Sloan v. Lawrence Furnace Co.

Ohio Supreme Court

Sloan v. Lawrence Furnace Co.

29 Ohio St. 568

CourtOhio Supreme Court

DecidedDecember 15, 1876

StatusPublished

Cited by17 cases

This text of 29 Ohio St. 568 (Sloan v. Lawrence Furnace Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sloan v. Lawrence Furnace Co., 29 Ohio St. 568 (Ohio 1876).

Pincite

Opinion

By the Court.

In the deed of conveyance from Israel to Sloan, the minerals underlying the soil were excepted from, the grant. It is true, the intention of the grantor was expressed by the word “reserving,” which technically saves only a right to som& use or benefit in the thing granted, instead of excluding or excepting from the operation of the deed a part of the thing embraced in the general description. But while this technical distinction between a reservation and an exception may exist, it is quite clear, from the subject-matter, that “ reserving ” was here used in the sense of “ excepting.” The “ minerals underlying the soil ” being a part of the land described in the deed, and not a mere future benefit or interest therein, there can be no doubt the grantor intended to retain the fee-simple title to the minerals. The defendant in error having succeeded to the interest retained by Israel, and the plaintiffs to that which was conveyed to Sloan, we think the judgment below was right. 30 Verm. 242 ; 46 Penn. St. 187; 3 Wash. on Real. Prop., side p. 640.

Motion overruled.

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By the Court.

In the deed of conveyance from Israel to Sloan, the minerals underlying the soil were excepted from, the grant. It is true, the intention of the grantor was expressed by the word “reserving,” which technically saves only a right to som& use or benefit in the thing granted, instead of excluding or excepting from the operation of the deed a part of the thing embraced in the general description. But while this technical distinction between a reservation and an exception may exist, it is quite clear, from the subject-matter, that “ reserving ” was here used in the sense of “ excepting.” The “ minerals underlying the soil ” being a part of the land described in the deed, and not a mere future benefit or interest therein, there can be no doubt the grantor intended to retain the fee-simple title to the minerals. The defendant in error having succeeded to the interest retained by Israel, and the plaintiffs to that which was conveyed to Sloan, we think the judgment below was right. 30 Verm. 242 ; 46 Penn. St. 187; 3 Wash. on Real. Prop., side p. 640.

Motion overruled.

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Bluebook (online)

29 Ohio St. 568, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sloan-v-lawrence-furnace-co-ohio-1876.

Opinion

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