Slough v. State

279 S.W.3d 409, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 622, 2009 WL 215321
Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided January 30, 2009·No. 11-07-00334-CR·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

OPINION

TERRY McCALL, Justice.

The jury convicted Sherry Lynn Slough of the state jail felony offense of credit card abuse. The trial court assessed appellant’s punishment at confinement for twelve months in the State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In two issues, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction. We affirm.

Background

The State charged appellant with credit card abuse under Section 32.31(b)(4) of the Penal Code. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.31(b)(4) (Vernon Supp.2008). Section 32.31(b)(4) provides that a person commits an offense if “he steals a credit card.” The term “credit card” is defined as “an identification card, plate, coupon, book, number, *410 or any other device authorizing a designated person or bearer to obtain property or services on credit,” and “[t]he term includes the number or description of the device if the device itself is not produced at the time of ordering or obtaining the property or service.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.31(a)(2) (Vernon Supp.2008). The indictment alleged that, on or about December 14, 2004, appellant “did then and there intentionally and knowingly steal a credit card, to-wit: an MBNA MasterCard number ... belonging to Nancy Egan from Nancy Egan.”

The State reindicted appellant with credit card abuse under Section 32.31(b)(1)(A) of the Penal Code. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.31(b)(1)(A) (Vernon Supp.2008). Section 32.31(b)(1)(A) provides that a person commits an offense if, “with intent to obtain a benefit fraudulently, he presents or uses a credit card or debit card with knowledge that: the card, whether or not expired, has not been issued to him and is not used with the effective consent of the cardholder.” Later, the State moved to dismiss the rein-dictment, and the State proceeded to trial on the original indictment. The trial court instructed the jury on the original indictment.

In her brief, appellant acknowledges that the evidence was sufficient to show that she presented or used Egan’s credit card without authorization and that, therefore, the evidence would have supported a conviction for the offense alleged in the reindictment. However, because the State proceeded to trial under the original indictment, the State was required to prove that appellant stole the credit card. Appellant contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to show that she stole the credit card.

Standard of Review

To determine if the evidence is legally sufficient, the appellate court reviews all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664, 667 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). To determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, the appellate court reviews all of the evidence in a neutral light. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (overruling in part Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477 (Tex.Crim.App.2004)); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 10-11 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407-08 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). Then, the reviewing court determines whether the evidence supporting the verdict is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the conflicting evidence. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15; Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 10-11. The jury, as the finder of fact, is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the witnesses’ testimony. Tex.Code CRiM. Pkoc. Ann. art. 36.13 (Vernon 2007), art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979).

Evidence at Trial

In late 2004 and early 2005, Nancy Rapp had an MBNA MasterCard. The card was issued to Nancy in her prior name, Nancy Egan. Nancy identified the card by its number during her testimony. In early 2005, Nancy discovered that unauthorized charges totaling $3,501.13 had been made on the card when she examined the state *411 ment for the card. The charges had been posted during December 2004 and January 2005. The evidence showed that the charges had been made to Overstock.com, Reliant Energy, 911 Health Shop.com, Travelocity, Virgin Mobile, Amazon.com, Wal-Mart.com, Southwest Airlines, and a Marriott Hotel in Anaheim, California. On February 8, 2005, Nancy informed the police of the unauthorized charges.

At the time of trial, Nancy had been married to Darin Rapp for about four years. Appellant was Darin’s ex-wife. They had been married about seventeen years ago, and their marriage had lasted for about eight months. They had a child, Alexis Rapp, who was seventeen years old at the time of trial. During the relevant time period, Alexis lived part-time with appellant and the remainder of the time with Nancy and Darin. The evidence showed that Darin provided financial support to appellant throughout the years. For example, Darin testified that he had an American Express card and that he permitted appellant, in his presence, to call in the number of his American Express card to pay utility bills. Darin also permitted appellant to use a low limit credit card that had been issued to him. He also said that “[h]e probably couldn’t count how many times [he] wired money to [appellant].”

Appellant testified at trial. She said that she used Nancy’s MBNA MasterCard number to make some of the above charges over the internet, including charges of $257.98 and $583.30 to Travel-ocity, a charge of $1,371.84 to the Marriott Anaheim, and a charge of $261.30 to Southwest Airlines. These charges related to a trip that appellant took to see her son in California in December 2004. Appellant used Nancy’s name (Nancy Egan) when she made these charges on the internet. Appellant testified that Nancy never personally consented to her using the card. Appellant said that she made the Travelocity reservation on the computer when Darin, Alexis, and Alexis’s friend, Caryn, were present. She also said that Darin Rapp “called out the number with the plus 3 on the card” when she made the reservation.

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Slough v. State, 279 S.W.3d 409, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 622, 2009 WL 215321 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).

279 S.W.3d 409 (Slough v. State) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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