Slawson v. United States

83 U.S. 310, 21 L. Ed. 356, 16 Wall. 310, 1872 U.S. LEXIS 1159

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: March 31, 1873
• Status: Published

Opinion

Mr. Justice DAVIS

delivered the opinion of the court.

It is impossible to suppose that Tower would have made the contract he did with Slawson if he had been informed of the true state of affairs with reference to this steamer,' and in the absence of proof on.the subject it is a fair presumption that he was kept purposely in ignorance of the fact that she had been engaged constantly'for nearly two years preceding the occupation of Charleston by the Federal forces, with the consent of the owner, in carrying on war against the United States. The object of Slawson in the transaction was obvious. If' he could, through the instrumentality of Tower, get his steamer in the service of the government at a stated compensation, he would have a chance at least to save her from being treated as prize of war, and, if so, to obtain a remunerative price for her future employment. The circumstances at the time were favorable to the accomplishment of his object. The steamer was aground on a distant island, and Tower, although he had a right to suspect, could not certaiuly know the kind of use to which she had been previously put. If a credulous man, which would seem to be the case, he could be easily imposed on, and in the nature of things it was not to be expected that any one would volunteer information to condemn the boat and Slaw-, son’s conduct' in connection with her.

It seems, however, that the mode adopted by Slawson to save his boat, and obtain compensation for her futuré use, if ingeniously contrived, did not accomplish his object, for the government not only declined to pay anything for her use, but appropriated the boat itself as the lawful capture of the army. This disposition of the property was strenuously resisted by Slawson. The quartermaster’s department not only refused on request to return the boat, but without notice to Slawson, and against his will, turned it over to the agent of the treasury. Learning that this was doné, he invoked, without success, the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury in his behalf. This officer declined to restore the boat, on the ground that by the act of transfer to the Treasury Department the military power had adjudged and determined the fact that the boat was the lawful capture or prize of the army, and that he had not the power to tevise that decision. She was accordingly sold, and the net proceeds paid into the treasury. Slawsou insists that he is entitled to these proceeds under the act to provide for the collection of abandoned property, even if there had been a valid capture, but the proviso to the first section of this act •expressly excludes from its operation property which, like this, has been used for the purpose of carrying on war against the United States. Congress did not think proper to become the trustee for the owner of a steamboat engaged, with his consent, in the military service of the enemy at the very time Charleston was taken. It will not do to say that Slawsou acted under compulsion after his purchase. In the first place the Court of Claims do not find this to be the ' case, and, besides, his conduct is inconsistent with any such theory, for he purchased the steamer while under charter in the Confederate service, and necessarily must have known that he could not recover her from that service. It needs no argument to show that the purchaser under such circurm stances, consents that the boat shall be continuediu the same business in which she had been engaged from the commencement of the rebellion. The claimant is, therefore, excluded from the benefit of the Captured.and Abandoned Property Act, and as the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction to try a case growing out of the appropriation of property by the army or navy, it follows that its judgment must be

Affirmed.