Goodman, J.
This is an appeal (G. L. c. 41, § 81BB) by the planning board of Harwich (board) from a judgment annulling its decision refusing an endorsement under G. L. c. 41, § 81P,
that “approval under the subdivision control
law [was] not required” (a § 81P endorsement) on a plan submitted on March 20, 1978, by the plaintiff, dividing into two lots a tract of land which she owns in Harwichport (locus). (The board filed its decision of refusal with the town clerk on March 24, 1978.) The judgment also declared that the owner was entitled to the endorsement. The case was tried on a “Statement of Agreed Facts,” including various exhibits from which the following appears. The locus consists of 34,925 square feet on which there are two buildings, a residence and a barn. Of the two lots shown on the plan, one has an area of 14,897 square feet and includes the residence; the other has an area of 20,028 square feet and includes the barn. Both structures were standing when the Subdivision Control Law went into effect in Harwich, and each of the lots shown on the plan has frontage on a public way greater than the 100-foot minimum frontage required by the Harwich zoning by-law. See definition of “subdivision” in G. L. c. 41, § 81L,*
clauses
designated [2], [3], and [4]. However, the zoning by-law requires a minimum area of 20,000 square feet for any use other than a guest house,* *
so that the smaller lot of 14,897 square feet containing the residence does not conform to the area requirements of the by-law. The plan also indicates violations of the sideline requirements of the zoning by-law.
The board contends that the zoning violations indicated on the plan justify its decision to withhold a § 81P endorsement. It points to G. L. c. 41, § 81M, which sets out the general purpose of the subdivision control law and declares that “[ t]he powers of a planning board . . . under the subdivision control law shall be exercised with due regard . . . for insuring compliance with the applicable zoning ordinances or by-laws . . . .”
In view of the legislative history and judicial interpretation of § 8IP, we do not read that section to place the same duties and responsibilities on the board as it has when it is called upon to approve a subdivision. Compare G. L. c. 41, § 81U;
Doliner
v.
Planning Bd. of Millis,
343 Mass. 1, 6 (1961). Provision for an endorsement that approval was not required first appeared in 1953, when § 81P was enacted. St. 1953, c. 674, § 7. Theretofore plans not requiring approval by a planning board could be lawfully recorded without reference to the planning board. The purpose of § 81P, as explained by Mr. Philip Nichols on behalf of the sponsors of the 1953 legislation, was to alleviate the “difficulty . . . encountered by registers of deeds in deciding whether a plan showing ways and lots could lawfully be recorded.” 1953 House Doc. No. 2249, at 55. The entire explanation is illuminating and is set out in the margin.* ***
This purpose is manifested in the insertion by St. 1953, c. 674, § 7, of G. L. c. 41, § 81X, which provided — as it now provides — that: “No register of deeds shall record any plan showing a division of a tract of land into two or more lots, and ways, . . . unless (1) such plan bears an endorsement of the planning board of such city or town that such plan has been approved by such planning board, ... or (2) such plan bears an endorsement ... as provided in [§ 81P].” See 1953 House Doc. No. 2249, at 59. See also 1954 Ann. Survey Mass. Law § 2.7; Johnson, Note on the New Subdivision Control Law, 38 Mass.L.Q. (No. 4) 13 (1953).
Thus § 8 IP was not intended to enlarge the substantive powers of the board but rather to provide a simple method to inform the register that the board was not concerned with the plan — to “relieve [ ] certain divisions of land of regulation and approval by a planning board (‘approval . . . not required’) . . . because the vital access is reasonably guaranteed . . . .”
Gifford
v.
Planning Bd. of Nantucket,
376 Mass. 801, 807 (1978).* ***
Thus, we have held that a § 81P endorsement “gives the lots no standing under the zoning ordinance.”
Gattozzi
v.
Director of Inspection Servs. of Melrose,
6 Mass. App. Ct. 889 (1978), citing
Alley
v.
Building Inspector of Danvers,
354 Mass. 6, 7-8 (1968). See
Goldman
v.
Planning Bd. of Burlington,
347 Mass. 320, 324 (1964);
Giovannucci
v.
Board of Appeals of Plainville, 4
Mass. App. Ct. 239, 243 (1976). The generally routine
nature of a § 8 IP endorsement is further indicated by the provision in § 8 IP that such an endorsement be made “forthwith, without a public hearing.” It is also emphasized by St. 1961, c. 332, which adds the provision: “Such endorsement shall not be withheld unless such plan shows a subdivision.” (See n.l.) Further, were we to accept the defendant’s contention that a planning board has a responsibility with reference to zoning when making a § 8 IP endorsement, it would imply a similar responsibility with reference to the other considerations in § 81M (see n.4), not only “for insuring compliance with the applicable zoning [laws]” but “for securing adequate provision for water, sewerage, drainage, underground utility services,” etc. A § 81P endorsement is obviously not a declaration that these matters are in any way satisfactory to the planning board. In acting under § 8IP, a planning board’s judgment is confined to determining whether a plan shows a subdivision.
Nor can we say that the recording of a plan showing a zoning violation, as this one does, can serve no legitimate purpose. The recording of a plan such as the plaintiff’s may be preliminary to an attempt to obtain a variance, or to buy abutting land which would bring the lot into compliance, or even to sell the nonconforming lot to an abutter and in that way bring it into compliance. In any event, nothing that we say here in any way precludes the enforcement of the zoning by-law should the recording of her plan eventuate in a violation.
The board also argues that the phrase “used, or available for use” in the definition of “lot”
refers to a lot meeting the zoning requirements. From that it concludes that the two exclusions from the definition of “subdivision” (see n.2, clauses [2], [3], and [4]) on which the plaintiff relies for a § 81P endorsement have no application because they both refer to lots meeting the zoning requirements. The argu
ment is without merit. The short answer is that it is self-defeating.
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Goodman, J.
This is an appeal (G. L. c. 41, § 81BB) by the planning board of Harwich (board) from a judgment annulling its decision refusing an endorsement under G. L. c. 41, § 81P,
that “approval under the subdivision control
law [was] not required” (a § 81P endorsement) on a plan submitted on March 20, 1978, by the plaintiff, dividing into two lots a tract of land which she owns in Harwichport (locus). (The board filed its decision of refusal with the town clerk on March 24, 1978.) The judgment also declared that the owner was entitled to the endorsement. The case was tried on a “Statement of Agreed Facts,” including various exhibits from which the following appears. The locus consists of 34,925 square feet on which there are two buildings, a residence and a barn. Of the two lots shown on the plan, one has an area of 14,897 square feet and includes the residence; the other has an area of 20,028 square feet and includes the barn. Both structures were standing when the Subdivision Control Law went into effect in Harwich, and each of the lots shown on the plan has frontage on a public way greater than the 100-foot minimum frontage required by the Harwich zoning by-law. See definition of “subdivision” in G. L. c. 41, § 81L,*
clauses
designated [2], [3], and [4]. However, the zoning by-law requires a minimum area of 20,000 square feet for any use other than a guest house,* *
so that the smaller lot of 14,897 square feet containing the residence does not conform to the area requirements of the by-law. The plan also indicates violations of the sideline requirements of the zoning by-law.
The board contends that the zoning violations indicated on the plan justify its decision to withhold a § 81P endorsement. It points to G. L. c. 41, § 81M, which sets out the general purpose of the subdivision control law and declares that “[ t]he powers of a planning board . . . under the subdivision control law shall be exercised with due regard . . . for insuring compliance with the applicable zoning ordinances or by-laws . . . .”
In view of the legislative history and judicial interpretation of § 8IP, we do not read that section to place the same duties and responsibilities on the board as it has when it is called upon to approve a subdivision. Compare G. L. c. 41, § 81U;
Doliner
v.
Planning Bd. of Millis,
343 Mass. 1, 6 (1961). Provision for an endorsement that approval was not required first appeared in 1953, when § 81P was enacted. St. 1953, c. 674, § 7. Theretofore plans not requiring approval by a planning board could be lawfully recorded without reference to the planning board. The purpose of § 81P, as explained by Mr. Philip Nichols on behalf of the sponsors of the 1953 legislation, was to alleviate the “difficulty . . . encountered by registers of deeds in deciding whether a plan showing ways and lots could lawfully be recorded.” 1953 House Doc. No. 2249, at 55. The entire explanation is illuminating and is set out in the margin.* ***
This purpose is manifested in the insertion by St. 1953, c. 674, § 7, of G. L. c. 41, § 81X, which provided — as it now provides — that: “No register of deeds shall record any plan showing a division of a tract of land into two or more lots, and ways, . . . unless (1) such plan bears an endorsement of the planning board of such city or town that such plan has been approved by such planning board, ... or (2) such plan bears an endorsement ... as provided in [§ 81P].” See 1953 House Doc. No. 2249, at 59. See also 1954 Ann. Survey Mass. Law § 2.7; Johnson, Note on the New Subdivision Control Law, 38 Mass.L.Q. (No. 4) 13 (1953).
Thus § 8 IP was not intended to enlarge the substantive powers of the board but rather to provide a simple method to inform the register that the board was not concerned with the plan — to “relieve [ ] certain divisions of land of regulation and approval by a planning board (‘approval . . . not required’) . . . because the vital access is reasonably guaranteed . . . .”
Gifford
v.
Planning Bd. of Nantucket,
376 Mass. 801, 807 (1978).* ***
Thus, we have held that a § 81P endorsement “gives the lots no standing under the zoning ordinance.”
Gattozzi
v.
Director of Inspection Servs. of Melrose,
6 Mass. App. Ct. 889 (1978), citing
Alley
v.
Building Inspector of Danvers,
354 Mass. 6, 7-8 (1968). See
Goldman
v.
Planning Bd. of Burlington,
347 Mass. 320, 324 (1964);
Giovannucci
v.
Board of Appeals of Plainville, 4
Mass. App. Ct. 239, 243 (1976). The generally routine
nature of a § 8 IP endorsement is further indicated by the provision in § 8 IP that such an endorsement be made “forthwith, without a public hearing.” It is also emphasized by St. 1961, c. 332, which adds the provision: “Such endorsement shall not be withheld unless such plan shows a subdivision.” (See n.l.) Further, were we to accept the defendant’s contention that a planning board has a responsibility with reference to zoning when making a § 8 IP endorsement, it would imply a similar responsibility with reference to the other considerations in § 81M (see n.4), not only “for insuring compliance with the applicable zoning [laws]” but “for securing adequate provision for water, sewerage, drainage, underground utility services,” etc. A § 81P endorsement is obviously not a declaration that these matters are in any way satisfactory to the planning board. In acting under § 8IP, a planning board’s judgment is confined to determining whether a plan shows a subdivision.
Nor can we say that the recording of a plan showing a zoning violation, as this one does, can serve no legitimate purpose. The recording of a plan such as the plaintiff’s may be preliminary to an attempt to obtain a variance, or to buy abutting land which would bring the lot into compliance, or even to sell the nonconforming lot to an abutter and in that way bring it into compliance. In any event, nothing that we say here in any way precludes the enforcement of the zoning by-law should the recording of her plan eventuate in a violation.
The board also argues that the phrase “used, or available for use” in the definition of “lot”
refers to a lot meeting the zoning requirements. From that it concludes that the two exclusions from the definition of “subdivision” (see n.2, clauses [2], [3], and [4]) on which the plaintiff relies for a § 81P endorsement have no application because they both refer to lots meeting the zoning requirements. The argu
ment is without merit. The short answer is that it is self-defeating. If a nonconforming “lot” takes a plan out of the exceptions to a subdivision it must also take it out of the definition of “subdivision” itself: — “the division of a tract of land into two or more lots” (emphasis supplied). G. L. c. 41, § 81L (see n.2, cl. [1]). See
Bloom
v.
Planning Bd. of Brookline,
346 Mass. 278, 283-284 (1963). But as we have indicated above, if this plan does not create a subdivision within § 81L, it is entitled to an endorsement under the second sentence of § 81P inserted by St. 1961, c. 332. In any event the defendant points to nothing to indicate that the definition of “lot” sets out anything but physical characteristics rather than zoning limitations. Indeed, it appears that this argument is a mere afterthought, for the statement of agreed facts uses the word “lot” without reference to whether it conforms to a zoning by-law.
We therefore affirm the judgment. In this connection we note that the lower court has retained jurisdiction though so far as appears nothing remains to be done but to place a § 8IP endorsement on the plan in accordance with the judgment. Judgment is thus sufficiently final to warrant our review.
Cape Ann Land Dev. Corp.
v.
Gloucester,
371 Mass. 19, 25 n.8 (1976). We cannot say that the retention of jurisdiction (which the parties do not argue) was an abuse of discretion.
Judgment affirmed.