0Rl0lt\IAl, l|n tbe @nite! $.tafts [,ourt of fpDtrsl @lsims No. l4-408C (Filed: June 4,2014)
:* :i *,1. :t **t 1. * * {,'t * * * * * * * * * :1.,1' r' ** :} ** :* ******* * FILED WILLIAM D. SLONE. JUN -4 2014 Plaintiff, U.S. COURTOF FEDERALCI-AIIfiI
THE TINITED STATES, :f
Defendant. * *:1.,t* *** **{. 't * ,t :i ********** *** *** *** *** ***
OPINION AND ORDER
On May 6,2014, plaintiffin the above-captioned case, appearing pgq se, filed a complaint and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff, who is cunently incarcerated in Pine West Liberty, Kentucky, contends that he has suffered "unjust conviction and imprisonment," Compl. 1, and that he is entitled to "$200,000 plus cost[s]" in damages, id. at 7. He challenges his alleged "transfer of custody" from Kentucky state jurisdiction to federal jurisdiction. Id. at 2. He also contends that a separate case that he filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 was inconectly "recharacterized" as two separate petitions for a writ ofhabeas corpus, "without notice" to him, id., but that he has still been "deprived . . . ofa fair habeas corpus," id. at 5. Further, he states that his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution ("U.S. Constitution"), id. at 2-3, as well as his rights under the Fourth and Sixth Amendments, have been violated, id. at 5. He also argues that he has been deprived ofhis rights pursuant to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Id. This court lacks jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff s claims and must therefore dismiss his complaint.
Whether the court has jurisdiction to decide the merits of a case is a threshold matter. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't,523 U.S.83,94-95 (1998). "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). The parties or the court on its own initiative may challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction at any time. Folden v. United states,379 F .3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Further, the ability ofthe United States Court of Federal Claims ("Court ofFederal Claims") to entertain suits against the United States is limited. "The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586 (1941). The waiver of immunity "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed." United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1,4 (1969). The Tucker Act, the principal statute governing the jurisdiction of this court, waives sovereign immunity for claims against the United States not sounding in tort that are founded upon the United States Constitution, a federal statute or regulation, or an express or implied contract with the United States. 28 U.S.C. $ 1a91(a)(1) (2006). However, the Tucker Act is merely ajurisdictional statute and "does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages." United States v. TesLan,424 U.S.392,398 (1976). The substantive right must appear in another source of law, such as a "money-mandating constitutional provision, statute or regulation that has been violated, or an express or implied contract with the United States." Loveladies Harbor. Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
In this case, plaintiffdoes not allege any claims based on a contract with the United States or a money-mandating constitutional provision, federal statute, or federal regulation. He challenges his alleged transfer ofcustody from state to federal authorities, but the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to entertain criminal matters. See Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378,379-80 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (affirming that the Court of Federal Claims had,,,no jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims whatsoever under the federal criminal code"'); Kania v. united states,650 F.2d 264,268 (ct.cl. 1981) (noting that "the role ofthejudiciary inthehigh function of enforcing and policing the criminal law is assigned to the courts of general jurisdiction and not to this court").
Moreover, to the extent that plaintiff alleges claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $ 19g3, the court lacks jurisdiction to consider claims under that statute. See Jefferson v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 81, 89 (2012) ("[T]he court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over actions arising under sections of the civil Rights Acts, including 42 u.s.c. g 19g3, g 1985, and l9s8 (2006) . $ . . ."); Marlin v. United Srates, 63 Fed. CL.475,476 (2005) (,,tTlhe Court does noi huue jurisdiction to consider civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 u.S.c. $$ 1991, 19g3, or 19g5 because jurisdiction over claims arising under the Civil Rights Act resides exclusively in the district courts."); Blassineame v. United srates, 33 Fed. cl. 504, 505 (1995) (,,sectio; 19g3 is not a jurisdiction-granting statute. District courts are given jurisdiction to hear claims for damages for violation of that provision. . . . Such an action cannot be sustained here, however, because this court has not been given an equivalent jurisdiction."), affd, 73 F.3d379 (Fed. cir. 1995). The court also lacks the authority to review a district court's decision adjudging a habeas petition; rather, that authority lies with the federal courts ofappeal. see generaliv d.s]Ba.r"orp Morte. co. v. Bonner Mall P'qhip, 513 u.s. 1s,27 (1994) ("congress has p."rrribrd u p.i.ury route, by appeal as ofright and certiorari, through which parties may seek ielieffrom the legal consequences ofjudicial judgments. To allow a party who steps off the statutory path to employ . . . [a] collateral attack on thejudgment would-quite apart from any considerations of faimess to the parties-disturb the orderly operation of the federal judicial system."); Joshua v. united states, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. cir. 1994) ("[T]he court ofF.derul cluio's d*. not ha* jurisdiction to review the decisions ofdistrict courts . . . relating to proceedings before those courts.").
Further, plaintiff contends that his rights under Kentucky's constitution have been deprived, but the Tucker Act only provides forjurisdiction for claims arising under the United states constitution, not state constitutions. See 28 U.S.c. 1491. plaintiff does assert $ violations of some amendments to the U.s. constitution, but because of the nature ofthese claims, the court lacks jurisdiction to hear them. Specifically, the Fourth Amendment's Search and Seizure Clause does not mandate the payment of money damages, and thus cannot provide a basis for jurisdiction in this court. See Brown, 105 F.3d at 623; cf. Crocker v. United States, 125 F .3d 1475, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("The Court of Federal Claims . . . does not have jurisdiction to hear . . . due process or seizure claims under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution."). The court also does not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiff s Sixth Amendment claims. Duore v. United States,229 Ct.
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0Rl0lt\IAl, l|n tbe @nite! $.tafts [,ourt of fpDtrsl @lsims No. l4-408C (Filed: June 4,2014)
:* :i *,1. :t **t 1. * * {,'t * * * * * * * * * :1.,1' r' ** :} ** :* ******* * FILED WILLIAM D. SLONE. JUN -4 2014 Plaintiff, U.S. COURTOF FEDERALCI-AIIfiI
THE TINITED STATES, :f
Defendant. * *:1.,t* *** **{. 't * ,t :i ********** *** *** *** *** ***
OPINION AND ORDER
On May 6,2014, plaintiffin the above-captioned case, appearing pgq se, filed a complaint and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff, who is cunently incarcerated in Pine West Liberty, Kentucky, contends that he has suffered "unjust conviction and imprisonment," Compl. 1, and that he is entitled to "$200,000 plus cost[s]" in damages, id. at 7. He challenges his alleged "transfer of custody" from Kentucky state jurisdiction to federal jurisdiction. Id. at 2. He also contends that a separate case that he filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 was inconectly "recharacterized" as two separate petitions for a writ ofhabeas corpus, "without notice" to him, id., but that he has still been "deprived . . . ofa fair habeas corpus," id. at 5. Further, he states that his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution ("U.S. Constitution"), id. at 2-3, as well as his rights under the Fourth and Sixth Amendments, have been violated, id. at 5. He also argues that he has been deprived ofhis rights pursuant to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Id. This court lacks jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff s claims and must therefore dismiss his complaint.
Whether the court has jurisdiction to decide the merits of a case is a threshold matter. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't,523 U.S.83,94-95 (1998). "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). The parties or the court on its own initiative may challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction at any time. Folden v. United states,379 F .3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Further, the ability ofthe United States Court of Federal Claims ("Court ofFederal Claims") to entertain suits against the United States is limited. "The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586 (1941). The waiver of immunity "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed." United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1,4 (1969). The Tucker Act, the principal statute governing the jurisdiction of this court, waives sovereign immunity for claims against the United States not sounding in tort that are founded upon the United States Constitution, a federal statute or regulation, or an express or implied contract with the United States. 28 U.S.C. $ 1a91(a)(1) (2006). However, the Tucker Act is merely ajurisdictional statute and "does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages." United States v. TesLan,424 U.S.392,398 (1976). The substantive right must appear in another source of law, such as a "money-mandating constitutional provision, statute or regulation that has been violated, or an express or implied contract with the United States." Loveladies Harbor. Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
In this case, plaintiffdoes not allege any claims based on a contract with the United States or a money-mandating constitutional provision, federal statute, or federal regulation. He challenges his alleged transfer ofcustody from state to federal authorities, but the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to entertain criminal matters. See Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378,379-80 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (affirming that the Court of Federal Claims had,,,no jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims whatsoever under the federal criminal code"'); Kania v. united states,650 F.2d 264,268 (ct.cl. 1981) (noting that "the role ofthejudiciary inthehigh function of enforcing and policing the criminal law is assigned to the courts of general jurisdiction and not to this court").
Moreover, to the extent that plaintiff alleges claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $ 19g3, the court lacks jurisdiction to consider claims under that statute. See Jefferson v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 81, 89 (2012) ("[T]he court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over actions arising under sections of the civil Rights Acts, including 42 u.s.c. g 19g3, g 1985, and l9s8 (2006) . $ . . ."); Marlin v. United Srates, 63 Fed. CL.475,476 (2005) (,,tTlhe Court does noi huue jurisdiction to consider civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 u.S.c. $$ 1991, 19g3, or 19g5 because jurisdiction over claims arising under the Civil Rights Act resides exclusively in the district courts."); Blassineame v. United srates, 33 Fed. cl. 504, 505 (1995) (,,sectio; 19g3 is not a jurisdiction-granting statute. District courts are given jurisdiction to hear claims for damages for violation of that provision. . . . Such an action cannot be sustained here, however, because this court has not been given an equivalent jurisdiction."), affd, 73 F.3d379 (Fed. cir. 1995). The court also lacks the authority to review a district court's decision adjudging a habeas petition; rather, that authority lies with the federal courts ofappeal. see generaliv d.s]Ba.r"orp Morte. co. v. Bonner Mall P'qhip, 513 u.s. 1s,27 (1994) ("congress has p."rrribrd u p.i.ury route, by appeal as ofright and certiorari, through which parties may seek ielieffrom the legal consequences ofjudicial judgments. To allow a party who steps off the statutory path to employ . . . [a] collateral attack on thejudgment would-quite apart from any considerations of faimess to the parties-disturb the orderly operation of the federal judicial system."); Joshua v. united states, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. cir. 1994) ("[T]he court ofF.derul cluio's d*. not ha* jurisdiction to review the decisions ofdistrict courts . . . relating to proceedings before those courts.").
Further, plaintiff contends that his rights under Kentucky's constitution have been deprived, but the Tucker Act only provides forjurisdiction for claims arising under the United states constitution, not state constitutions. See 28 U.S.c. 1491. plaintiff does assert $ violations of some amendments to the U.s. constitution, but because of the nature ofthese claims, the court lacks jurisdiction to hear them. Specifically, the Fourth Amendment's Search and Seizure Clause does not mandate the payment of money damages, and thus cannot provide a basis for jurisdiction in this court. See Brown, 105 F.3d at 623; cf. Crocker v. United States, 125 F .3d 1475, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("The Court of Federal Claims . . . does not have jurisdiction to hear . . . due process or seizure claims under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution."). The court also does not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiff s Sixth Amendment claims. Duore v. United States,229 Ct. CI.706,706 (1981) (per curiam) ("[T]he fourth and sixth amendments do not in themselves obligate the United States to pay money damages; and, therefore, we have no jurisdiction over such claims."). Additionally, because the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not money-mandating, the court lacks jurisdiction over such claims. See LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025,1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[T]he Due Process Clauses ofthe Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments [and] the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [are not] a sufficient basis forjurisdiction because they do not mandate payment of money by the govemment."); Mullenberg v. United States , 857 F .2d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses "do not trigger Tucker Actjurisdiction in the courts"); Pleasant-Bey v. United States, 99 Fed. C|.363,367 (2011) ("[T]his court does not have j urisdiction over claims based on either the Thirteenth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment because neither mandates the payment of money damages.").
Finally, plaintifffiled, concunent with his complaint, an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ 1915, courts of the United States are permitted to waive filing fees and security under certain circumstances.' Sgg 28 U.S.C. $ 1915(a)(1); see also Haves v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 366,366-67 (2006) (concluding that 28 U.S.C. g 1915(a)(1) applies ro both prisoners and nonprisoners alike). Plaintiffs wishing to proceed in forma pauperis must submit an affidavit that lists all of their assets, declares that they are unable to pay the fees or . give the security, and states the nature of the action and their beliefthat they are entitled to redress. 28 u.s.c. $ 1915(a)(l). Further, prisoners must hle "a certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing ofthe complaint . . . obtained from the appropriate official of each prison which the prisoner is or was confined." Id. g 1915(a)(2).
Plaintiffhas substantially satisfied the requirements set forth in section l9l5(a). The court therefore grants plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis and waives plaintiff s prepayment of the filing fee. Notwithstanding the court's waiver, prisoners seeking to proceed in fgrma pauperis are required to pay, over time, the filing fee in full. Id. $ 1915(b). Thus, plaintiff shall be assessed, as a partial payment of the court's filing fee, an initial sum of twenty percent of
' while the court of Federal claims is not generally considered to be a "court of the United States" within the meaning of title twenty-eight of the United States code, the court has jurisdiction to grant or deny applications to proceed in forma pauperis. see 2g u.s.c. 2503(d) $ (deeming the Court ofFederal Claims to be "a court of the United States" for the purpoies of28 u.s.c. $ 1915); see also Matthews v. United states,72 Fed. c\.274,277 -78 (2006) (recognizing that Congress enacted the Court ofFederal Claims Technical and Procedural Improvements Act of 1992, authorizing the court to, among other things, adjudicate applications to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. g 1915). the greater of(l) the average monthly deposits into his accolrnt, or (2) the average monthly balance in his account for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint. Id. $ 1915(bxl). Thereafter, plaintiff shall be required to make monthly payments of twenty percent ofthe preceding month's income credited to his account. Id. $ 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of plaintiff shall forward payments from plaintiff s account to the Clerk ofthe Court ofFederal Claims each time the account balance exceeds $10 and until such time as the filing fee is paid in full. Id.
In sum, the court GRANTS plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis and DISMISSES plaintiff s complaint for lack ofjurisdiction. The clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.