Sloan v. Given

Opinion

No. 830 September 2, 2026 645

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

Katherine SLOAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Robert Leo GIVEN, Defendant-Respondent. Lane County Circuit Court 24CV44126; A189213

Karrie K. McIntyre, Judge. Submitted July 10, 2026. Katherine Sloan filed the brief pro se. No appearance for respondent. Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Egan, Judge.* LAGESEN, C. J.

Affirmed.

______________

* Determined by a two-judge department as authorized by ORS 2.570(2)(b).

646 Sloan v. Given

LAGESEN, C. J. Plaintiff appeals a general judgment dismissing her claim after a bench trial. Plaintiff sought specific performance of a purported contract under which she agreed to purchase, and defendant agreed to sell, certain real property for $10. On appeal, in her only assignment of error, plaintiff contends that “the trial court erred in dismissing appellant’s contract claim because the findings entered” do not support that legal result. We affirm.

“In reviewing a trial court’s determinations following a bench trial, we review the trial court’s explicit and implicit findings of fact for any evidence in the record to support them, and the legal consequences of those facts for legal error.” Pistol Resources, LLC v. McNeely, 312 Or App 627, 629, 496 P3d 28 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In deciding this case, a detailed recitation of the facts would not benefit the bench, the bar, or the public. But in brief, by way of historical fact that is relevant to our analysis, we note that the trial court found that defendant agreed to sell the property—which was defendant and his wife’s “marital home”—to plaintiff for $10. The intent of the agreement was to deprive defendant’s wife of any claim to the marital home in upcoming divorce proceedings, and also to accomplish defendant’s wife’s “ouster” from the marital home, of which she had “exclusive use” pursuant to a court-issued “restraining order” against defendant.

Indeed, during trial, defendant testified that the agreement plaintiff sought to enforce was entered into as a “ruse,” and explained that his wife had “displaced” him from the marital home via the restraining order. Plaintiff, for her part, testified that the agreement was entered into, in part, because defendant “didn’t want his wife to get the house.” Finally, in terms of historical fact, we highlight that notwithstanding the $10 sales price, the trial court found that plaintiff valued the home at $140,000 and defendant valued the home at $300,000.

Given those facts, the trial court ultimately determined that plaintiff was not entitled to the relief she sought in her complaint, i.e., specific performance, because she “came to

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 645 (2026) 647

court requesting relief with ‘unclean hands’ and therefore[ ] is precluded from the equitable relief of specific performance.”1 On appeal, plaintiff makes various arguments as to why the trial court erred when it dismissed her complaint. As an initial matter, we understand plaintiff to argue that it was error for the trial court to apply the doctrine of unclean hands because that is an equitable doctrine, and she sought relief under contract law—that is, we understand her to argue that the trial court erred because she sought relief in law and not equity. That argument fails because, as the trial court noted, specific performance is equitable relief. See Cameron v. Benson, 295 Or 98, 105, 664 P2d 412 (1983) (“[I]n an action seeking the equitable remedy of specific performance , it is the function of the court to do full and complete justice to the parties.”). And specific performance is the only relief plaintiff sought in her complaint.

We also understand plaintiff to argue that, given the trial court’s findings, the doctrine of unclean hands is inapplicable as a matter of law. We disagree with plaintiff. As we have explained, “[a] conveyance designed for the purpose of placing property beyond the reach of creditors constitutes inequitable conduct sufficient to bar relief under the unclean hands doctrine”; the doctrine can apply whether the “target” of the “inequitable conduct” is a “defendant or some third party”; and, indeed, the trial court “may invoke the doctrine on its own motion.” Osborne v. Nottley, 206 Or App 201, 205, 136 P3d 81, rev den, 341 Or 579 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). We also note, contrary to what plaintiff asserts in her brief on appeal, the “wrongdoing” in this case is “related to the transaction” giving rise to her claim. North Pacific Lumber Co. v. Oliver, 286 Or 639, 653, 596 P2d 931 (1979) (observing that “[t]he principle that a party’s unclean hands will preclude him from obtaining equitable relief only when the wrongdoing 1 Although the trial court’s explicit statement that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the doctrine of unclean hands was contained in an order granting reconsideration entered after entry of the judgment on appeal, we understand that reconsideration order to have clarified the reasoning underlying the trial court’s prior ruling regarding plaintiff’s claim. The trial court’s clarification has informed plaintiff’s arguments on appeal. For that reason, we take it into account in evaluating the trial court’s determination that plaintiff is not entitled to the equitable relief requested.

648 Sloan v. Given

is related to the transaction giving rise to the claim is well established in Oregon”).

In arguing that we should reverse, plaintiff also contends that (1) “the trial court’s finding that no dissolution proceedings existed eliminates any marital-equity or prospective marital property framework” and (2) “the finding that respondent was the sole owner at all relevant times eliminates theories based on protection of a non-owner spouse’s property interest.” As to the first contention, among other difficulties for plaintiff, the trial court found that less than 10 days after entering into the agreement plaintiff seeks to enforce via specific performance, defendant initiated a dissolution proceeding vis-à-vis his wife, and that plaintiff assisted defendant in preparing the paperwork for the proceeding. Plaintiff does not explain why equity requires a dissolution proceeding be pending at the same time that a “ruse” transaction is entered into in order for the doctrine of unclean hands to apply in these circumstances.2 As to the second contention, we do not understand the trial court to have found that respondent was the “sole owner at all relevant times,” such that defendant’s wife might not have claims regarding the home during a dissolution proceeding . Indeed, in the judgment on appeal, the trial court noted that defendant’s wife is a “potential creditor on the marital home” in the event of dissolution proceedings and was presently entitled to “exclusive use and possession of the property.”

Affirmed.

2 That dissolution proceeding was ultimately dismissed due to lack of service on defendant’s wife.