Slingerland v. Gillespie

51 A. 475, 67 N.J.L. 385, 38 Vroom 385, 1902 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 151
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedFebruary 24, 1902
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 51 A. 475 (Slingerland v. Gillespie) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Slingerland v. Gillespie, 51 A. 475, 67 N.J.L. 385, 38 Vroom 385, 1902 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 151 (N.J. 1902).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Collins, J.

It incidentally appears in the evidence that the plaintiff had previously sued the East Jersey Water Company for the same alleged cause of action. We find that a verdict recovered in that case of $5,000 was set aside by this court, and as some of the legal questions now involved were then settled, it will be necessary to advert to the opinion read by Chief Justice Beasley on that occasion. Slingerland v. East Jersey Water Company, 29 Vroom 411.

The state of facts recited was the same as that above given, except that there seems to have been no dispute in that case that the entry was after the tender, for it is stated in the opinion that such entry was “admittedly in all respects legal.” It is recited that no other authority for the plaintiff to act for her father was proved than by his' declaration in testimony that when he left home in the morning he left his farm in the care of his daughter, who had been in the habit of assisting him in the business there carried on. The law of the case was thus declared: “The plaintiff, in her conduct on this occasion, was a pure and simple wrongdoer. She had no authority from her father to intervene in the affair. She was not his agent for that purpose, and he was not responsible for her acts. But even if she had been specially empowered' by him to do what she did, it would have been of no .avail, for this subcontractor, having taken possession of the strip of land which had been condemned and paid for, had the right to defend that occupancy even against the landowner’ himself. Under the circumstances mentioned, if the proprietor of the farm had interposed' his person so as to be an obstacle to the laying of the pipes, it is plain that he could’ have been lawfully pushed aside, by the use of all the force [388]*388needful for that end. The rule of law upon this subject is not open, in this state, to any question. Nor will the pretence set up at the trial, that the plaintiff, on at least one occasion, was pushed against by one of the water-pipes while she was standing on her father’s land outside of the strip of thirty-three feet, be of any avail. The claim was that, in rolling some of the pipes, they extended on to the contiguous property, and one of the plaintiff’s witnesses says that at one of the times in question the plaintiff was at least two feet beyond the line of the condemned tract. If this be so, she was still there committing' a trespass, for her purpose and attempt were tprevent, by force, .this contractor from the exercise of his legal right. There is no testimony that even tends to show that she had been commissioned by her father to defend, by violence or by any other means, an intrusion, no matter how wrongful, into any part of his lands. The result is that the court concludes that the contractor under the defendant was in lawful possession of the premises in dispute; that he had the right to use the necessary force to maintain such occupancy, and .that the plaintiff herself was the wrongdoer in the occurrence forming the basis of the suit.”

It was further the opinion of the court that, admitting a cause of action, the East Jersey Water Company would not be, the party to be implicated, as Gillespie was an independent contractor to do the work in its behalf, and that, in any view, the damages awarded were excessive; and on all those grounds the rule to show cause was made absolute. The subject of damages was thus presented: "Lastly, the verdict is so excessive with respect to damages that it would be necessary to set it aside even if otherwise unobjectionable.. The sum is $5,000, and for what mischief done by the defendant is this amount awarded? It is said that the plaintiff’s nervous system was morbidly affected by the occurrences above narrated. But the question is, how much.had the defendant (regarding Gillespie as its agent) contributed to produce this unfortm nate result ? What it had done was this: When the plaintiff had placed herself before the slowly-rolling pipes, to remove her from the danger, if any, so incurred. This was done con[389]*389siderately and kindly, and so far was this from disordering her nerves, that on one occasion she laughed as she was led away. It appears absurd to insist that if the' plaintiff received a nervous shock on the occasion in question, it was occasioned by the conduct of-the contractor and his assistants. When a girl of eighteen entered upon the extravagant enterprise of placing her' body as an obstacle 'in the way of over fifty laborers in the prosecution of their work, it is plain that she must have been wrought up to the highest point of nervous excitement, and if disease in that line ensued, the cause is obvious. This principal factor in this branch of the case has been obviously overlooked by the jury.”

After this decision the present suit was begun and in due course came to trial, the plaintiff recovering a verdict 'for '$2,500, which also was set aside by this court,'Mr. Justice Gummere, now sitting, reading the opinion. Slingerland v. Gillespie, 36 Vroom 92. On that trial the authority to the plaintiff, stated by her father in the testimony, was “to look after the property while he was gone, and if anyone entered .the premises to ask them to show a written authority for their entry, and in case they did not have authority, to forbid them the premises in his name.” The time of entry was disputed and this court was of opinion from testimony not, however, recited, that it was clearly after the tender, but the decision of the cause was rested on a lack of authority in the plaintiff to resist such entry. The case in this regard was held indistinguishable from that against the water company. On the trial now under review the father testified that his instructions went further than he had'before stated, and authorized and directed the plaintiff “not to allow anyone to come on the place, but to keep them off unless they showed written authority to do so.” It therefore becomes necessary to examine the evidence as to the time of the entry which the plaintiff resisted-

Mr. Slingerland had procured from the Court of Chancery an order temporarily restraining entry on the' condemned strip. The water company, in expectation of the'removal of the restraint, had notified the subcontractors to be in readiness for [390]*390work upon notice 'to proceed, the conduit having been constructed throughout its entire length, except across the Slingerlahd farm and'a short distance on each side^ and Mr. Gillespie had had a force of men at hand for some days. The sections of'pipe were oh the adjoining lands near the fence lines. The matter was to come up at chambers at ten o’clock in the forenoon of December 24th, and the reason for Mr. Slingerland’s absence from laome was to attend on that occasion. The undisputed evidence is that the restraint was removed at about a quarter-past ten; that the award of the commissioners was immediately tendered and that shortly afterward word was sent by telephone to Mr! Gillespie to proceed. The contention for the plaintiff is that this order was anticipated by an earlier entry. The entry, whenever made, was from the north. The testimony as to time on the part of the plaintiff was first taken and was as follows:

Jacob A. Slingerland, an uncle of the plaintiff, testified that he drove away from his brother’s farm at about half-past eight and that a fence had then been thrown down and the men had begun to dig the trench.

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Bluebook (online)
51 A. 475, 67 N.J.L. 385, 38 Vroom 385, 1902 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 151, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/slingerland-v-gillespie-nj-1902.