Smith v. City of Medford

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedApril 10, 2025
Docket23-4213
StatusUnpublished

This text of Smith v. City of Medford (Smith v. City of Medford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. City of Medford, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 10 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JERRY SMITH, No. 23-4213 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 1:17-cv-00931-CL v. MEMORANDUM*

CITY OF MEDFORD,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Mark D. Clarke, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 31, 2025** Portland, Oregon

Before: LEE and FORREST, Circuit Judges, and BENCIVENGO, District Judge.*** Plaintiff Jean Smith, personal representative for the estate of Jerry Smith1,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Cathy Ann Bencivengo, United States District Judge for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation. 1 Plaintiff Jerry Smith passed away in August 2022 after the parties filed their cross motions for summary judgment. The district court subsequently granted Plaintiff’s appeals from the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary

judgment, and grant of Defendant City of Medford’s motion for summary judgment,

on the issue of whether the condition of certain sidewalks in Medford violated

Plaintiff’s rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The

district court held that Defendant was entitled to summary judgment because

Plaintiff failed to adequately cite any applicable standards.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s

decision to grant or deny summary judgement de novo. See Branch Banking & Tr.

Co. v. D.M.S.I., LLC, 871 F.3d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

A district court is not required to “examine the entire file for evidence

establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the evidence is not set forth in the []

papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found.” Carmen v.

S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, ADA standards

are particularly precise and, as such, should be referenced with similarly precise

citation. See Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945–46 (9th Cir.

2011) (“The ADA[Accessibility Guidelines] requirements are as precise as they are

thorough, and the difference between compliance and noncompliance with the

standard of full and equal enjoyment established by the ADA is often a matter of

counsel’s motion to amend the complaint to change Plaintiff from Jerry Smith to Jean Smith as personal representative for his estate. 2 23-4213 inches.”).

In their motion for summary judgement and opposition to Defendant’s motion

for summary judgment, Plaintiff generally provides relevant ADA statutes which

establish the application of Title II of the ADA to the City of Medford. However,

Plaintiff fails to demonstrate which specific ADA standard applies to each of their

specific alleged violations, which include obstructed sidewalks, missing sidewalks,

sidewalks lacking curb ramps, improper curb ramps, and improper curb ramp grades.

Plaintiff’s claims concern roughly one hundred sidewalks along fifty-six

Medford streets. Plaintiff submitted as exhibits over 300 pages of photographs of

alleged ADA violations and 140 pages encompassing the entire 2010 ADA

Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”). But Plaintiff fails to connect the alleged

violations to either their corresponding exhibits or the relevant ADA standards by

which the court could adjudicate the claims. See Zoslaw v. MCA Distributing Corp.,

693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982) (“A party may not prevail in opposing a motion

for summary judgment by simply overwhelming the district court with a miscellany

of unorganized documentation”); see Mote v. City of Chelsea, 284 F. Supp. 3d 863,

881 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (“The plaintiffs have utterly failed to point out for the Court

which portions of [their] exhibits correlate to what specific ADAAG violations that

they allege.”).

Moreover, Plaintiff is required to establish when, where, and how a given

3 23-4213 street was altered so that the court can determine if the ADA even applies, and if so,

which ADAAG standard applies to the alleged violation. See Kirola v. City & Cnty.

of San Francisco, 860 F.3d 1164, 1177 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[A]lterations commenced

between September 15, 2010, and March 15, 2012, could comply with the 1991

ADAAG standards . . . or with the . . . 2004 ADAAG standards. And . . . alterations

commenced after March 15, 2012, [have] to comply with the 2004 ADAAG

standards.”) (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s proffered evidence is a disorganized chart

which fails to provide precise dates for when a particular street was altered, and on

multiple pages lacks necessary columns and rows of information, rendering it

difficult to decipher. Finally, as to location, Plaintiff lists the names of streets in the

chart but does not provide the specific section or cross street where the alteration

took place. See Cohen v. City of Culver City, 754 F.3d 690, 700 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The

City would have been required to build [a] curb ramp if it altered this particular

segment of the street or the sidewalk after January 26, 1992.”) (emphasis added).

Although Plaintiff recites various relevant statutes, simple recitation of law is

insufficient. Plaintiff must apply the legal standards to the facts—the court cannot

dig through the record and construct their arguments for them. See Carmen, 237 F.3d

at 1031 (holding it “profoundly unfair” for “the district court . . . [to] perform[] the

lawyer’s duty of setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.”).

4 23-4213 Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err in granting summary

judgment for Defendant.

AFFIRMED.

5 23-4213

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Related

Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc.
631 F.3d 939 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
William Cohen v. City of Culver City
754 F.3d 690 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Ivana Kirola v. City & County of San Francisco
860 F.3d 1164 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Branch Banking and Trust Co. v. D.M.S.I., LLC
871 F.3d 751 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Mote v. City of Chelsea
284 F. Supp. 3d 863 (E.D. Michigan, 2018)
Zoslaw v. MCA Distributing Corp.
693 F.2d 870 (Ninth Circuit, 1982)

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Smith v. City of Medford, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-city-of-medford-ca9-2025.