Smart v. R.C. Moore, Inc.

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedJanuary 15, 2002
DocketCUMcv-01-264
StatusUnpublished

This text of Smart v. R.C. Moore, Inc. (Smart v. R.C. Moore, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smart v. R.C. Moore, Inc., (Me. Super. Ct. 2002).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE ae SUPERIOR COURT

CUMBERLAND, ss. Lo CIVIL ACTION ICY ee BET DOCKET NO. CV,01-18 Cf ROBERT A. SMART and MICHAEL LASKO Plaintiffs, Vv. ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS

CERTIFICATION

R.C. MOORE, INC. and R.C. MOORE DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants.

The plaintiffs, Robert Smart and Michael Lasko, filed a motion for class certification in their claim against the defendants, R.C. Moore, Inc. (“R.C. Moore”) and R.C. Moore Distribution Services, Inc. (“Moore Distribution”), to recover unpaid overtime wages. Upon reviewing the plaintiffs’ motion, the defendants’ opposition, and the relevant law, the plaintiffs’ request for class certification will be denied.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs’ underlying complaint seeks payment of overtime wages, under

26 M.RS.A. § 664(3)', for truck drivers, employed by the defendants, who have

126 M.R.S.A. § 664(3) provides: An employer may not require an employee to work more than 40 hours in any one week unless 1-1/2 times the regular hourly rate is paid for all hours actually worked in excess of 40 hours in that week. The regular hourly rate includes all earnings, bonuses, commissions and other compensation that is paid or due based on actual work performed and does not include any sums excluded from the definition of worked over 40 hours per week, but were not paid overtime.

R.C. Moore categorizes truck drivers in four ways: local drivers, who drive exclusively in Maine; independent contractors, who are not employees of R.C. Moore; regional drivers, who drive outside of Maine; and over-the-road drivers, who drive long distances and can be out of Maine driving for days or longer at a time. Drivers employed by R.C. Moore are not confined by these categories during the course of their employment - i.e., a particular driver may work as a local driver some weeks, and a regional driver in others. The local drivers are paid overtime wages by R.C. Moore in compliance with the statute. Independent contractors, regional, and over-the-road drivers are not paid overtime wages. The defendants argue that the statute does not apply to regional and over-the-road drivers, and

therefore overtime wages are not due. In addition, the defendants assert that

“regular rate” under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 United States Code, Section 207(e) The overtime provision of this section does not apply to:

A. Automobile mechanics, automobile parts clerks and automobile salesmen as defined in section 663. The interpretation of these terms must be consistent with the interpretation of the same terms under federal overtime law, 29 United States Code Section 213;

Hotels and motels;

Mariners;

Public employees;

Restaurants and other eating establishments; and

The canning, processing, preserving, freezing,. drying, marketing, storing, packing for shipment or distribution of:

(1) Agriculture produce;

(2) Meat and fish products; and

(3) Perishable foods.

Individuals employed, directly or indirectly, for or at an egg processing facility that has over 300,000 laying birds must be paid overtime in accordance with this

subsection.

mM OW because independent contractors are not their employees, the statute does not apply, and as a consequence, overtime wages are not due. The plaintiffs argue that, with . respect to the regional and over-the-road drivers, even though much of the work occurred out-of-state, the employees reside in Maine, the employer operates from Maine, and a sufficient amount of the work is done in Maine and therefore overtime wages are due under 26 M.R.S.A. § 664. The plaintiff’s initially proposed the class as follows: all R.C. Moore, Inc. (RCMI) truck drivers (1) who reside in Maine and (2) who work out of the company’s Scarborough, Maine facility.”

DISCUSSION

In order for a class action to be certified, the requirements of MLR. Civ. P. 23(a) must be satisfied, and one of the three requirements set out under M.R. Civ. P. 23(b) must also be satisfied. The plaintiffs claim to have satisfied the requirements of

+ - 3 ace partiftiratint “a taattx; MLR. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).° Class certification dramatically a

2 The plaintiffs have conceded that the class should be redefined, as is discussed, infra, in Section D.

3 MLR. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) provides as follows:

An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:

(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; .

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class;

(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of

3 increasing the stakes for the defendants, increasing the number of unmeritorious claims, inflating potential damage awards, and creating insurmountable pressure on

defendants to settle. Melnick v. Microsoft Corp., 2001 WL 1012261, at *16 (Me. Super.

Ct., Cum. Cty.), citing Millett v. Atlantic Richfield Co., CV-98-555, at *44-45 (Me. Super. Ct., Cum. Cty., March 2, 2000). Thus, in order to warrant certification, the plaintiffs must demonstrate under a strict burden of proof that they have satisfied the requirements of Rule 23. Id. I. MLR. Civ.P. 23(a) Rule 23(a) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure provides: One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. A. Numerosity

The number of potential class members alone does not dictate whether the

class is sufficiently numerous that joinder is impracticable. Gaines v. Boston

Herald, 998 F. Supp. 91, 116 (D.Mass. 1998), citing Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 131 (1st Cir. 1985). Additional factors impacting the practicability of joinder include: (1) whether the class members live in the same geographic area, (2)

whether they can be easily identified, (3) the nature of the action, and (4) the size of

the claims in the particular forum, (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. each potential member’s claim. Howard’s Rexall Stores, Inc. v. Aetna U.S.

Healthcare, Inc., 2001 WL 501055, at *6 (D.Me.). A determination that the proposed

class members “are not located in the same geographic portion of the state [would]

support[] a finding that the numerosity requirement is satisfied.” Weld v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 1999 WL 1565175, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct.). Where joinder is impracticable, a class of 50 to 60 members has been determined to be sufficiently numerous to warrant class certification. Id.

Because the numerosity requirement of the rule directly relates to the practicability of joinder, there is no particular absolute minimum or maximum number of parties that satisfies the numerosity requirement. Rather, the number of class members is considered as it impacts upon the impracticability of joinder.

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Related

Baby Neal v. Casey
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Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp.
780 F.2d 124 (First Circuit, 1985)

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