Slak v. Porter

875 P.2d 515, 128 Or. App. 274, 1994 Ore. App. LEXIS 790
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedMay 25, 1994
Docket9207-04834; CA A77302
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 875 P.2d 515 (Slak v. Porter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Slak v. Porter, 875 P.2d 515, 128 Or. App. 274, 1994 Ore. App. LEXIS 790 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

*276 LANDAU, J.

This action arises out of a dispute concerning the continuing existence of an easement over defendants’ land. Plaintiffs brought suit to quiet title to the easement, for a declaratory judgment, and to permanently enjoin defendants from interfering with their use of the easement. Defendants counterclaimed to quiet title and to remove cloud from their title, on the theory that the easement had been extinguished by adverse possession. The trial court declared that plaintiffs retained the easement as described in their deed, enjoined defendants from interfering with the easement, and instructed defendants to remove the obstructions they had placed on the easement. On de novo review, ORS 19.125(3), we reverse.

Before 1958, plaintiffs’ and defendants’ predecessor owned a single tract of land on the west bank of the Willamette River. In 1958, the predecessor divided the single tract into two parcels, an eastern parcel that bordered the river and a western parcel that was situated on the upland side of the eastern parcel. The predecessor sold the eastern, riverfront parcel to defendants, subject to an easement in favor of the western parcel. The easement was described in the deed as a three-foot wide path along the northern edge of the property running eastward to the river. The western parcel was sold to a series of owners, and ultimately, in 1989, to plaintiffs.

In 1959, defendants developed the eastern, riverfront property. Among the improvements was a six-foot-high fence, which begins just inside the entrance to the property, at its northwestern corner, and runs 60 feet along the northern boundary, parallel to the easement. At the northwestern corner, however, shortly after the entrance to the property, the fence angles directly across the easement and completely blocks it. Defendants constructed the fence with the deliberate intention of blocking access to the easement. The fence has been maintained continuously since its construction.

Beginning in the late 1970’s, defendants planted substantial shrubbery and other vegetation in and along the easement. At least six rhododendrons were planted directly in the path, as was a 60-foot-long photinia hedge, a holly tree *277 and several cedars. Defendants have maintained the vegetation continuously since the time of planting.

Evidence of any attempts by owners of the western parcel to obtain access to the river since 1959 is sketchy. The first owner of the western parcel testified that, from 1959 to 1968, he and members of his family walked to the river two to three times each year. However, because the easement was blocked by the fence, he and his family walked to the north of the fence, on the neighboring owner’s land, to get to the river. He assumed, incorrectly, that the fence did not block the easement, and that, when he walked to the north of the fence, he was walking on the easement.

The owner of the western parcel from 1968 to 1970 testified that he attempted to walk to the river from his property on one occasion. He said that there was no trail at the time, and that he could not recall whether he walked to the north or the south of the fence. Similarly, the owners of the western parcel from 1970 to 1973 “checked out” the easement on one occasion. There is no testimony as to the route they took to the river on that occasion.

The owner of the parcel from 1973 to 1989 testified that, at the time he purchased the property, the easement area was so heavily overgrown with shrubbery and other vegetation that he could not use it. He testified that his wife would occasionally “stand on the end of the easement,” and that he and his grandchildren would occasionally go from their property to the river and back. However, he could not identify the route he took to the river, and whether it was to the north or the south of the fence and the shrubbery. He did say that he was aware that the shrubbery blocked the easement and that “it had been our intention eventually to confront [defendants] on this issue.”

Plaintiffs obtained the western parcel in 1989. Plaintiff Matthew Slak testified that he used the easement five or six times. He said that he walked along the south side of the fence through some bushes and then to the south of the photinia hedge that occupied the easement.

To establish that they extinguished the three-foot easement to the river, defendants must show that their use or *278 occupancy of the easement was actual, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and hostile for a 10-year period. Abbott v. Thompson, 56 Or App 311, 316, 641 P2d 652, rev den 293 Or 103 (1982); see also Schoeller v. Kulawiak, 118 Or App 524, 528, 848 P2d 619, rev den 317 Or 272 (1993). 1 In addition, defendants must show that their use or occupancy was inconsistent with plaintiffs’ use of the easement. Abbott v. Thompson, supra, 56 Or App at 317. Each element must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Thompson v. Scott, 270 Or 542, 547, 528 P2d 509 (1974).

To establish “actual” possession, defendants must show

“occupation or use of the land that would be made by an owner of the same type of land, taking into account the uses for which the land is suitable.” Lee v. Hansen, 282 Or 371, 376, 578 P2d 784 (1978).

Defendants contend that, by erecting a fence and planting trees, shrubs and other vegetation in the easement, they have established actual possession. Plaintiffs do not address the sufficiency of defendants’ proof with respect to this element. In any event, we find that defendants’ use of the easement is the type of use that would be made by the owner of the property. The element of actual possession is satisfied.

To establish that their use was “open” and “notorious,” defendants must show that plaintiffs had notice that defendants were asserting a claim of ownership of the easement. Corson v. Williford, 44 Or App 145, 149, 605 P2d 1194 (1980). Defendants argue that their construction of the fence in 1959 and their later planting of trees, shrubs and other vegetation directly in the easement put plaintiffs on notice that defendants were asserting ownership of the easement. Plaintiffs characterize defendants’ use of the easement as “secretive and covert” and argue that defendants’ failure to declare openly their intentions with respect to the easement is fatal to their adverse possession claim. According to plaintiffs, there was no way for them to know that the fence and the vegetation actually blocked the easement.

*279 Defendants’ failure to announce their intentions to acquire the easement by adverse possession is not fatal to their claim. Notice of the adverse possession may be actual or constructive. Corson v. Williford, supra, 44 Or App at 149. Construction of a fence, in fact, is recognized as a “classic” example of the type of use that satisfies the requirement of open and notorious use. Doan v. Bogart,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Tim Thomson And Dan Thomson v. R And H Family, Llc
Court of Appeals of Washington, 2020
Morris v. Kanne
436 P.3d 36 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2019)
Mid-Valley Resources, Inc. v. Foxglove Properties, LLP
381 P.3d 910 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2016)
Uhl v. Krupsky
294 P.3d 559 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2013)
Johnston v. Cornelius
218 P.3d 129 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2009)
Stonier v. Kronenberger
214 P.3d 41 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2009)
Shields v. Villareal
33 P.3d 1032 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2001)
Mariah Investments, Ltd. v. McCabe
986 P.2d 1209 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1999)
Hoffman v. Freeman Land and Timber, LLC
964 P.2d 1144 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1998)
Stump v. Whibco
715 A.2d 1006 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1998)
Faulconer v. Williams
936 P.2d 999 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1997)
Cotsifas v. Conrad
905 P.2d 851 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1995)
Davis v. Parke
898 P.2d 804 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1995)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
875 P.2d 515, 128 Or. App. 274, 1994 Ore. App. LEXIS 790, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/slak-v-porter-orctapp-1994.