Slack v. Tucker & Co.

90 U.S. 321

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: October 15, 1874
• Status: Published

Opinion

Mr. Justice BRADLEY

delivered the opinion of the court.

The general meaning of the act of Congress in the passages under consideration is sufficiently clear. Congress evidently intended to tax as “wholesale dealers” as well those who sold goods as commission merchants as those who sold on their own account; always excepting manufacturers, selling at the place of manufacture, or by sample at their principal office and place of business. The intention is equally evident to tax as “commercial brokers” those who, as brokers merely, negotiated sales or purchases for others, and not in their own names nor on their own account.

¥e are clearly of opinion that the evidence propounded by the plaintiffs showed that the sales were not the sales of the corporations made by the plaintiffs as mere agents, much less that they were made at the principal office or place of business of the corporations. The latter had an office and place of business of their own where their principal executive officer managed their executive and financial operations, and to which any persons having business with the corporations would naturally go. On the contrary, the store of the plaintiffs was their own store, hired and furnished by themselves. The clerks employed in it were their own clerks. All the expenses were paid by themselves. The business was carried on in their own names. The sales were made, and the bills made out, in their names. The money arising from the sales was paid to them and deposited to their account. They charged regular commissions on the sales. It is true they sold by sample, and did not keep the goods in their store; but that did not make the sales any less their own. Persons selling their own goods often do the same. But, though they did not keep the goods at their store, and though, as sales were made, the goods by their direction were put up at the mill and directed to the purchasers, yet they were sent to and received by the plaintiffs; who delivered them if the purchasers were in Boston, or shipped them if the purchasers resided elsewhere.. The goods passed through their hands before the purchaser received them. They came into their possession as soon as it was necessary to enable them to fulfil their contracts of sale.

In our opinion, therefore, the plaintiffs were commission merchants, and chargeable as such with the tax in question as “wholesale dealers.” The difference between a factor or commission merchant and a broker is stated by all the books to be this: a factor may buy and sell in his own name, and he has the goods in his possession; while a broker, as such, cannot ordinarily buy or sell in his own name, and has no possession of the goods sold.

* The plaintiffs made the sales themselves, in their own names, at their own store, and on commission, and had possession of the goods as soon as the sales were made, and delivered or shipped them to their customers. This course of business clearly constituted them commission merchants as contradistinguished from mere brokers or agents.

The fact that the corporations paid the manufacturing tax of five per cent, on the same goods is of no consequence at all in deciding the case. The tax in question was not imposed upon the corporations, but upon the commission merchants, as a tax on their business. It woqld even have been imposed on the corporations themselves if they had sold the goods in any other manner than as provided in the seventy-fourth section of the act, namely, at the place of manufacture, or, by sample, at their principal office and place of business.

We are of opinion, therefore, that upon the evidence adduced, the court ought to have given judgment for the defendant instead of the plaintiffs.

Judgment reversed, with directions to award

A VENIRE DE NOVO.

Mr. Justice FIELD dissented from the judgment, being of opinion that the plaintiffs were not wholesale dealers, either within the common acceptation of the terms or the meaning of the statute.

See Story on Sales, § 91; Story on Agency, § 34; 2 Kent, 622, note; and cases cited.