Smith v. Brown

165 P. 468, 50 Utah 27, 1917 Utah LEXIS 42
CourtUtah Supreme Court
DecidedMay 8, 1917
DocketNo. 3030
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 165 P. 468 (Smith v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Utah Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Brown, 165 P. 468, 50 Utah 27, 1917 Utah LEXIS 42 (Utah 1917).

Opinion

FRICK, C. J.

The plaintiff brought this action to recover upon a promissory note. The complaint is in the usual form. The defendant, in his answer to the complaint admitted “the execution” of the note, but denied its delivery, and denied “the indebtedness therein alleged.” Among other things, the defendant also averred in his answer that “said note was given without consideration”; that it was given “by reason of the fraudulent representations of the plaintiff,” setting forth the circumstances in detail. The defendant also averred that several months prior to the execution of said note the plaintiff, by [29]*29certain promises, induced tlie defendant to enter into the business of selling and handling grain and other farm products; that to accomplish the plaintiff’s purpose in that regard a corporation known as the Western Grain & Brokerage Company was organized; that before said corporation was organized it was agreed that plaintiff would subscribe for 7,500 shares of the capital stock of said corporation of the par value of $1 each; that 3,750 shares of the said 7,500 shares should be issued in the name of the defendant; that the number of shares was thereafter increased so that both the plaintiff and the defendant each held 3,900 shares of the capital stock of said corporation; that it was agreed that the plaintiff should advance all the money to pay for said capital stock, and that the defendant should manage and conduct the business affairs of said corporation, and that plaintiff was to be repaid the amount advanced by him for said 3,900 shares of defendant’s stock out of the first profits derived from said business, and “not otherwise”; that, in addition to the money plaintiff advanced for the stock as aforesaid, he also agreed to furnish such additional funds as might be necessary to carry on the business of said corporation; “that thereafter the plaintiff herein requested of the defendant the execution of some written agreement showing the conditions herein set forth, and under which this defendant accepted and held such stock, and that prior to the execution of the note herein the plaintiff turned over to the defendant, in pursuance of such agreement, all of said stock; that such an agreement was prepared, but never executed, and that after consideration the plaintiff desired and requested that the defendant herein execute a note for the amount, par value, of such stock, together with interest, the same being the note in question, but with the agreement and understanding between the parties hereto at such time that such note would simply be an evidence of the amount to be paid by the defendant from the profits of such business, and that, relying upon said representations of the plaintiff herein, and the further statement at such time by the plaintiff that unless such note was executed so that he would have some evidence of the amount due from the defendant to the plaintiff [30]*30that he would not advance further and necessary funds to carry on such business, that, relying upon such representations, and not otherwise, the defendant executed such note; that thereafter the plaintiff absolutely refused to advance sufficient and necessary funds to successfully and properly carry on said business, as agreed upon by all of the parties in interest, and as a result thereof said company become indebted and insolvent, and its affairs were entirely closed up, and that there were not sufficient assets to pay any of the stockholders therein any distributive share or dividend above the indebtedness of said company”; that the defendant, relying on plaintiff’s said promises, entered into the business relations aforesaid, and thereafter managed said business and executed said note for the reasons stated, and not otherwise. While the answer contained other averments, yet the foregoing are sufficient to show the nature of the defenses relied on. While the plaintiff filed a reply, yet, under our statute, no reply was either necessary or proper. It is therefore unnecessary to make further reference to the pleadings.

At the trial the defendant assumed the burden of proof and opened the case. When he attempted to establish the averments of his answer by the testimony of the defendant and other witnesses plaintiff’s counsel, as appears from the bill of exceptions, interposed the following objection:

“Mr. Bagley: I object to that. I object to it on the grounds that it is immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent and as an attempt to vary and contradict the terms of a written instrument.
“The Court: Objection sustained.”

The defendant duly • excepted.

The foregoing objection was interposed and sustained to every question asked by the defendant’s counsel and to all offers to prove the averments of the answer made by them. The defendant was thus not permitted to introduce any evidence in support of the averments of his answer, and the court directed the jury to return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the amount of the note with accrued interest. Judgment was entered accordingly, and the defendant appeals.

[31]*311 Defendant’s counsel contend that the court committed manifest error in excluding the proffered evidence. They insist that, in view of the averments contained in the answer, they were entitled to show that the note in question was delivered upon an express condition and that it was given without consideration. "While the answer *is somewhat inartifieially drawn and several defenses are intermingled, yet, when the averments contained therein are considered and are given the liberal construction required by our statute, the answer is sufficient to permit the defendant to prove the following state of facts: That long prior to the making of the note the plaintiff had induced the defendant to become a stockholder in a certain corporation which was organized for plaintiff’s benefit; that the plaintiff was to subscribe and pay for a certain amount of the capital stock of said corporation, one-half of which was to be issued in the name of the defendant, and the defendant was to manage and conduct the business affairs of said corporation; that the plaintiff was to be repaid the amount he had advanced for the stock issued to the defendant out of the first profits derived from the business of said corporation, and not otherwise; that the plaintiff had also agreed to advance all further sums of money that might be necessary to carry on said business if any was necessary; that he afterwards refused to do so unless the note in question was made; that the note was made and delivered to the plaintiff as evidence of the amount of money he had advanced for the capital stock issued in the name of the defendant and partly because the plaintiff had refused to advance the money he had promised to advance to carry on the business, and which money the plaintiff continued to refuse to advance unless the note was executed by the defendant, and that, after the note was executed, plaintiff nevertheless refused to advance any money, with the consequences set forth in the answer. If, therefore, the jury should have found, as under the issues they might have found, if the evidence supported the averments in the answer, that those were the facts and the conditions upon which the note.in question was actually made and delivered, [32]*32we cannot conceive upon what theory the plaintiff should prevail in the action. Certainly not as a matter of law.

2 Under the Negotiable Instruments Act (Laws 1899, c.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
165 P. 468, 50 Utah 27, 1917 Utah LEXIS 42, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-brown-utah-1917.