Smith v. Celebrezze

229 F. Supp. 827, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7088
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. North Carolina
DecidedMay 22, 1964
DocketCiv. A. No. 640
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 229 F. Supp. 827 (Smith v. Celebrezze) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Celebrezze, 229 F. Supp. 827, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7088 (E.D.N.C. 1964).

Opinion

DALTON, District Judge.

In this proceeding Currie L. Smith seeks judicial review of a decision by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare disallowing his claim for benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, as amended (42 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq.). (hereinafter called the Act) Plaintiff filed his application to establish a period of disability1 and for disability insurance benefits under Sections 216 (i) and 223 of the Act, respectively, (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 416 (i), 423) on November 7, 1960, alleging that he became unable to work on January 9, 1960, as a result of a back injury and neuritis. The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration by the Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance. He then appeared before a hearing examiner who considered the case de novo and found that the plaintiff had failed to establish that he was disabled within the meaning of the Act. This became the final decision of the [829]*829Secretary when the Appeals Council denied the plaintiff’s request for review on November 29,1961.

The Secretary is required to consider and evaluate all the medical evidence relating to the claimed disability and all the non-medical evidence in the case including the subjective statements by the claimant, and on the basis of all this evidence, decide whether or not a claimant is disabled. The scope of the review of his decision in this Court is limited by Section 205(g) of the Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g)), which provides that the findings of the Secretary as to any fact shall be conclusive if supported by “substantial evidence”. Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla — it means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. N. L. R. B., 305 U.S. 197, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938).

Not every serious impairment entitles one to benefits under the Act. The plaintiff, with his peculiar talents and experiences, in order to establish a claim for benefits, must carry the burden to show:

“ * * * inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or to be of long-continued and indefinite duration.” 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 416 (i), 423.

The issue in this case, then, is whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Secretary’s determination that the plaintiff has failed to establish a medically determinable impairment rendering him unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity. This Court is of the opinion that the Secretary’s decision is supported by the evidence in that the plaintiff’s intelligence and managerial experience qualify him for employment entailing service in a supervisory capacity or in other capacities not requiring substantial amounts of physical activity.

Although Currie Smith did not progress far with his formal education, not having completed the ninth grade, he is represented as highly intelligent and cooperative in answering questions. He was born November 11, 1912, and thus was forty-seven years old at the time he quit working, the date of his alleged disability onset. His work experience was primarily in a supervisory capacity. From 1939 through 1944 he was employed by the A&P Company as a market manager. In the year 1947 he went to work for the Colonial Stores chain and was employed by this firm until January 1960, working as a manager of the meat department in Colonial Stores of several North Carolina communities. In this capacity he was responsible for the entire operation of the meat department but, being a skilled butcher, he also personally did meat cutting and packaging.

It was in this latter connection that an accident occurred on September 29, 1959, which led to the alleged disability. On this date plaintiff was carrying a quarter of beef from the refrigeration room when his foot slipped and he felt his back jerk. Apparently, he did not suffer severe injury at that time for he continued working and first sought medical attention on October 13, 1959. He was able to work every day after the injury although he had to be careful about lifting heavy objects. This situation continued until January 9, 1960, when he quit working because he could no longer stand on his feet for any length of time without developing trouble in his back, sides, and down into his legs. However, in an interview at the Social Security District Office on November 8, 1960, he reported that standing caused him pain but that he was fairly comfortable while sitting. He also reported that on his doctor’s advice he was taking walks daily, walking downtown and back, a round trip of approximately thirty-six blocks. (Tr. 57) He also stated that he was able to drive his automobile.

[830]*830At the hearing, Smith testified that he had received several job offers since terminating his employment but that he was unable to take them because of his back condition. In addition, he stated that he had, for a short period, attempted working in a market for a member of his family but had not been successful in his effort also because of his impairment.

In light of the above history of plaintiff’s case the Court must consider: (1) the objective medical evidence, (2) the diagnosis of treating and examining physicians and their expert medical opinions as to the over-all effect the condition will have upon the plaintiff (but not including their opinions on the ultimate issue), and (3) the subjective evidence of pain and disability brought to light by the plaintiff and others testifying on his behalf. Underwood v. Ribicoff, 298 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1962).

Dr. Stephen McIntyre, plaintiff’s personal physician, submitted two reports concerning plaintiff’s condition. (Tr. ■59-60, 80) In the first report, dated November 22, 1960, Smith’s condition was diagnosed as myositis (muscle inflammation) and neuritis (nerve inflammation) with back pains radiating forward. Objective findings by Dr. McIntyre included tenderness over the lumbar spine limiting motion and activity. “Limitation 50% in all planes of spinal motion.” He was ambulatory but, according to Dr. McIntyre, the condition required continuous therapy “with no lasting response”. Plaintiff’s activity limitations were reported as follows: “unable to lift ■or stand, very little walking.” In the latter report, dated June 29, 1961, Dr. McIntyre stated:

“This is to certify that I have treated Currie L. Smith since October 13,1959 continuously, seeing him on an average of from one to three times a week, for a back injury * * *
“I considered Mr. Smith partially •disable from October 13, 1959 to January 9, 1960. Since that time he has been totally disable, and he is still under my care, my last examination and treatment having been on June 27,1961.
“* * * [T]he length of total disability is undetermined because I feel that his condition has reached its maximum improvement and is now static. I also concur with Dr. Jacobs [an orthopedic surgeon to Whom Dr.

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229 F. Supp. 827, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7088, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-celebrezze-nced-1964.