Smith v. Bousquet

111 F.2d 157, 27 C.C.P.A. 1136, 45 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 347, 1940 CCPA LEXIS 88
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedApril 29, 1940
DocketPatent Appeal 4235
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 111 F.2d 157 (Smith v. Bousquet) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Bousquet, 111 F.2d 157, 27 C.C.P.A. 1136, 45 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 347, 1940 CCPA LEXIS 88 (ccpa 1940).

Opinion

HATFIELD, Associate Judge.

This is an appeal in an interference proceeding from the decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office affirming the decision of the Examiner of Interferences awarding priority of the invention defined in the two counts in issue to appellee, Euclid W. Bousquet.

The interference is between appellant’s application, No. 729,830, filed June 9, 1934, and appelleeis application, No. 737,046, filed July 26, 1934.

The invention in issue relates to insecticides, and is sufficiently described in the involved counts which read:

"1. An insecticide containing as its essential active ingredient phenthiazine.

“2. An insecticidal composition comprising a water-insoluble thio-di-arylamine.”

As originally declared, the interference involved count 1 only, which originated in appellant’s application. On motion of ap-pellee, count 2 was added.

It appears from the decision of the Primary Examiner on the motion of Bousquet to amend the interference that thio-di-arylamine, called for in count 2, is generic to and includes phenthiazine, called for in count 1.

Appellee is the junior party, and the burden was upon him to establish priority of invention by a preponderance of the evidence.

In his decision, the Examiner of Interferences .stated that phenthiazine and thio-di-arylamine are old compounds, and that the invention resides solely in the discovery that those compounds are useful as insecticides. The examiner further stated that the counts in issue are not limited to any specific insecticidal use, but are sufficiently broad to have application to any type of insect whether in the larval or adult state; that the terms “insecticide,” in count 1, and “insecticidal composition,” in count 2, should be interpreted to mean “a material which will kill at least one species of insects (or its larva) when applied under the usual conditions of that insect’s natural or adapted environment, as distinguished from artificial or special laboratory conditions which are not comparable to those commonly encountered in nature”; and that—

“Insects, like other living organisms, vary widely in their susceptibility to a particular toxic material. Thus a substance which destroys ants may have little or no effect on the common carpet beetle. Additionally, the mode of application is dependent upon the type of insect and its environment or host. A substance soluble in kerosene may be applicable as a fly spray, but obviously lacks utility as a means of killing weevils in grain stored in elevators or warehouses. Likewise, the utility of a given material as an insecticide cannot be measured by an arbitrary laboratory standard, but must be determined by actual test under conditions at least approximating those of intended use.

“In view of these facts, it is clear that the suggested use of a chemical compound, or group of compounds, as an insecticide broadly is not sufficient to constitute an invention. It must also be shown that a mode of application was contemplated which is operative and possesses practical utility against at least one designated insect.

“It is * * * the formation in the mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention as it is thereafter to be applied in practice that constitutes an available conception within the meaning of the patent law” (Lotterhand v. Hanson, 1904 C.D. 39; 108 Off.Gaz. 799.) (Italics added by examiner of interferences.)

It appears from the record that appellant is a chemist in the United States Department of Agriculture; that in June, 1933, appellant prepared and sent a quantity of phenthiazine to Dr. F. L. Campbell, who during the period of time in question was in charge of a laboratory of the United States Government in which entomologists were engaged in testing certain organic compounds to determine their value as insecticides.

After reviewing the evidence submitted by appellant, the Examiner of Interferences held that, by virtue of certain laboratory tests on mosquito larvae, appellant had established conception of the invention and reduction of it to practice on March 28, 1934. Relative to those tests, the examiner said: “In Campbell’s quarterly report for January — March 1934, exhibit 12, and in the monthly report for March 1934, exhibit 27, it is stated that phenthiazine is toxic to mosquito larvae in dilutions up to 1 part per million. There is no descrip *159 tion in the exhibits of the experiments or tests upon which the statement is based, and neither Campbell nor Bulger described them in the oral testimony. Apparently from an inspection of Bulger’s laboratory notes, exhibits 25 and 26, the tests with mosquito larvae were made by adding a stock solution of the thiodiarylamine to a flask containing 100 mosquito larvae in an aqueous medium, the amount of stock solution being so' proportioned to the volume of liquid in the flask that the desired concentration of chemical could be readily and accurately obtained. This is substantially in accord with the description of prior similar experiments involving other organic compounds, found in Smith Exhibit 4.”

The Examiner of Interferences further stated that, although prior to March 28, 1934, appellant had suggested that phenthia-zine might be useful as an insecticide, he did not know “what insects, if any, it might be effective against nor did he contemplate any particular mode of application which would possess practical utility. As admitted in Smith’s brief, pages 10 and 11, there is no known relation between chemical structure and insecticidal action, and therefore it is obviously impossible to predict or determine in advance of actual experiment whether or not any specific compound, or group of compounds is a new and tisefid insecticide.

“In the experimental sciences of chemistry and biology this element of unpredictability frequently prevents a conception separated from actual experiment and test. Here the work of conception and reduction to practice goes forward in such a zvay that no date can be fixed as subsequent to conception but prior to reduction to practice. The inventor conjectures that some act or material will subserve a given purpose and having tried it finds that it accomplishes the end, and at no time before the successful experiment can it be said that a conception of the invention exists in the inventor’s mind. Until that instant it is mere speculation or possibly a probable deduction from facts already known; but the conception does not reach a definite and final form until the completion of acts which likewise satisfy the requirements of a reduction to practice.

“The laboratory tests on mosquito larva, as hereinabove reviewed, are considered as sufficiently approximating natural conditions to effectively demonstrate that phen-thiazine possesses practical utility as an insecticide for this species of insect. Upon the completion of this experiment Smith was in complete possession of the invention, and accordingly it is held that on March 28,' 1934, Smith conceived and reduced to practice.” (Italics ours.)

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111 F.2d 157, 27 C.C.P.A. 1136, 45 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 347, 1940 CCPA LEXIS 88, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-bousquet-ccpa-1940.