Slovak v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 8, 2025
• Docket: 23-2649
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 8 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT A. SLOVAK, No. 23-2649 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:13-cv-00569-MMD-CLB v. MEMORANDUM* WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 14, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: N.R. SMITH and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN, District Judge.***

Robert Slovak appeals the district court’s enforcement of a settlement

agreement between Slovak and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”). Slovak

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Dana L. Christensen, United States District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation. also appeals the district court’s 2021 evidentiary hearing, arguing that the district

court lacked jurisdiction to proceed. Slovak further contends that the district court

treated him disparately, resulting in “manifest injustice.” We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291 and we affirm the judgment of the district court.

We review a district court’s order to enforce a settlement agreement for

abuse of discretion. Wilcox v. Arpaio, 753 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2014).

Here, the magistrate judge found, based on the evidence presented at two

evidentiary hearings, that “the Loan Documents proffered by Wells Fargo [were]

the authentic original documents.” The judge based this conclusion on the evidence

presented by Wells Fargo through its chain of custody witnesses and its expert

witnesses. The judge explained that “there [was] no evidence in the record to refute

the fact that the tendered documents are [] the authentic, originals.” The district

court adopted these findings in full. Based on these findings, the magistrate judge

issued an enforcement order requiring the parties to consummate the settlement

agreement. This was not an abuse of discretion. See Wilcox, 753 F.3d at 875.

We also conclude that the magistrate judge retained jurisdiction to proceed

with the 2021 evidentiary hearing. “‘The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of

jurisdictional significance—it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and

divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the

appeal.’” Rodriguez v. Cnty. of L.A., 891 F.3d 776, 790 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting

2 23-2649 Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)). However,

“[w]hen a [n]otice of [a]ppeal is defective in that it refers to a non-appealable

interlocutory order, it does not transfer jurisdiction to the appellate court, and so

the ordinary rule that the district court cannot act until the mandate has issued on

the appeal does not apply.” Nascimento v. Dummer, 508 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir.

2007). Rather, “when an improper appeal is taken, the district court retains its

jurisdiction to act on the case.” Id. at 910.

We granted Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss Slovak’s appeal of the district

court’s no filing mandate “because the challenged order [was] not appealable as an

injunction.” Because we found that the appeal was defective, “the district court

retain[ed] its jurisdiction to act on the case.” Nascimento, 508 F.3d at 910.

Finally, contrary to Slovak’s contention, we conclude that the district court

did not treat Slovak in a prejudicial and disparate manner resulting in “manifest

injustice.”

First, the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the orders that

Slovak claims undermined his case. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260

(9th Cir. 1992) (“District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets

and, ‘[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions.’”). Second,

because Slovak did not move to disqualify Kelly Dove nor object to her testimony

at the second evidentiary hearing, we deem Slovak’s objection to her testimony

3 23-2649 waived. See Price v. Kramer, 200 F.3d 1237, 1252 (9th Cir. 2000) (“By failing to

object to evidence at trial and request a ruling on such an objection, a party waives

the right to raise admissibility issues on appeal.”). Third, the district court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Slovak’s motion to recuse. See United States v.

Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[A] judge’s prior adverse ruling is not

sufficient cause for recusal.”).

AFFIRMED.

4 23-2649