assigns shall have cut over and abandoned said land one time, the timber then remaining thereon shall revert to grantors, their heirs or assigns.’
“Defendants represent to the court that plaintiff, in the exercise of its rights to cut and remove said timber, did go upon said land and cut over the same generally, cutting the various character and kinds of timber therein stipulated in said above mentioned deed prior to the time of the institution of this suit and abandoned said land. That by reason of said entry upon said land and the cutting over of same, and the abandonment of said cutting under the terms of said deed, the timber that was left thereon reverted to grantors, and is now the property of grantors, and was at the time of the institution of this suit, and at the time of the alleged entry upon said land and the cutting of said timber complained of in plaintiffs’ original petition, the property of defendants.
“Defendants represent that by reason of the entry upon said land and the cutting of timber on same, and the abandonment of said cutting, and by reason of the reversionary clause in said deed, plaintiff has no further right in said timber, and the defendants are the sole and exclusive owners thereof.
“Wherefore, defendants pray the court that they go hence with their costs, and that the title to said timber be quieted in defendants, and that they do have and recover of and against plaintiff judgment for title and possession of all timber now standing, growing or being upon the land described in plaintiffs’ petition.”

The case was tried to a jury, and at the conclusion of the evidence both parties filed motion for an instructed verdict. Plaintiffs in error’s motion was refused, and that of defendant in error granted, and the jury returned the following verdict: “We, the jury,' find for the plaintiff for all the timber sued for.” Judgment was entered for defendant in error for the timber and for $14.14 as damages for timber cut. 'The case is before us on writ of error brought by defendants below.

Plaintiffs in error's first and second assignments of error are to the effect that defendant in error, plaintiff below, having alleged that it was a Louisiana corporation with a permit to do business in Texas, with its principal office in Jasper, Jasper county, Tex., it was necessary for it to introduce proof in the manner required by law to show that it had a permit to do business in Texas, and having failed to offer such proof, it had no right to maintain the suit, and the court erred in instructing verdict for it, and in rendering judgment in its favor.

The allegation in defendant in error’s‘petition reads: “Comes now Jasper County Lumber Company, a Louisiana corporation with a permit to do business in Texas, and with its principal office and place of business in Jasper, Jasper County, Texas, hereinafter called plaintiff.” This is all the allegation relating to the character of defendant in error, or its activities. The effect of defendant in error’s petition is set out in the opening statement of this opinion, supra.

The assignments are overruled-There is nothing in the petition to show that the corporation was doing business in Texas in violation of law. Where this is true, that defense cannot be invoked by exception, but must be pleaded. This was not done. Panhandle Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Co., 62 Tex. Civ. App. 402, 132 S. W. 963 (writ refused); Oklahoma Tool & Supply Co. v. Daniels (Tex. Com. App.) 290 S. W. 727. The prohibition stated in article 1536, R. S. 1925, of the right of a foreign corporation to maintain any suit, whether legal or equitable, upon any demand, either arising out of contract or tort, unless at the time, such contract was made, or tort committed, the corporation had filed its articles of incorporation with the secretary of state, does not apply to all foreign corporations, but only to those desiring 'to transact business in this state. Unless the vice in plaintiff’s case appears affirmatively in its petition, the failure to take out a permit is a defense to be pleaded by the defendant, and one, too, which, if not pleaded, is waived. 11 Tex. Jur. §§ 503, 505; Oklahoma Tool & Supply Co. v. Daniels (Tex. Com. App.) 290 S. W. 728; Barcus v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine [432]*432Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 197 S. W. 478; U. O. Colson Co. v. Powell (Tex. Civ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Scarborough v. Calypso Veneer Company
92 S.E.2d 435 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1956)
Jasper County Lumber Co. v. Smith
115 S.W.2d 1191 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1938)
Chester v. American Law Book Co.
102 S.W.2d 501 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1937)
Jasper County Lumber Co. of Texas v. Smith
91 S.W.2d 834 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1936)
Feder v. Texas Bitulithic Co.
82 S.W.2d 724 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1935)
Jenkins v. Parkersburg Rig & Reel Co.
78 S.W.2d 694 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1935)
Smith v. Jasper County Lumber Co.
76 S.W.2d 505 (Texas Supreme Court, 1934)
Smith v. Jasper County Lumber Co.
76 S.W.2d 505 (Texas Commission of Appeals, 1934)
Gholson v. Wickwire Spencer Sales Corp.
66 S.W.2d 814 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1933)
Bevil v. Kirby Lumber Co.
58 S.W.2d 843 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1933)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
46 S.W.2d 430, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-jasper-county-lumber-co-texapp-1932.