Smith v. Atlantic Mutual Fire Insurance

22 N.H. 21
CourtSuperior Court of New Hampshire
DecidedDecember 15, 1850
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 22 N.H. 21 (Smith v. Atlantic Mutual Fire Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Atlantic Mutual Fire Insurance, 22 N.H. 21 (N.H. Super. Ct. 1850).

Opinion

Perley, J.

The ground is taken for the plaintiff that, as to the courts and government of New Hampshire, the Circuit Court of the United States for this district, is to be regarded as a court of foreign jurisdiction; and for that reason an action pending in the Circuit Court of this district cannot be pleaded in abatement of a subsequent suit brought for the same cause in a court of this State.

The judiciary of the United States is a branch of the general government of this country established by the Constitution. The Circuit Court of the United States, within its territorial limit, and as to causes within its jurisdiction, cannot be regarded as a foreign court. Its powers are not derived from any foreign government; its judgments operate directly to bind persons and property within this State; its process, mesne and final, is effectual to enforce its own orders and judgments. The Circuit Court of another district has no authority within this State, and may be considered, territorially and for some purposes, as a foreign jurisdiction.

The Circuit Court, and the courts of this State, derive their powers from different sources, and for most, if not for all purposes, are independent of each other. But in certain cases, they exercise concurrent jurisdiction. The case, supposed by the plea in this action, is one of them. The plaintiff had his election to pursue his remedy in the courts of this State, or resort to the concurrent jurisdiction of the Circuit Court.

The general rule of law forbids that a defendant should be harassed by two suits for the same cause at the same time. In some cases, where the first suit, from defect of jurisdiction in the court, cannot give adequate remedy, a second action is allowed.

This case falls clearly within the reason of the general rule, which prohibits the second suit. No ground has been suggested, and none occurs to us, for supposing that two suits, one in a State court, and the other in the Circuit Court for the same State, are less vexatious and oppressive to the defendants, than two suits in the same court.

On the other hand, the plaintiff fails to bring himself within the reason of the excepted cases, where a second action is allowed, [24]*24because the court in -which the first was pending, cannot give complete remedy for want of jurisdiction over the person or property of the defendants.

Where the prior suit is in an inferior court of special and limited jurisdiction, incapable of affording the plaintiff the remedy which he needs, the prior will not abate the second, though both courts exercise their jurisdiction in the same country. Sparry’s case, 5 Coke, 62 a.

But the fact that the court, in which the prior action is pending, is a subordinate jurisdiction, would seem to be no objection to the plea, provided the first action can give adequate and complete remedy. It has been decided in numerous cases that an action pending in a court whose jurisdiction is territorially foreign, cannot be pleaded in abatement. The reason of this rule would seem to be, not that the authority of the foreign court is questionable within the limits of its jurisdiction, but because the foreign court cannot enforce its orders and judgment beyond its own territory; and, on this account, the remedy of the plaintiff by his prior suit may be incomplete. The defendant may have property which ought to be applied to the payment of the same demand in both jurisdictions; or his property may be in one jurisdiction and his person in another; and suits for these and other reasons may be necessary in both territorial jurisdictions. It has accordingly been held, that a suit pending in the circuit court for another district cannot be pleaded in abatement of a suit in a State court. Walsh v. Durkin, 12 Johns. 99.

But in this case the plaintiff’s remedy was as complete and effectual in the Circuit Court, as he could have in the courts of this State. The mesne process of that court gives security on the person and property of the defendant, at least as effectual as can be had by ours ; the trial, if held, would be by jurors of this State ; the judgment for the plaintiff would be final and conclusive, and could be executed by the process of that court throughout the State. The plaintiff, therefore, had no more necessity or excuse for his second suit, than he would have had if both had been in the same court. And it has accordingly been held that the judgment of the Circuit Court for the same State, is not to [25]*25be considered in the State courts as a foreign judgment. Barney v. Patterson, 6 Har. & Johns. 203.

We are of opinion, that the pendency of another action for the same cause, between the same parties, in the Circuit Court of the United States, is sufficient, if well pleaded, to abate a suit in the courts of this State, where the Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the prior cause.

No affidavit to the truth of matter pleaded in abatement is required in our practice. To obtain a continuance at the first term, the defendant must satisfy the court, by affidavit, that he has probable ground of defence, and this affidavit is supposed to furnish sufficient security against dilatory pleas, whether in abatement or in bar. 27th printed rule.

If an affidavit were necessary, it is, at least, doubtful whether want of it could be taken advantage of by demurrer. The affidavit is no part of the record. In the English practice, the plaintiff moves to reject the plea for want of an affidavit, or signs judgment, as if no plea had been made. 1 Tidd’s Practice, 588 ; Com. Dig. Abatement, (I. 11.)

The plaintiff insists, that the plea does not sufficiently show that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction; and this exception, though it might have been taken in a different and broader form, is well founded, and fatal to the plea.

Where another action pending was pleaded, the ancient rule required that the identity of the cause of action, and of the parties, should appear to the court upon inspection of the record, to be tried in pais. An averment, was not admitted. If, from looseness in stating the cause of action since general pleading has come in use, the identity of the cause of action is not apparent by the record, it may be averred and proved, which would seem to be a relaxation of the rule requiring the identity of the cause of action to appear on inspection of the record. Sparry’s case, 5 Coke, 62 a; Doctrina Placitandi, 12.

If both actions were pending in the same court, it was sufficient for the plea to state that the parties and cause of action were the same, and refer the court to their own record; and the trial in such case was by inspection of the record, and not by [26]*26proof aliunde. The plaintiff was entitled to oyer of the record remaining in the same court. Theobalds v. Lang, Ld. Raym. 847 ; Cremer v. Wickett, Ib. 550 ; Bond v. Barnes, 3 Ib. 77.

If the prior action was pending in another court, to furnish the means of determining the truth of the plea by inspection, the rule of pleading requires that the plea should set out the record in the prior action literally, sub pede sigilli. Carwen v. Fletcher, 1 Strange, 520; Lord Petre v. The University of Cambridge, 3 Levinz, 332.

A note to 2 Chitty’s PI.

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Bluebook (online)
22 N.H. 21, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-atlantic-mutual-fire-insurance-nhsuperct-1850.