Smith 197527 v. Lonzo

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedDecember 23, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-02071
StatusUnknown

This text of Smith 197527 v. Lonzo (Smith 197527 v. Lonzo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith 197527 v. Lonzo, (D. Ariz. 2020).

Opinion

1 WO SC 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Albert Smith, No. CV 20-02071-PHX-MTL (ESW) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 K. Vinalonzo, et al., 13 Defendants.

14 15 Plaintiff Albert Smith, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex- 16 Eyman, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and 17 an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). The Court will order Defendants 18 Scott, Vinalonzo, Curtis, and Potts to answer the Complaint and grant Plaintiff 120 days to 19 file a notice substituting the actual name of the Doe Defendant, before requiring a response 20 from that Defendant. 21 I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee 22 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 28 23 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915(b)(1). The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. Id. The statutory filing 25 fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income credited 26 to Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. 27 § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government 28 agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 1 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 3 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 4 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 5 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 6 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 7 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). 8 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 9 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 10 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 11 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 12 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 13 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 14 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 15 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 16 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 17 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 18 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 19 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 20 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 21 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 22 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 23 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 24 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 25 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 26 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 27 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 28 . . . . 1 III. Complaint 2 Plaintiff alleges a single count for excessive force by an officer. Plaintiff sues the 3 following employees of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC): Warden T. Scott, 4 Sergeant K. Vinalonzo, and Corrections Officers II John Doe, Potts, and Curtis. Plaintiff 5 sues each of the Defendants in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff seeks 6 declaratory, injunctive, compensatory, and punitive relief. 7 Plaintiff alleges the following facts: 8 On July 30, 2020, Plaintiff was housed in the “Enhanced Security Unit” (ESU) of 9 the Eyman Complex, which required prisoners in the pod to be escorted in full restraints 10 whenever they left their cells and the presence of a sergeant or supervisor with a camera 11 during any out-of-cell movement. That day, Defendants Doe, Potts, and Curtis removed 12 Plaintiff from his cell. Because of an “Incident Command System” (ICS) event, Warden 13 Scott told these Defendants, “Cameras Off gentlemen, smash the hell out of that firebug.” 14 Plaintiff and the escort officers walked past Scott, out the pod door, and down a hallway 15 into a blind spot where there were no cameras. Defendant Doe, who had held the pod 16 camera and Plaintiff’s right arm during the escort, and Defendant Curtis violently slammed 17 Plaintiff face-first into a brick wall, and one of them punched Plaintiff in the right eye with 18 a closed fist. Defendant Vinalonzo then appeared in the corridor and apparently said, “I 19 told her you see this fool punching to tell him to stop.” “She” stated, “I ain’t see that.” 20 Defendants Doe and Curtis then slammed Plaintiff into the ground face-first and repeatedly 21 punched and kicked him in the head, absent provocation. Plaintiff, who was shackled hand 22 and foot, was rendered senseless. 23 IV. Claim for Which an Answer Will be Required 24 Liberally construed, Plaintiff sufficiently states an Eighth Amendment claim for 25 excessive force against all the Defendants in their individual capacities. Defendants 26 Vinalonzo, Potts, Curtis, and Scott will be required to respond to the Complaint. 27 Although Plaintiff has stated a claim against the Doe Defendant, the Court will not 28 require service on the Doe Defendant at this time because it is, in most instances, 1 impossible for the United States Marshal or his designee to serve a summons and complaint 2 upon an anonymous defendant. However, the Court will not dismiss the claim against the 3 Doe Defendant at this time. 4 The Ninth Circuit has held that where identity is unknown prior to the filing of a 5 complaint, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the 6 unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or 7 that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds. Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 8 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)). 9 The Court will allow Plaintiff 120 days in which to discover the actual name of one or more 10 of the Doe Defendants, through subpoena or otherwise, and to substitute at least one of the 11 Defendants’ actual names by filing a “notice of substitution.” See Wakefield, 177 F.3d at 12 1163.

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Related

Gardner v. Collins
27 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1829)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Michael Henry Ferdik v. Joe Bonzelet, Sheriff
963 F.2d 1258 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
Gillespie v. Civiletti
629 F.2d 637 (Ninth Circuit, 1980)

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Bluebook (online)
Smith 197527 v. Lonzo, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-197527-v-lonzo-azd-2020.