Sluev v. Rubio

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedFebruary 24, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2025-0899
StatusPublished

This text of Sluev v. Rubio (Sluev v. Rubio) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sluev v. Rubio, (D.D.C. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ ) TIMOFEY SLUEV, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) Case No. 25-cv-899 (APM) MARCO RUBIO, ) in his official capacity as U.S. Secretary of State, ) et al., ) ) Defendants. ) _________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Timofey Sluev seeks an F-1 nonimmigrant visa to pursue a course of graduate

studies in the United States. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 1. On June 24, 2024, following an interview

at the U.S. Embassy in Astana, Kazakhstan, a consular officer advised him that his case would

require additional administrative processing and requested that he supply a curriculum vitae and a

list of publications with translations. Id. ¶ 45. Plaintiff submitted the additional records two days

later, id. ¶ 46, but no further action was taken on his application for nine months, causing him to

delay the start of his education program multiple times. Id. ¶¶ 46, 48. He then filed this suit.

Contending that Defendants’ failure to act constitutes a violation of law, id. ¶¶ 79–120,

Plaintiff asks the court to compel agency action pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act

(APA) and to issue a writ of mandamus.

In a familiar boilerplate motion, Defendants move to dismiss on two grounds:

(1) the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Karimova v. Abate, No. 23-5178, 2024 WL 3517852 (D.C. Cir.

July 24, 2024), incontrovertibly holds that a consular officer has no duty to act on a visa application held in administrative processing, and (2) Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of consular

nonreviewability. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 5 [hereinafter Defs.’ Mot.], at 4–12.

As to the first ground, the court does not read Karimova so broadly. Karimova held only

that “Section 555(b) [of the APA]—and only Section 555(b)” does not place a “clear, non-

discretionary duty” on a consular officer to “re-adjudicate [an] already-refused application.”

2024 WL 3517852, at *3. It offered no opinion as to whether any other source of law creates a

nondiscretionary duty as to a visa application placed in administrative processing. Cf. Nikjooy v.

Rubio, 804 F. Supp. 3d 76, 84–85 (D.D.C. 2025). Plaintiff here does rely on § 555(b), see Compl.

¶¶ 28, 64, but not exclusively like the plaintiff in Karimova. He also alleges a host of other sources

of law that he claims require a consular officer to act on his application, including notably

22 C.F.R. § 41.121(c).1 See id. ¶¶ 28–37, 92; 22 C.F.R. § 41.121(c) (“If the ground(s) of

ineligibility may be overcome by the presentation of additional evidence, and the applicant has

indicated the intention to submit such evidence, a review of the refusal may be deferred for not

more than 120 days.”). Defendants, however, grapple with none of these other legal grounds.

See Defs.’ Mot. at 9–12. They do address some, but not all, in their reply brief, but that comes too

late. See Defs.’ Reply in Further Supp. of Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 9, at 10–14; Rollins Env’t. Servs.

(NJ) Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2d 649, 652 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Issues may not be raised for the first

time in a reply brief.”). So, even if Karimova disposes of § 555 as the basis for a discrete legal

duty, Defendants’ failure to challenge any other cited source of law means that dismissal on that

ground is not warranted.

As to the defense of consular nonreviewability, courts in this District repeatedly have held

that inaction on a visa application stuck in administrative processing under § 221(g) is not shielded

1 Plaintiff also cites, among other sources of law, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), 22 C.F.R. § 41.121(a), and 9 FAM 403.7-3, 403.10-2(A). See Compl. ¶¶ 28, 31–33, 114.

2 from review under that doctrine. See, e.g., Al-Gharawy v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 617

F. Supp. 3d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2022); Nine Iraqi Allies Under Serious Threat Because of Their Faithful

Serv. to the U.S. v. Kerry, 168 F. Supp. 3d 268, 292 (D.D.C. 2016). And Karimova did not clearly

rule on the applicability of consular nonreviewability to visa applications in administrative

processing. See Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *6; Thein v. Trump, No. 25-cv-2369 (SLS),

2025 WL 2418402, at *8–10 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2025).

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 5, is denied.

Dated: February 24, 2026 Amit P. Mehta United States District Judge

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