SMITH v. FOSTER

District Court, S.D. Indiana·Decided September 25, 2023·No. 1:22-cv-00404·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

KEVIN E. SMITH, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 1:22-cv-00404-JRS-CSW ) FOSTER, ) MARTIN, ) BENNETT, ) HYATT,1 ) ) Defendants. )

Order Granting Summary Judgment on Exhaustion in favor of Certain Defendants

Plaintiff Kevin Smith, an Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) inmate, filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on allegations of activity that occurred while he was at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (Wabash Valley) between March and July 2019. Dkt. 16. Defendant IDOC Officers—Martin, Bennett, and Hyatt—now seek partial summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claims alleged against them, on the basis that Mr. Smith failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this lawsuit as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).2 For the reasons explained below, the defendants' partial motion for summary judgment, dkt. [28], is GRANTED, such that the Eighth Amendment claims against Martin, Bennett, and Hyatt are DISMISSED without prejudice.

1 Lt. Hyatt's last name also appears as "Hiatt" throughout the record. Dkt. 28 at 1. The Court uses the spelling "Hyatt" because that is the spelling used in the caption.

2 Additionally, an Eighth Amendment claim proceeds against defendant IDOC Officer Foster based on Mr. Smith's allegations that Officer Foster impeded his access to pain medication and medical treatment. Dkt. 16. The IDOC defendants have not pursued exhaustion related to Mr. Smith's claim against Officer Foster. See dkt. 28. I. Background In March 2019, Mr. Smith underwent surgical repair of his right elbow and required ongoing medical care for his condition while at Wabash Valley. Dkt. 2 at 6. On April 23, 2019, Officer Foster "created a situation . . . by interfering with medical practice and delivery of his medication" which Mr. Smith alleges caused him to be placed on an approximate 4-month

administrative medical hold on the Custody Control Unit (CCU). Id. at 10. During this hold, Mr. Smith alleges that he was deprived of medical treatment for his arm. Id. Mr. Smith also alleges that while he was on this medical hold, he encountered cruel and unusual punishment when Officers Martin and Bennett and Lt. Hyatt harassed him by banging on his cell door with their keys or fists "in order to antagonize" and startle him. Id. at 11. He alleges that Lt. Hyatt personally participated in this conduct and allowed the staff to continue the abuse, which affected Mr. Smith's mental stability. Id. Mr. Smith states he suffers from both anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. Consistent with the Court's screening order, Eighth Amendment claims "proceed against

Officers Martin and Bennett and Lt. Hyatt for their personal involvement in antagonizing and exacerbating Mr. Smith's mental health conditions by intentionally banging on Mr. Smith's cell while he was placed on a medical hold and did not have access to medical treatment." Dkt. 16 at 5. II. Preliminary Matters Mr. Smith opposed the defendants' summary-judgment motion and filed more than 500 pages of exhibits in support. See dkt. 34 and 34-1.3 The defendants replied. Dkt. 36. In addition,

3 Mr. Smith's filings teem with unrelated grievances against different defendants regarding issues that are not relevant to the claims here. Moreover, Mr. Smith's arguments are convoluted and hard to follow because they muddle unrelated issues with the issues at hand here—whether he exhausted his administrative remedies on the circumstances surrounding his claims against Officers Martin and Bennett and Lt. Hyatt. the Court granted the defendants' unopposed motion to strike Mr. Smith's surreply, dkt. 38, and it has not been considered in resolving the exhaustion issue. See dkt. 52. Accordingly, this matter was fully briefed when the defendants' filed their reply, but Mr. Smith continued to piecemeal additional submissions to the Court in June 2023, by filing an affidavit and a short appendix. Dkt. 42; dkt. 43. These filings, (docket numbers 42, 43, and 43-1) have not been considered by the

Court because Mr. Smith was not given permission to file them. S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1 (setting forth briefing on summary judgment). The clerk is therefore directed to STRIKE Mr. Smith's filings at dockets [42], [43], and [43-1]. III. Legal Standards A. Summary Judgment Summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A "material fact" is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine only if a reasonable jury could find

for the non-moving party. Id. If no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, then there is no "genuine" dispute. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). The Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in the non-movant's favor. Ault v. Speicher, 634 F.3d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 2011). B. Prison Litigation Reform Act On a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he applicable substantive law will dictate which

The Court's analysis focuses only on the arguments and documents relevant to this action. The Court cautions Mr. Smith from this kind of scattershot filing practice. Moreover, the Court need only consider the cited materials and need not "scour the record" for evidence that could be relevant to the summary judgment motion. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). facts are material." Nat'l Soffit & Escutcheons, Inc., v. Superior Sys., Inc., 98 F.3d 262, 265 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The substantive law applicable to this motion for summary judgment is the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which requires that a prisoner exhaust his available administrative remedies before bringing suit concerning prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). "[T]he PLRA's

exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter, 534 U.S. at 532 (citation omitted). "Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81

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