Sloop v. Williams Exxon Service

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

Sloop v. Williams Exxon Service

210 S.E.2d 111, 24 N.C. App. 129, 1974 N.C. App. LEXIS 1950

CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina

DecidedDecember 4, 1974

Docket7426IC842

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 210 S.E.2d 111 (Sloop v. Williams Exxon Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sloop v. Williams Exxon Service, 210 S.E.2d 111, 24 N.C. App. 129, 1974 N.C. App. LEXIS 1950 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974).

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Opinion

MARTIN, Judge.

Appellant Edna Sloop presents a single question for our consideration which can be stated as follows: “Did the' Full Commission err in concluding as a matter of law that a husband and wife are not living separate and apart for ‘justifiable cause’ within the meaning of G.S. 97-2(14) if they are living separate and apart as a result of a mutual agreement evidenced by a legally executed separation agreement?”

Counsel for appellant concedes that the Full Commission merely followed this Court’s determination in Bass v. Mooresville Mills, 11 N.C. App. 631, 182 S.E. 2d 246 (1971) where an identical question was posed. However, counsel strongly urges this Court to rethink the question and depart from Bass.

G.S. 97-39 provides in part that a “widow” shall, be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon the *131 deceased, employee. “The term ‘widow’ includes only the decedent’s wife living with or dependent for support upon him at the time of his death; or living apart for justifiable cause or by reason of his desertion at such time.” G.S. 97-2(14). “[T]here is authority in other jurisdictions to the effect that ‘justifiable cause,’ as that term is employed in statutory provisions similar to our G.S. 97-2(14), may not be interpreted as applicable to separations by mutual consent. [Citations].” Bass, supra, at 633. The Court in Bass considered such authority to be sound and stated at 633-634, “ [T] here is no reason why a separated wife who has surrendered all right to look to the husband for support while he is living, should upon his death, receive benefits that are intended to replace in part the support which the husband was providing, or should have been providing.”

In reaffirming Bass, we also affirm the opinion and award of the Full Commission.

Affirmed.

Chief Judge Brock and Judge Hedrick concur.

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MARTIN, Judge.

Appellant Edna Sloop presents a single question for our consideration which can be stated as follows: “Did the' Full Commission err in concluding as a matter of law that a husband and wife are not living separate and apart for ‘justifiable cause’ within the meaning of G.S. 97-2(14) if they are living separate and apart as a result of a mutual agreement evidenced by a legally executed separation agreement?”

Counsel for appellant concedes that the Full Commission merely followed this Court’s determination in Bass v. Mooresville Mills, 11 N.C. App. 631, 182 S.E. 2d 246 (1971) where an identical question was posed. However, counsel strongly urges this Court to rethink the question and depart from Bass.

G.S. 97-39 provides in part that a “widow” shall, be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon the *131 deceased, employee. “The term ‘widow’ includes only the decedent’s wife living with or dependent for support upon him at the time of his death; or living apart for justifiable cause or by reason of his desertion at such time.” G.S. 97-2(14). “[T]here is authority in other jurisdictions to the effect that ‘justifiable cause,’ as that term is employed in statutory provisions similar to our G.S. 97-2(14), may not be interpreted as applicable to separations by mutual consent. [Citations].” Bass, supra, at 633. The Court in Bass considered such authority to be sound and stated at 633-634, “ [T] here is no reason why a separated wife who has surrendered all right to look to the husband for support while he is living, should upon his death, receive benefits that are intended to replace in part the support which the husband was providing, or should have been providing.”

In reaffirming Bass, we also affirm the opinion and award of the Full Commission.

Affirmed.

Chief Judge Brock and Judge Hedrick concur.

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210 S.E.2d 111, 24 N.C. App. 129, 1974 N.C. App. LEXIS 1950, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sloop-v-williams-exxon-service-ncctapp-1974.

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