Sloat v. Spring

22 F. Cas. 330, 1850 U.S. App. LEXIS 304

This text of 22 F. Cas. 330 (Sloat v. Spring) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sloat v. Spring, 22 F. Cas. 330, 1850 U.S. App. LEXIS 304 (circtedpa 1850).

Opinion

GRIER, Circuit Justice

(charging jury). I congratulate you that we have at last got so near what I hope is the end of our labors in this case. You have observed that this is not the usual common law action brought for the infringement of a patent right, in which, if the plaintiff is successful, the jury assess damages, and render a verdict which, [331]*331is tlie foundation of a judgment at law. But this case had its origin on the equity— the chancery — side of this court. The plaintiff, in his bill, prayed for an injunction against the use of a certain machine in the possession of the defendants, which he alleged was an infringement of the patent to .Woodworth, of which plaintiff was the as-signee. The defendants, in their answer, denied — First. That Woodworth was the original inventor of the machine patented by him in December. 1828. Second. They alleged that the patent re-issued in July, 1845, is not for the same invention intended to be patented by the first patent of 1828. And thirdly. That admitting the validity of the plaintiff's patent, the machine invented and used by the defendants did not infringe upon it.

As the questions in issue on the equity side of the court were all matters of fact, affirmed by one party and denied by the other, which would probably be the subject of mueli contradictors’ testimony of facts, and conflicting opinions on questions of mechanics, we thought it best to have them tried by a jury — the proper tribunal for trying questions of fact — when the witnesses and the machines themselves can be brought into court, where the one may be subject to careful inspection, and the other to rigid cross-examination; the only sure method of eliciting the truth in such cases as the present. Courts of chancery examine all questions by depositions, not by witnesses, and in depositions every man may be just six feet long, and you cannot compare them. It will be your duty, therefore, gentlemen, to carefully examine and weigh the testimony which has been laid before you, on each of the three several points stated, and according as you find the truth to be, to return an affirmative or a negative answer to the three following propositions. You will observe that they are stated in the interrogative form; your verdict will be made by changing them into the affirmative or negative form.

The first is — Was Wm. Woodworth the original inventor of the machine patented by him, December 27th, 1828? Your answer will be, either he was the original inventor or he was not. The second — Is the re-issued patent of July, 1845, for the same invention, intended to have been patented by the patent of December 27th, 1828? Your answer will be either that the patent of July was for the same invention as that of 1S28, or it was not. So with the third— Does the machine of the defendants infringe upon "the said amended patent of July, 1845? Your answer will be either that it is or it is not. 'So that you are not to be troubled with any other extraneous questions; they will be settled when we get your answers to these.

The first point for your consideration is, was Wm. Woodworth the original inventor of the machine patented by him, December 27th, 1S28? Now without pretending to sum up the whole evidence on any one- of these points — a thing that has been done with great ability by the learned counsel on both sides, I must confess, with uncommon ability — it will be necessary for the court only to make a few remarks on the points of law that bear on each of these points, and especially on those which the counsel have requested us to instruct you. To entitle a man to a patent, the law requires that a machine must be new and useful. You will observe that this .first question admits the machine to be useful; it does not question that; it only denies its novelty so far as Woodworth is concerned in it. Was Wood-worth the first inventor of this machine for planing, tonguing and grooving boards at one operation? “The intellectual production, or that which, when perfected, constitutes the thing invented, differing from all other things by some substantial peculiarity, which gives it a distinct character, is what the law means to protect with an exclusive privilege.” That is what is meant by an invention. It is usually the case, when any valuable discovery is made, or any new machine of great utility has been invented, that the attention of the public has been turned to that subject previously; that many have been making researches and experiments. Philosophers and mechanicians may have in some measure anticipated, in their speculations, the possibility or probability of such discovery or invention; many experiments have been unsuccessfully tried, coming very near, yet falling short of the desired result Yet all these speculations and experiments have produced nothii.7 really beneficial. The invention, when '■< rfected, may be truly said to be the culminating point of many experiments, not only by the inventor, but by many other persons. It is when speculation is reduced to practice, when experiments have resulted in a contrivance or machine, new and useful, not known or used by others before, that such discovery or invention is entitled to a patent. It has happened that adroit speculators may steal the inventions or discoveries of others, and be the first to obtain a patent. But it more generally happens that when an inventor has successfully produced a new and useful machine, that dozens of others rise up to claim a priority. Never has a useful invention been patented, that witnesses could not be found to swear that they had seen it in use many years before, either, in New or Old England; and yet, strange to tell, the invention, though most valuable, has been left to drop into obscurity, both by the inventor and the public, burnt up, or had some other accident, so that neither the public nor the inventor received any advantage from it. Such testimony ought to be received with suspicion, as it carries improbability on its face. You will inquire, [332]*332then, whether any person had previously invented the machine patented hy Woodworth in 182S, or whether he was the first, invent- or of that compound machine used for the planing of hoards, for which he obtained a patent. The evidence on the affirmative of this question, is: First — the patent, which is prima facie evidence; it is founded on the oath of the applicant, and is sufficient until those alleging he is not the inventor prove the contrary. Ton know that is the meaning of prima facie evidence, sufficient to prove a fact until the contrary is proved; but it is liable to be rebutted. That is the difference between prima facie and conclusive evidence. Second — the testimony of witnesses that such a machine was not known before 1828. when Wm. Woodworth put it into successful operation at the dry ■dock in Sew York.

Has the force of this testimony been overcome by that offered by the defendants? They allege. First. That Woodworth is not the first inventor, nor entitled, as such, to a patent, because his machine had been described in a public work, anterior to his patent. Certain volumes of an English publication, called the Repertory of Arts, have been put in evidence to show that one Samuel Bentham had described such a machine in +he specifications of certain patents granted to him as early as 1798. or before that time. And they have shown you a patent granted to one Bramah. It must strike you as strange, that if either Bentham or Bramah had invented a machine of such immense value, no person could be found who had ■ever seen it in operation. It is true, that if a machine substantially the same with that patented to Woodworth, in 182S. is described in books as long ago as 1798.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
22 F. Cas. 330, 1850 U.S. App. LEXIS 304, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sloat-v-spring-circtedpa-1850.