Smith v. Harris

128 P. 378, 88 Kan. 226, 1912 Kan. LEXIS 43
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedDecember 7, 1912
DocketNo. 17,616
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 128 P. 378 (Smith v. Harris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Harris, 128 P. 378, 88 Kan. 226, 1912 Kan. LEXIS 43 (kan 1912).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

West, J.:

Smith and Swan, and Harris entered into an arrangement to deal in oil-and-gas leases and properties, and after having operated for some time sold out their accumulations for $108,000 cash and a deferred payment of $81,000, the latter being compromised for $45,000. Afterwards Smith sued Harris to recover on a note of $3000, and Swan sued to recover on a note of $2000. Harris answered, alleging that Smith and Swan owed him about $17,000 on account of their former mutual dealings, that he was entitled to a half interest, that he had assigned a portion of his claim to his wife, Minnie Harris, and asking that [227]*227the eases be tried together. Minnie Harris was made a party and the cases were consolidated, the reply asserting that Harris’ interest was one-third instead of one-half.' Smith offered to confess judgment for $2415.52 and afterwards Smith and Swan offered to confess judgment for $4000. A referee was appointed, who, after a trial of great length, decided that Harris owned a third interest, and that Smith and Swan should pay the costs. In an additional report the ques-. tion whether the costs should be thus decreed or divided equally among the three on the theory that the action was one for an equitable accounting was suggested. The original report was approved by the court and judgment rendered accordingly, from which the defendants, Harris and wife, appeal. A fourth party named Compton was taken into the .transaction and afterwards his interest was purchased by Smith, and one of the contentions of Harris was that the purchase inured to his individual benefit; the referee, however, found that the Compton interest was purchased for the mutual benefit of Smith, Harris and Swan. The chief controversy was over the question whether Harris had a half or third interest, but the referee, after receiving a great mass of testimony on the question, decided that the interest was one-third. The plaintiff’s main contentions are that Harris should be decreed to own one-half, that when the sale of the property was made certain parcels were the' individual property of Harris and not of the three jointly, and that a bonus of $1652.40 paid to a certain window-glass company should be disallowed as a charge for which Harris was not in any degree responsible, and that a larger sum should .be allowed as interest.

Counsel asserts that there is no finding and no evidence supporting the one-third interest theory, and that the third conclusion of law, that Harris should be credited personally with one-third of the net profits as [228]*228shown on the Smith, Swan and Harris account, is erroneous and without foundation. The eighth finding of fact was in substance that in May or June, 1904, Harris agreed with Compton that any leases thereafter taken by them should be turned into the Smith, Swan and Harris gas deal, Compton to have one-i'ourth interest in such leases, Harris one-fourth and Smith and Swan the other half. The ninth finding is in. substance that shortly thereafter Smith was informed of this arrangement and no objections were made, and from thence leases were taken in the names of the different parties but owned by the four jointly until the sale of the Compton interest. The fiftieth finding is that the Compton interest was purchased by Smith for the benefit of himself, Swan and Harris. Finding No. 277 is that the Smith, Swan and Harris account showed on May 11, 1908, certain net proceeds and profits and that the third interest of C. C. Harris in such profits, less the amounts paid, left a balance due him of a certain named amount. It is true that these findings were none too definite and specific as to the one-third interest matter, but one of the numerous abstracts shows that Harris testified that he never made a claim of a one-half interest until December, 1907, and Smith testified that Harris never demanded a half interest until this action was begun, and in fact never máde a claim for more than a third, while Swan testified that Harris agreed to a third and never before the beginning of this action claimed a half. Smith also testified that he had many conversations with Harris during 1904 and 1905, and that the latter repeatedly mentioned his interest and on August 18,1904, he had a fourth interest, that such was their agreement, that he had several conversations with him after Compton sold out, one in particular when Harris “said that he would take one-third with us—that was our interest in the partnership funds. Harris did not say anything [229]*229only he had a third.” It is said that the first 732 pages of the transcript, about one-third, are devoted to the question concerning whether the interest of Harris was one-half or one-third. And in view of the findings and testimony already indicated we are not able to say that the report which was approved by the trial court should in this respect be set aside.

It is insisted that the individual leases owned by Harris at the time of the sale did not become partnership property and that the proceeds arising from them should go to Harris individually; that there is neither finding nor evidence to the contrary. Supplemental finding No. 5 is to the effect that when the leases and pipe lines were sold on March 15, 1905, the individual leases theretofore mentioned in the report were turned in with the other leases and sold under the contract, being the interest in the Johnson, Myers, Dow, Red-dins, Frost and Read leases; that it was agreed between Smith, Harris and Swan that they should be sold together with the leases owned by them jointly, and the proceeds divided and owned in the same proportion and treated as though received for leases owned by them jointly. Smith testified that they enumerated the leases that were turned in, that were already owned outside or taken outside of the partnership arrangement but turned in by mutual consent an,d agreement, that Compton and Harris said they would turn theirs in and each have one quarter. Harris testified that these individual leases, by common consent and general understanding, were to be a part of the gas property when built up. All that can be clearly ascertained from the bits pf evidence found in the various abstracts is that this, like the question of the interest owned by Harris, was disputed; that there was conflicting evidence; that the referee took the view that the individual leases' went into the partnership interest; and that the trial court adopted the same view.

[230]*230A charge of $1652.40 for bonus paid to a certain window-glass company was deemed by the referee to be a partnership charge, for one-third of which Harris should be held responsible. Finding No. 284 is to the effect that it was agreed between Smith, Harris and Swan that the claim for bonus made by the window-glass company should be paid and the matter settled. Finding No. 285 is that in accordance with this agreement Smith paid the amount. Swan testified that he' discussed the bonus proposition with Harris when it was asked for and that Smith discussed it with both Harris and Swan. He further testified:

“After fully discussing it, we all agreed that it would be the proper arrangement to make to agree to give the bonus of $4,000.00 worth of gas. There was a hitch afterwards as to how it should be paid. I remember the time when this $1,652.41 was paid. I brought the parties together. I went down to The Western Window Glass Company’s plant and had the officers accompany me up to our office at the time the payment was made. ... It was agreed that it should be paid and Harris agreed to it.”

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
128 P. 378, 88 Kan. 226, 1912 Kan. LEXIS 43, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-harris-kan-1912.