Smihula v. Navy Federal Credit Union

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedAugust 27, 2025
Docket8:24-cv-01332
StatusUnknown

This text of Smihula v. Navy Federal Credit Union (Smihula v. Navy Federal Credit Union) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smihula v. Navy Federal Credit Union, (M.D. Fla. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

DOUGLAS J. SMIHULA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:24-cv-1332-MSS-NHA

NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,

Defendant.

ORDER This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s third attempt to state a claim against Defendant Navy Federal Credit Union under the soundly rejected theory of “vapor paper” or “vapor money.” Under this theory, Plaintiff claims that by sending him a payoff document upon which he affixed his name and certain rote legal phrases, Navy Federal Credit Union paid off Plaintiff’s loan that he owes to Navy Federal Credit Union. This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this frivolous claim and ORDERS that this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff originally filed a pro se Complaint against Navy Federal for breach of contract and violation of section 673.3031, Florida Statutes on May 31, 2024. (Dkt. 1) He filed an Amended Complaint on July 16, 2024 (Dkt. 4), and has now filed a nearly identical Complaint (Dkt. 29) (“Second Amended Complaint”), attempting to assert the same causes of action. The only insignificant changes made between the Amended Complaint and the Second Amended Complaint are that Plaintiff corrected Defendant’s name and added an alleged “receipt of payments made to Navy Federal Credit Union.” Plaintiff, however, has again failed to plead any facts to establish the jurisdiction

of this Court. Accordingly, the Second Amended Complaint must be dismissed, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). On its face, the Second Amended Complaint establishes that there is no subject matter jurisdiction because (a) there is no diversity jurisdiction because the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000, and (b) Plaintiff does not allege any cause of

action under federal law. As Defendant properly states: “Diversity jurisdiction requires both diversity of citizenship between the parties and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.” See Welch v. Atmore Cmty. Hosp., 704 F. App’x 813, 817 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)).1 Courts must dismiss a claim for lack of jurisdiction when “it is

apparent, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot recover [the requisite amount in controversy].” See Deen v. Egleston, 597 F.3d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 2010) (alterations in original). “[O]nce it is clear that as a matter of law the claim is for less than [$75,000], the [court] is required to dismiss” the claims. See Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1272 (11th Cir. 2000) (alterations in original).

As to jurisdictional amount, in his request for relief, Plaintiff requests “[s]pecial

1 The Court notes that “[a]lthough an unpublished opinion is not binding on this court, it may be considered as persuasive authority. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2.” United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000). Where cited herein, any unreported decision of a panel of the Circuit is considered well-reasoned and is offered as persuasive, not binding. performance of the contract or restitution of the parties in the amount of Forty Four thousand dollars $44,000.00.” (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 12(1)) Thus, it is apparent, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot establish the requisite amount in controversy. Deen,

597 F.3d at 1228. The Court’s jurisdiction is also not invoked on the basis of the “federal question doctrine.” Plaintiff fails to plead any claim arising under federal law. He references no federal statutes or constitutional law provisions in his complaint to support his demand for relief. Nor could he, as none exist.

Both defects were pointed out to Plaintiff in the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 30) and in the subsequently filed Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 37). Plaintiff has filed no response to the demand for dismissal or the motion for summary judgment. He did file a premature Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 32) in which he reiterates the debunked vapor money theory of liability on which the claim is based.

This is no substitute for pleading diversity or federal question to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. While pro se litigants are afforded some leniency in pleading and proceedings, they must still meet fundamental requirements of law to proceed in federal court. Plaintiff has failed despite several opportunities. It is facially apparent that the

Complaint’s pleading requirements cannot be cured. Accordingly, the Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE THIS CASE. DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida this 27th day of August 2025.

Vj Fs SLL ie! bf bn MARY'S_SGRIVEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to: Counsel of Record Any Unrepresented Party

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Related

Deen v. Egleston
597 F.3d 1223 (Eleventh Circuit, 2010)
Welch v. Atmore Community Hospital
704 F. App'x 813 (Eleventh Circuit, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
Smihula v. Navy Federal Credit Union, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smihula-v-navy-federal-credit-union-flmd-2025.