Smith v. Camdon Development Inc.

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: September 2, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-0428
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KAYLA SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 24-428 (TJK)

CAMDEN DEVELOPMENT INC. et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

In February 2024, Plaintiff Kayla Smith sued Defendant Camden Development Inc., as-

serting eight statutory and common-law claims relating to sex-based discrimination she allegedly

suffered while working for Camden from 2021 to 2023. ECF No. 1. Specifically, she alleged that

Camden committed common-law torts and violated both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

and the D.C. Human Rights Act in allegedly imposing a hugging policy on its employees. Id.

¶¶ 80–115, 118–21. She further alleged that Defendant Jose Mancilla, a former Camden em-

ployee, used that policy as a means to sexually assault her. Id. ¶¶ 110, 116–17. On December 16,

2024, the Court dismissed all but two counts against Camden, leaving only Count V (a negligence

claim) and Count VII (a “constructive discharge” claim). See Min. Order of Dec. 16, 2024; ECF

No. 1 ¶¶ 108–11, 118–21. The Court later granted Camden’s motion for judgment on the pleadings

for Count VII. Min. Order of May 1, 2025.

The parties are now conducting discovery on Smith’s sole remaining claim against Cam-

den, that for negligence. On August 11, 2025, the Court held a conference to discuss a discovery

dispute that had arisen between the parties. Following that conference, it ordered the parties to file

a joint status report on the status of their dispute by August 19, 2025. Min. Order of Aug. 12, 2025. Then, when the parties again contacted the Court about another discovery dispute, it ordered

them to include their positions on the new dispute in their August 19 joint status report. Min.

Order of Aug. 19, 2025.

The parties have now filed that report. ECF No. 22.1 In it, they outline that Camden has

objected to several of Smith’s discovery requests because they are purportedly either irrelevant or

disproportionate to the needs of the case and that the dispute has spilled over into a deposition. Id.

at 3, 7–9. The dispute largely stems from a “disagree[ment] regarding the nature of the remaining

claim, which is essential to determining the scope of discovery.” Id. at 5. According to Camden,

Smith has pleaded “only a negligent training claim,” meaning her discovery requests going beyond

“Camden’s sexual harassment, sexual assault, and workplace violence trainings and policies” are

irrelevant and disproportionate. Id. at 5, 8.

Camden’s reading of Smith’s complaint is unduly constrained. The Court holds that, read

fairly, Count V is not limited to “only a negligent training claim.” ECF No. 22 at 5. Smith alleges

that “Camden owed all of its employees—including Ms. Smith—a duty of reasonable care in pro-

tecting her from workplace violence.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 109. She further alleges that Camden’s alleged

“‘Hug Life’ policy,” which purportedly “promot[ed] hugging as part of [Camden’s] workplace

culture,” “endangered young women like Ms. Smith because it subjected them to a culture of

coworkers and managers with power over them touching them, notwithstanding consent.” Id.

¶¶ 27, 109. So she alleges that the imposition of the policy itself breached Camden’s duty of care

and was therefore negligent. In addition, she alleges that Camden compounded its negligence—

1 The Court admonishes counsel for including the name of one of the Court’s law clerks in this report. Since relying on common sense appears insufficient, the Court hereby orders counsel not to publicly identify any of its law clerks again, and it intends to sanction any counsel that violates this order.

2 or at least failed to mitigate it—by failing to train its employees in ways that would reduce the risk

of assault under the alleged policy. Id. ¶ 109. At bottom, Smith’s allegation that Camden was

negligent in failing to train its employees does not preclude her from seeking discovery on the

other, perhaps more obvious, aspect of her claim: that Camden was negligent in imposing the

alleged policy in the first place. So to the extent that Camden objects to Smith doing so on rele-

vance grounds, Camden’s objection is overruled.

Camden responds that Smith’s negligence claim cannot be so broadly construed because,

had Camden known Count V went beyond a mere negligent-training theory, it “would have moved

to dismiss[]” that count. ECF No. 22 at 6. But it is not the Court’s job to remedy counsel’s

potential mistake by ignoring the allegations in the complaint.

Camden next seems to imply that reading Count V as asserting more than a negligent-

training claim would conflict with the Court’s conclusion that hugging is not “inherently sexual.”

ECF No. 22 at 8. According to Camden, in ruling on its partial motion to dismiss, the Court held

“that it was not foreseeable that [the ‘Hug Life’ policy] would lead to a sexual assault given that

such behavior is not inherently sexual.” Id. The Court said no such thing. The Court merely

concluded that Smith had not plausibly alleged that the policy was “conduct of a sexual nature”

such that it could give rise to liability under the D.C. Human Rights Act. ECF No. 14 at 12 (quoting

D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(c-2)(2)(B)(i)). Nothing about how the Court ruled on that point should be

taken to mean that Smith cannot seek discovery to prove up her claim that, in imposing the alleged

hugging policy, Camden was negligent, especially in light of its alleged failure to train. ECF No.

1 ¶ 109.

Camden also objects on relevance grounds to Smith’s discovery requests for videos and

other evidence of Mancilla’s whereabouts on the day he allegedly assaulted Smith. ECF No. 22

3 at 9. But, the Court holds, the requested material is relevant, so Camden’s objection is again

overruled. Smith alleges that Camden’s “Hug Life” policy led to Mancilla’s purported assault on

her. ECF No. 1 ¶ 110. She further grounds her damages in the harm she purportedly suffered

from that assault. Id. ¶ 111. Maybe the connection between Camden’s policy and the assault will

turn out to be a stretch, but Camden can make that argument in a motion for summary judgment.

Camden responds by arguing that the requested materials are irrelevant because Mancilla’s

liability has been established by default. ECF No. 22 at 9. But no default judgment has yet been

entered in this case. And even if it had, that Mancilla’s liability may be established by default does

not mean that Camden is bound by that default or that Smith is relieved of her obligation to prove

up her case against Camden. See Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552, 554 (1872).

* * *

In light of the above, it is hereby ORDERED that the parties shall confer about what, if

anything, of their discovery dispute remains and file another joint status report updating the Court

by September 16, 2025. It is further ORDERED that the discovery deadline shall be EXTENDED

to October 17, 2025. The Court will consider any request for sanctions once this dispute is fully

resolved, taking into account the good faith of the parties in applying this Order to the specific

requests for production of documents and interrogatories at issue.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge

Date: September 2, 2025