Smith v. Board of Trustees of La.

398 So. 2d 1045
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedMay 18, 1981
Docket80-C-2295
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 398 So. 2d 1045 (Smith v. Board of Trustees of La.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Board of Trustees of La., 398 So. 2d 1045 (La. 1981).

Opinion

398 So.2d 1045 (1981)

Dewey SMITH
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF LOUISIANA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM.

No. 80-C-2295.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 18, 1981.

*1046 J. Arthur Smith, III, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-applicant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., William T. Reeves, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant-respondent.

CALOGERO, Justice.

Plaintiff Dewey Smith sued the Board of Trustees of Louisiana School Employees Retirement System for the restoration of payment of disability retirement benefits. After trial, the district court entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appealed and the First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the district court. Plaintiff applied to this Court for writs of certiorari which we granted to review the decisions of the lower courts. 393 So.2d 748 (La.1980).

Smith began employment as a bus driver for the Washington Parish School Board in May 1955. He applied for membership in the Louisiana School Employees Retirement System and began his creditable service in July 1956. Eight years later, in July 1964, plaintiff suffered a ruptured disc. The following school year, 1964-1965, plaintiff employed a substitute driver approximately 30% of the time and personally drove the school bus the other 70% of the time. During the 1965-1966 school year he used the substitute driver 70% of the time and personally drove the bus 30% of the time. In April 1966, he applied for disability retirement benefits. For the 1966-1967 school year plaintiff hired a substitute driver full time and did not personally drive the bus at all. The Washington Parish School Board knew and approved of the use of the substitute driver.

In January 1967, the Retirement System approved plaintiff's application for disability retirement benefits effective back to June 1, 1966. In March 1967, the system paid Mr. Smith $836.20 in retroactive benefits and then terminated the benefits on April 19, 1967, after learning that Mr. Smith was still being paid by the Washington Parish School Board to provide bus transportation for students although he was not personally driving the bus during the then current school year. Plaintiff ended his employment with the Washington Parish School Board on March 20, 1967, the day he received the disability retirement payment. Consequently, at the time that the Retirement System terminated his benefits, plaintiff was no longer employed and being paid by the school board. Plaintiff applied for the restoration of benefits and later filed the instant suit when the system refused to reinstate them.

The law regarding application for disability retirement, at the time plaintiff applied, read:

"Upon the application of a member in service or of his employer, any member who has had five or more years of creditable service may be retired by the board of trustees, not less than thirty and not more than ninety days next following the date of filing such application, on a disability retirement allowance, provided that the medical board, after a medical examination of such member, shall certify that such member is mentally or physically incapacitated for the further performance of duty; that such incapacity is likely to be permanent; and that such member should be retired. No member shall be retired prior to July 1, 1948." R.S. 17:914

A report of the Medical Board, dated June 2, 1966, states that plaintiff was examined and the Board certifies that he "is physically incapacitated for the performance of duty and should be retired." On January *1047 23, 1967, the Retirement System notified Smith of the finding of the Medical Board. There is no question but that Mr. Smith has the requisite creditable service, for he had been a school bus driver and had personally driven his bus more than five years, minimally, for the inclusive period 1956-1964.

The Retirement System defended the suit on the grounds that plaintiff was not personally driving the bus at the time he applied for benefits and therefore did not qualify. The trial judge agreed that Mr. Smith could not be a "school bus driver" within the context of the statute if he was not personally driving a school bus. Therefore, the court held that plaintiff was not entitled to benefits. The Court of Appeal essentially adopted the reasons of the trial judge as the basis for its opinion. In this Court, as in the courts below, plaintiff argues that the statute did not require that a "school bus driver" personally be driving a school bus to qualify for retirement benefits. Additionally, plaintiff contends that the Retirement System is foreclosed from litigating this issue because in a pre-trial order the system stipulated that plaintiff was a "member in service" at the time he applied for benefits.

We agree with plaintiff that defendant in its answer and later in the pre-trial order stated that plaintiff was a "member in service" at the time he applied for benefits. An admission in a pleading falls within the scope of a judicial confession and is full proof against the party making it. La. Civ. Code art. 2291; Cheatham v. City of New Orleans, 378 So.2d 369 (La.1979). Nevertheless, a fair construction of defendant's answer and stipulation indicates that defendant may well have meant only that plaintiff was being carried as a "member in service" while not legally eligible to be so classified, because other portions of the answer and the pre-trial order assert that plaintiff was "not legally entitled to be a member of the [retirement] system." Thus it is clear that defendant did not intentionally concede plaintiff's status within the retirement system. However, it is significant that defendant's only witness, a former Secretary-Treasurer of the Retirement System, testified that part time credit was given when part time service was rendered. The witness did not state that full time service was a prerequisite for eligibility for benefits.

Regardless, we base our decision upon a more pertinent ground—our finding that plaintiff was legally a member of the system at the time of his application and that at such time he had at least five years of creditable service.

In holding that plaintiff was not a member in service at the time he applied for benefits, the trial judge relied in part upon an amendment to the statute which postdates plaintiff's application. In 1968, the Legislature amended the definition portion of the statute to read: "(11) `Employee' means any person legally occupying a position as a school bus driver who actually renders a service by driving a school bus during the full time of his employment,..." R.S. 17:882(11) as amended by Acts 1968, No. 30, § 1.

To the trial court, this indicated a clear expression of legislative intent that a bus driver be only a person actually driving a school bus. We consider an equally compelling interpretation of the amendment to be legislative recognition that the statute before the amendment did not require that the "bus driver" personally drive the bus to qualify as an "employee" in the system. In this regard we note that when the Legislature intended that the "bus driver" drive the bus personally (to qualify for tenure), it so stated in unmistakable terms. See R.S. 17:492 concerning the manner in which a bus driver may acquire tenure. That statute requires that the school bus operator "personally operate and drive the school bus he is employed to operate" to acquire tenure as a bus driver. That very statute was in effect during the time that plaintiff was employed by the Washington Parish School Board.

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Bluebook (online)
398 So. 2d 1045, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-board-of-trustees-of-la-la-1981.