Sledge v. The Village of Melrose Park

2023 IL App (1st) 221950-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: November 22, 2023
• Docket: 1-22-1950
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2023 IL App (1st) 221950-U

No. 1-22-1950

Filed November 22, 2023

Fourth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT

SAMUEL SLEDGE, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) 22 CH 2577 ) THE VILLAGE OF MELROSE PARK, and THE ) ILLINOIS LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION, ) ) Defendants, ) Honorable ) Cecilia A. Horan (The Village of Melrose Park, Defendant-Appellee). ) Judge, Presiding

JUSTICE MARTIN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hoffman and Ocasio concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Administrative decision affirming local decision to deny liquor license is affirmed.

¶2 Appellant Samuel Sledge appeals pro se the final order of the circuit court affirming the

Illinois Liquor Control Commission’s (State Commission) affirmance of Melrose Park Liquor

Control Commission’s (Melrose Commission) denial of his application for a liquor license. Sledge

applied to the Village of Melrose Park (the Village) for a business license in April 2021. Sledge No. 1-22-1950

leased property in the Village with the intent to operate a “private social club.” In his license

application, Sledge indicated that the club, a for-profit endeavor to be named Socialite, was

established for the purpose of “Encourag[ing] Members toward economics.” In conjunction with

the business license application, Sledge also applied for a Private Club and Association retail liquor

license. He planned to serve liquor at Socialite.

¶3 After processing the application for a business license, the Village contacted Sledge by

mail advising him that the Village Board of Trustees (Board) would consider his application at its

next meeting scheduled for May 24, 2021. At that meeting, the Village’s building commissioner,

Ralph Source, recommended that Sledge’s application be denied, as the subject property had “zero

off street parking,” as required by the Village’s code regulations. Both Sledge and the leased

property’s landlord, Omelia Garcia, were in attendance and spoke in favor of being granted the

license. The Board voted 6-0 to deny Sledge’s application for a business license.

¶4 In early June 2021, the Village notified Sledge that his request for a liquor license was

denied by the Melrose Commission. Shortly after receiving notice of the liquor license denial,

Sledge appealed the denial to the State Commission. While his appeal was pending, Sledge filed a

complaint in the circuit court seeking administrative review of the Village’s decision denying his

request for a liquor license. The Village moved to dismiss the action, arguing that Sledge had failed

to exhaust his administrative remedies. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the action, finding

Sledge’s claim was not ripe.

¶5 The State Commission heard arguments on Sledge’s appeal on December 8, 2021. On

January 19, 2022, the State Commission affirmed the decision of the Melrose Park Liquor Control

Commission denying Sledge’s application for a liquor license. Sledge requested a rehearing, which

the State Commission denied, sustaining its prior decision.

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¶6 Sledge filed the instant complaint for administrative review in the circuit court on March 3,

2022, seeking review of the State Commission’s decision. By written order filed December 5,

2022, the circuit court affirmed, finding that both the Melrose Park Liquor Commission and the

State Commission’s decisions denying the issuance of a liquor license were “well-supported by

the record.” Sledge filed a timely notice of appeal. 1

¶7 Sledge, pro se, filed a brief on appeal and his argument is difficult to follow. See Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (stating that an appellant’s brief must “contain

the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor” and that “[p]oints not argued are

forfeited”); see also Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(4),(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Specifically,

Sledge raises four issues on appeal:

“Point 1 – Whether the trial court inadvertently applied an ordinance rule with a state statute that applies to people who have a liquor license and the fact[s] are different does not apply to the plaintiff who was denied a liquor license? Point 2 – Whether the state liquor control commissioners should have affirmed the [V]illage of Melrose [P]ark local liquor control commissioner[’s] discretionary decision based on parking? Point 3 – Whether the trial court erred [in] adjudicating stat[e] liquor commissioner[’s] denial based on not having a business license for its denial who did not adhere to 235 ILCS 5/7-9? Point 4 – Whether the trial court affirmed the [V]illage officer[’s] action that was under color of law whether its action constitutes conspiracy of civil rights violation IN RE to denial of licenses and parking?”2

1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order. 2 For the reader’s convenience, the court has corrected some spelling and grammar quoted from the petitioner’s brief. -3- No. 1-22-1950

While Sledge cites to various acts and statutes (including the Dram Shop Act of 1934 and the

criminal offense of conspiracy against civil rights) in support of his argument, the bulk of his

argument is incomprehensible. Nonetheless, despite Sledge’s failure to adhere to the requirements

of Supreme Court Rule 341, we can discern from his statement of issues that he clearly challenges

the circuit court’s findings affirming the Commission’s decision to deny his liquor license. Thus,

we address this issue.

¶8 When reviewing an administrative proceeding, we review the decision of the

administrative agency, not the trial court’s decision. Matlock v. Illinois Department of Employment

Security, 2019 IL App (1st) 180645, ¶ 18. An agency’s findings of fact will be upheld unless

contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, while we review de novo its rulings on questions

of law. Koehler v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm’n, 405 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 1078-79 (2010). An

agency’s decisions on mixed questions of law and fact will be upheld unless clearly erroneous. Id.

at 1079.

¶9 The Village’s argument is straightforward. It denied Sledge’s application for a liquor

license because his business license had been denied. Since there was no business in operation at

the desired location, there could be no liquor license for that location either. In other words, having

a valid business license for the location was a prerequisite for obtaining a liquor license. See

Melrose Park Municipal Code, 5-12-060(C)(5); 5-12-090(V). Here, the Village previously denied

Sledge a business license after it determined that there was inadequate parking at the location. It

was incumbent upon Sledge to challenge that determination before seeking a liquor license.

¶ 10 Before every tribunal that heard this matter, Sledge seemed to argue that because his

business organization was incorporated in another state, both Illinois and municipalities within

Illinois were required to grant his business any license for which he applied. This argument has no

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merit. Sledge needed a valid business license to operate a social club at the location he leased in

the Village, and he failed to obtain it. Without a business license, the Village could not issue a

liquor license. The record supports the State Commission’s judgment. Accordingly, we affirm.

¶ 11 Affirmed.

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