1 HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE
10 SMART-TD LOCAL 161, a labor organization, 11
12 Plaintiff, v. CASE NO.: 20-01312 RAJ 13 WEDRIVEU, INC., a California corporation;
14 and ASURE SOFTWARE, INC., a Delaware ORDER 15 corporation,
17 Defendants. 18 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Asure Software, Inc.’s 19 (“Asure”) motion to dismiss. Dkt. # 9. Defendant WeDriveU, Inc. (“WeDriveU”) filed a 20 notice of joinder to Asure’s motion. Dkt. # 11. Having considered the parties’ briefing, 21 the record, and the applicable law, the Court the Court GRANTS the motion. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff SMART-TD Local 161 (“Plaintiff” or “Union”) is a labor union 24 representing drivers formerly employed by Defendant WeDriveU. Dkt. # 1 at 1. Plaintiff 25 filed this claim against WeDriveU and its employee health benefits plan administrator, 26 Asure, (collectively “Defendants”) for violations of the Consolidated Omnibus 27 Reconciliation Act (“COBRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff alleges that 1 Defendants failed to provide the former employees with Election Notice within the 2 required time frame of 44 days of a qualifying event. Id. This failure to provide notice 3 denied the former employees their right to choose whether to continue coverage under 4 COBRA within 60 days and resulted in “significant out-of-pocket expenses for services, 5 treatments, and medications that would have been covered by their health benefits had 6 they had an opportunity to pursue continuation coverage.” Id. at 2. 7 Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) without 8 leave to amend, alleging that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action. Dkt. # 9. 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint 11 for failure to state a claim. The court must assume the truth of the complaint’s factual 12 allegations and credit all reasonable inferences arising from those allegations. Sanders v. 13 Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). A court “need not accept as true conclusory 14 allegations that are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.” Manzarek v. 15 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Instead, the 16 plaintiff must point to factual allegations that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on 17 its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007). If the plaintiff succeeds, 18 the complaint avoids dismissal if there is “any set of facts consistent with the allegations 19 in the complaint” that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563; 20 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 21 III. DISCUSSION 22 In the pending motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff—a union—lacks standing 23 to bring claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). 24 Plaintiff disagrees and argues that the Court should deny the motion on several grounds. 25 First, Plaintiff argues that dismissal is procedurally improper “because it would require a 26 weighing of facts before discovery has taken place.” Dkt. # 14 at 2. Second, Plaintiff 27 asserts that it has standing because its members are plan participants and it is in the best 1 interest of judicial economy to proceed in this manner. Id. Third, Plaintiff claims it has 2 Article III associational standing because its members have standing individually and no 3 individual member’s participation would be necessary to establish the Union’s claim. Id. 4 And finally, should the Court find that Plaintiff does not have standing, Plaintiff claims 5 the Court should grant leave to amend because the Union’s members have suffered harm 6 and should be permitted to pursue remedies under ERISA. Id. The Court will consider 7 each parties’ arguments in turn. 8 A. Procedural Argument 9 Plaintiff first argues dismissal is inappropriate here because Plaintiff’s participant 10 status under ERISA “speaks to the merits of the claim, not this Court’s jurisdiction” and 11 “it would require a weighing of facts before discovery has taken place.” Dkt. # 14 at 2. 12 As such, this issue could only be addressed in a motion for summary judgment, not a 13 motion to dismiss. Plaintiff argues that “[s]o long as a plaintiff has a colorable claim 14 under ERISA, the Ninth Circuit does not permit district courts to grant a motion to 15 dismiss based exclusively on a plaintiff’s plan participant status because that status is an 16 element of the claim, not a jurisdictional prerequisite.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff relies on Leeson 17 v. Transamerica Disability Income Plan for the proposition that “participant status is an 18 element of an ERISA claim, not a jurisdictional limitation.” 671 F.3d 969, 979 (9th Cir. 19 2012). 20 Plaintiff’s reliance on this case, however, is misplaced. Under § 1132(a), an 21 ERISA claim may be brought by an ERISA plan participant, beneficiary, fiduciary, or the 22 Secretary of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). In Leeson, the question before the Court 23 was whether the plaintiff qualified as a “plan participant” under § 1132. Id. at 978. The 24 plaintiff alleged that he was, in fact, a participant in the defendant’s long-term disability 25 plan. Id. at 974. The defendant contended that he did not satisfy the statutory definition 26 of a “participant.” Id. The Court explained that “[b]ecause [the plaintiff’s] ERISA claim 27 rises and falls on the district court’s determination of participant status, the construction 1 of the term ‘participant’ involves a merits-based determination, even if it results in a 2 dismissal.” Id. To establish federal court subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff needed 3 only to assert a colorable claim that he was a plan participant. Id. at 979. The plaintiff 4 did so, and the Court concluded that he had established subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 5 Here, there is no allegation that Plaintiff is a “participant”—nor any other category 6 of potential claimant explicitly identified in § 1132(a). The question before this Court is 7 not participant status, but whether Plaintiff—a labor union—may bring a claim even 8 though it does not fall within the list of potential claimants provided in the statute. This 9 matter is therefore clearly distinguishable from Leeson because there is no colorable 10 claim that Plaintiff is a plan participant with standing to sue. Because Leeson does not 11 apply here, the court may consider the motion to dismiss based on a lack of statutory 12 standing. See DB Healthcare, LLC v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Arizona, Inc., 852 F.3d 13 868, 873 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that “[t]he question whether Congress has granted a 14 private right of action to a particular plaintiff is not a jurisdictional requirement”); see 15 also Vaughn v. Bay Env’t Mgmt., Inc., 567 F.3d 1021, 1022 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that 16 “a dismissal for lack of statutory standing is properly viewed as a dismissal for failure to 17 state a claim rather than a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction”). 18 B.
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1 HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE
10 SMART-TD LOCAL 161, a labor organization, 11
12 Plaintiff, v. CASE NO.: 20-01312 RAJ 13 WEDRIVEU, INC., a California corporation;
14 and ASURE SOFTWARE, INC., a Delaware ORDER 15 corporation,
17 Defendants. 18 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Asure Software, Inc.’s 19 (“Asure”) motion to dismiss. Dkt. # 9. Defendant WeDriveU, Inc. (“WeDriveU”) filed a 20 notice of joinder to Asure’s motion. Dkt. # 11. Having considered the parties’ briefing, 21 the record, and the applicable law, the Court the Court GRANTS the motion. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff SMART-TD Local 161 (“Plaintiff” or “Union”) is a labor union 24 representing drivers formerly employed by Defendant WeDriveU. Dkt. # 1 at 1. Plaintiff 25 filed this claim against WeDriveU and its employee health benefits plan administrator, 26 Asure, (collectively “Defendants”) for violations of the Consolidated Omnibus 27 Reconciliation Act (“COBRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff alleges that 1 Defendants failed to provide the former employees with Election Notice within the 2 required time frame of 44 days of a qualifying event. Id. This failure to provide notice 3 denied the former employees their right to choose whether to continue coverage under 4 COBRA within 60 days and resulted in “significant out-of-pocket expenses for services, 5 treatments, and medications that would have been covered by their health benefits had 6 they had an opportunity to pursue continuation coverage.” Id. at 2. 7 Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) without 8 leave to amend, alleging that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action. Dkt. # 9. 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint 11 for failure to state a claim. The court must assume the truth of the complaint’s factual 12 allegations and credit all reasonable inferences arising from those allegations. Sanders v. 13 Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). A court “need not accept as true conclusory 14 allegations that are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.” Manzarek v. 15 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Instead, the 16 plaintiff must point to factual allegations that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on 17 its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007). If the plaintiff succeeds, 18 the complaint avoids dismissal if there is “any set of facts consistent with the allegations 19 in the complaint” that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563; 20 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 21 III. DISCUSSION 22 In the pending motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff—a union—lacks standing 23 to bring claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). 24 Plaintiff disagrees and argues that the Court should deny the motion on several grounds. 25 First, Plaintiff argues that dismissal is procedurally improper “because it would require a 26 weighing of facts before discovery has taken place.” Dkt. # 14 at 2. Second, Plaintiff 27 asserts that it has standing because its members are plan participants and it is in the best 1 interest of judicial economy to proceed in this manner. Id. Third, Plaintiff claims it has 2 Article III associational standing because its members have standing individually and no 3 individual member’s participation would be necessary to establish the Union’s claim. Id. 4 And finally, should the Court find that Plaintiff does not have standing, Plaintiff claims 5 the Court should grant leave to amend because the Union’s members have suffered harm 6 and should be permitted to pursue remedies under ERISA. Id. The Court will consider 7 each parties’ arguments in turn. 8 A. Procedural Argument 9 Plaintiff first argues dismissal is inappropriate here because Plaintiff’s participant 10 status under ERISA “speaks to the merits of the claim, not this Court’s jurisdiction” and 11 “it would require a weighing of facts before discovery has taken place.” Dkt. # 14 at 2. 12 As such, this issue could only be addressed in a motion for summary judgment, not a 13 motion to dismiss. Plaintiff argues that “[s]o long as a plaintiff has a colorable claim 14 under ERISA, the Ninth Circuit does not permit district courts to grant a motion to 15 dismiss based exclusively on a plaintiff’s plan participant status because that status is an 16 element of the claim, not a jurisdictional prerequisite.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff relies on Leeson 17 v. Transamerica Disability Income Plan for the proposition that “participant status is an 18 element of an ERISA claim, not a jurisdictional limitation.” 671 F.3d 969, 979 (9th Cir. 19 2012). 20 Plaintiff’s reliance on this case, however, is misplaced. Under § 1132(a), an 21 ERISA claim may be brought by an ERISA plan participant, beneficiary, fiduciary, or the 22 Secretary of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). In Leeson, the question before the Court 23 was whether the plaintiff qualified as a “plan participant” under § 1132. Id. at 978. The 24 plaintiff alleged that he was, in fact, a participant in the defendant’s long-term disability 25 plan. Id. at 974. The defendant contended that he did not satisfy the statutory definition 26 of a “participant.” Id. The Court explained that “[b]ecause [the plaintiff’s] ERISA claim 27 rises and falls on the district court’s determination of participant status, the construction 1 of the term ‘participant’ involves a merits-based determination, even if it results in a 2 dismissal.” Id. To establish federal court subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff needed 3 only to assert a colorable claim that he was a plan participant. Id. at 979. The plaintiff 4 did so, and the Court concluded that he had established subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 5 Here, there is no allegation that Plaintiff is a “participant”—nor any other category 6 of potential claimant explicitly identified in § 1132(a). The question before this Court is 7 not participant status, but whether Plaintiff—a labor union—may bring a claim even 8 though it does not fall within the list of potential claimants provided in the statute. This 9 matter is therefore clearly distinguishable from Leeson because there is no colorable 10 claim that Plaintiff is a plan participant with standing to sue. Because Leeson does not 11 apply here, the court may consider the motion to dismiss based on a lack of statutory 12 standing. See DB Healthcare, LLC v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Arizona, Inc., 852 F.3d 13 868, 873 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that “[t]he question whether Congress has granted a 14 private right of action to a particular plaintiff is not a jurisdictional requirement”); see 15 also Vaughn v. Bay Env’t Mgmt., Inc., 567 F.3d 1021, 1022 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that 16 “a dismissal for lack of statutory standing is properly viewed as a dismissal for failure to 17 state a claim rather than a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction”). 18 B. Standing Based on Case Law & Judicial Economy 19 Defendants contend that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action because no 20 one except ERISA plan participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and the Secretary of Labor 21 is statutorily authorized to bring a civil action under ERISA in federal court. Dkt. # 9 at 2 22 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)). Because a union is not included in the list of parties 23 authorized to bring suit under ERISA, Defendants argue, it has no standing to do so. Id. 24 In response, Plaintiff argues that a union has standing to bring an ERISA claim on 25 behalf of its members based on a 1990 district court decision, Hawaii Teamsters & Allied 26 Workers, Loc. 996, IBT v. City Exp., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 1426, 1430 (D. Haw. 1990). Dkt. 27 # 14, 4-6. In Hawaii Teamsters, the court held that a labor union had standing because it 1 acted as the bargaining unit representative for the plan participants. Id. The court relied 2 on two Ninth Circuit cases which held that the potential claimants who could bring an 3 ERISA action were not restricted to those listed in § 1132(a). See Amalgamated Clothing 4 & Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. Murdock, 861 F.2d 1406, 1410 n.6 (9th Cir. 1988) 5 (holding that § 1132(a) “does not provide an exhaustive list of eligible plaintiffs”); 6 Fentron Indus., Inc. v. Nat’l Shopmen Pension Fund, 674 F.2d 1300, 1305 (9th Cir. 1982) 7 (holding that “[t]here is nothing in the legislative history to suggest either that the list of 8 parties empowered to sue under this section is exclusive”). Instead, Plaintiff argues, 9 despite not falling within one of the categories listed in § 1132(a), it may still have 10 standing if it satisfies a three-part test set forth in Fentron. 674 F.2d at 1304. 11 A review of the case law, however, shows that this precedent is no longer 12 controlling. After the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fentron, the Supreme Court clarified 13 the narrow scope of § 1132 accordingly: “ERISA carefully enumerates the parties entitled 14 to seek relief under § 502; it does not provide anyone other than participants, 15 beneficiaries, or fiduciaries with an express cause of action for a declaratory judgment on 16 the issues in this case.” Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation 17 Tr. for S. California, 463 U.S. 1, 27 (1983). The Supreme Court has described ERISA as 18 a “carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme,” Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 19 U.S. 248, 254 (1993), and “a comprehensive legislative including an integrated system of 20 procedures for enforcement,” Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 21 147 (1985). 22 The Ninth Circuit subsequently acknowledged that its reasoning issue in Fentron 23 was no longer controlling as it “has twice been repudiated by the Supreme Court.” 24 Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing 46 U.S. at 25 27 and Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985). Later Ninth Circuit case law illuminated the 26 Court’s altered interpretation of the potential claimants permitted under § 1132. See 27 McBride v. PLM Int’l, Inc., 179 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that “[t]he list of 1 potential claimants in section 1132 is exclusive”); Cripps, 980 F.2d at 1265 (holding that 2 “[n]o one except plan participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and the Secretary of Labor is 3 expressly authorized by § 1132(a) to bring claims in federal court”). Because Plaintiff, as 4 a union, does not fall within one of the four exclusive categories of potential claimants set 5 forth in the statute, Plaintiff lacks standing and is not plausibly entitled to relief under the 6 statute. 7 Based on this conclusion, Plaintiff’s argument for standing based on judicial 8 economy is unavailing. Indeed, the Court cannot—even for the sake of judicial 9 economy—bestow a plaintiff with statutory standing where none exists. 10 C. Article III Associational Standing 11 Plaintiff argues that even if the Court finds that it lacks statutory standing as a plan 12 participant under ERISA, the Court should still allow Plaintiff’s claim to proceed because 13 Plaintiff has Article III associational standing. Dkt. # 14 at 9. The Court disagrees. 14 First, because Plaintiff does not fall within the exclusive categories of potential claimants 15 listed in § 1132, it is statutorily barred from pursuing such claims. Second, Plaintiff 16 cannot satisfy the requirements for associational standing. 17 The Supreme Court held that an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of 18 its members when “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own 19 right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and 20 (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of 21 individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 22 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Here, the request for relief includes compensatory damages 23 for the cost of expenses incurred by union members and beneficiaries. Dkt. # 1 at 8. 24 Thus, the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit, 25 precluding satisfaction of the third prong. Plaintiff, therefore, cannot establish 26 associational standing. 27 IV. CONCLUSION 1 Having concluded that Plaintiff lacks standing to file a civil action under 29 2 U.S.C. § 1132(a), the Court finds that amendment would be futile. See 3 Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding 4 that dismissal was required where the sole named plaintiff never had standing to pose a 5 challenge a particular defendant); see also Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th 6 Cir. 1995) (dismissal without leave to amend is proper where “it is absolutely clear that 7 no amendment can cure the defect”). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 8 Motion to Dismiss the Complaint without leave to amend. Dkt. # 9. Plaintiff’s claims as 9 to all Defendants are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 10 11 DATED this 12th day of August, 2021.
12 A 13
14 15 The Honorable Richard A. Jones United States District Judge 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27