S&M Brands, Inc. v. Stein

2018 NCBC 26
CourtNorth Carolina Business Court
DecidedApril 2, 2018
Docket17-CVS-6894
StatusPublished

This text of 2018 NCBC 26 (S&M Brands, Inc. v. Stein) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Business Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
S&M Brands, Inc. v. Stein, 2018 NCBC 26 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2018).

Opinion

S&M Brands, Inc. v. Stein, 2018 NCBC 26.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION COUNTY OF WAKE 17 CVS 6894

S&M BRANDS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER AND OPINION ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS JOSH STEIN, in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of North Carolina, and the STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,

Defendants.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”; ECF No. 43).

THE COURT, after considering the Motion, the briefs in support and in

opposition to the Motion, the supporting materials filed by the parties, the arguments

of counsel at the hearing, and other appropriate matters of record, concludes that

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED for the reasons set forth below.

Troutman Sanders LLP by Christopher G. Browning, Jr. and Bryan M. Haynes for Plaintiff S&M Brands, Inc.

The North Carolina Department of Justice by Lauren M. Clemmons for Defendants Josh Stein and the State of North Carolina.

McGuire, Judge.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Court does not make findings of fact on motions to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6), but only recites those facts drawn from the Amended Complaint (ECF

No. 36) that are relevant to the Court’s determination of the motion. A. The parties

2. Plaintiff S&M Brands, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) is a Virginia corporation formed

in 1994 with its principal place of business in Keysville, Virginia. Plaintiff is in the

business of manufacturing tobacco products, including cigarettes. Plaintiff sells its

products primarily in the southeastern United States, including North Carolina.

3. Defendant Josh Stein is the Attorney General of the Defendant State of

North Carolina (“Attorney General”; collectively, Josh Stein and the State of North

Carolina are “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that at all times Stein acted under color

of State authority and sues Stein only in his official capacity. (ECF No. 36 at ¶¶ 13–

14.)

B. The Master Settlement Agreement and the Qualifying Statute

4. In or around 1994, numerous states sued the four major tobacco

companies – Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, and Lorillard –

alleging that they had deceived the public about the dangers of smoking cigarettes

and had engaged in other unlawful conduct designed to mislead consumers. (Id. at

¶¶ 21–24.) The lawsuit made claims for, inter alia, antitrust, fraud, racketeering,

and conspiracy. (Id.)

5. On November 23, 1998, forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and

five territories (the “Settling States”) settled the lawsuit with Philip Morris, R.J.

Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, and Lorillard. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Four states (Florida,

Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas) had previously settled separately with Philip

Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, and Lorillard. (Id.) 6. Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, Lorillard, and the

Settling States executed a Master Settlement Agreement (the “MSA”). (ECF No.

36.1) Under the terms of the MSA, Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown &

Williamson, and Lorillard (in the MSA, the four signatory tobacco companies are for

some purposes referred to as the “Original Participating Manufacturers” and will

hereinafter in this order be referred to collectively as the “OPMs”) agreed to make

annual settlement payments to the Settling States in perpetuity. The settlement

payments are first made into a national escrow fund and are then distributed to the

Settling States according to each state’s “allocable share.” (Id. at ¶ 30.) The

settlement payments from the OPMs are linked to the OPMs’ respective shares of the

cigarette market; in other words, to the extent an OPM increases its market share in

a given year, its settlement payments increase. (ECF No. 36 at ¶ 33.) The revenues

generated from the OPMs’ sales, however, are not considered in determining the

payments. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that under this method, the OPMs are discouraged

from “trying to increase revenue by lowering prices” because increasing sales, and

market share, would cause higher settlement payments. (Id.) Instead, Plaintiff

alleges that the MSA payment scheme encourages the OPMs to raise prices as a

means of increasing revenue without increasing market share. (Id.)

7. In the MSA, the OPMs agreed to substantial restrictions on their

marketing, advertising, and lobbying activities. The OPMs also agreed to restrict

their trade association activities and to relinquish any challenges to state laws and

rules regarding tobacco. (Id. at ¶ 34.) 8. The MSA permits cigarette manufacturers who were not sued by the

Settling States to sign the MSA along with the OPMs. Manufacturers who signed

the MSA after the OPMs are known as “Subsequent Participating Manufacturers”

(“SPMs”). (ECF No. 36.1 at p. 16.) If an SPM signed the MSA within sixty days of

the MSA’s execution and had a market share of cigarette sales in 1997 or 1998, that

SPM had its market share “grandfathered” under the MSA and is only required to

make settlement payments to the extent that the SPM’s sales exceeded its 1998

market share or 125% of its 1997 market share in any given year. (Id. at pp. 78–80.)

If the SPM either signed the MSA more than sixty days after the MSA’s execution or

had no market share in 1997 or 1998, that SPM must make yearly payments based

on its market share for the year prior to the payment. (Id.)

9. Cigarette manufacturers who were not sued by the Settling States and

who did not join the MSA are called “Non-Participating Manufacturers” (“NPMs”).

(ECF No. 36.1 at p. 9.)

10. In order to prevent NPMs from having a competitive advantage over the

OPMs and SPMs (collectively, the “Participating Manufacturers” (“PMs”)), the MSA

required each Settling State to enact a “Qualifying Statute.” (ECF No. 36.1 at p. 65.)

The MSA defines a Qualifying Statute as a “statute, regulation, law and/or rule

(applicable everywhere the Settling State has authority to legislate) that effectively

and fully neutralizes the cost disadvantages that the [PMs] experience vis-à-vis

[NPMs] within such Settling State as a result of [the MSA].” (Id.) The MSA included,

as an exhibit, a model Qualifying Statute that would satisfy terms of the MSA. (ECF 36.1, Ex. T.) North Carolina enacted a Qualifying Statute (the “NC Qualifying

Statute”) based on the model Qualifying Statute in July 1999. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 66-

290–294.2 (hereinafter, references to the North Carolina General Statutes shall be

referred to as “G.S.”).

11. The NC Qualifying Statute requires that NPMs pay a statutorily-

prescribed annual amount into a “Qualified escrow fund” (“Escrow Fund”). G.S. § 66-

291(a)(2). Each NPM establishes its own individual Escrow Fund. An NPM’s

payment is calculated based on a set amount paid for each cigarette sold in North

Carolina in the prior year. (Id.) The NPM receives any interest or appreciation on

the amounts held in its Escrow Fund. Otherwise, the amounts held in the Escrow

Fund can only be released: (1) to pay a judgment or settlement on certain claims by

the Settling State against the NPM; (2) to refund the NPM for any overpayments into

its Escrow Fund; or (3) to revert back to the NPM twenty-five years after the specific

funds were paid into the Escrow Fund. G.S. § 291(b).

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2018 NCBC 26, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sm-brands-inc-v-stein-ncbizct-2018.