NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 15 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
S.L., a minor by and through the Guardian No. 25-4537 Ad Litem Kristine Llamas Leyva, D.C. No. individually and as successor-in-interest to 5:24-cv-00249-CAS-SP Johnny Ray Llamas, deceased; V.L., by and through the Guardian Ad Litem Amber Snetsinger, individually and as successor-in- MEMORANDUM* interest to Johnny Ray Llamas, deceased; CAROLYN CAMPBELL, Individually,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE; SHAWN HUBACHEK; JIMMIE MCGUIRE,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 21, 2026 Pasadena, California
Before: LEE, BUMATAY, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellants County of Riverside, Shawn Hubachek, and Jimmie
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. McGuire appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the
collateral order doctrine, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528–30 (1985), and
review the district court’s denial of qualified immunity de novo, Peck v. Montoya,
51 F.4th 877, 884 (9th Cir. 2022). We reverse in part and remand.
1. Plaintiff-Appellees first argue that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal
because Defendant-Appellants only challenge the district court’s determinations of
disputed facts. Plaintiff-Appellees are correct that “any decision by the district court
that the parties’ evidence presents genuine issues of material fact is categorically
unreviewable on interlocutory appeal.” George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 834 (9th
Cir. 2013). But “[w]e ‘undoubtedly’ have jurisdiction to consider the district court’s
denial of qualified immunity,” and Defendant-Appellants’ “defense-friendly
presentation of the facts does not deprive us of jurisdiction.” Est. of Aguirre v. Cnty.
of Riverside, 29 F.4th 624, 627 (9th Cir. 2022). Thus, we may exercise jurisdiction
only “[t]o the extent the district court’s order denies summary judgment on purely
legal issues.” Foster v. City of Indio, 908 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2018).
2. Defendant-Appellants argue that the district court erred in denying them
qualified immunity on Plaintiff-Appellees’ Fourth Amendment claims. The doctrine
of qualified immunity protects government officials from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability
“unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the
2 25-4537 unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.” District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018) (simplified). We may address the
prongs of qualified immunity in either order, and officers are entitled to qualified
immunity if either prong is not satisfied. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
241–43 (2009).
“To find that a right is clearly established, courts generally need to identify a
case where an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to have
violated the Constitution.” Zorn v. Linton, 146 S. Ct. 926, 930 (2026) (simplified).
A right is only clearly established when it is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable
official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right” and
“existing precedent . . . place[s] the constitutional question beyond debate.” Id.
(simplified). This “demanding” requirement “protects ‘all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law[.]’” Smith v. Agdeppa, 81 F.4th
994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63).
We hold that the officers’ conduct did not violate clearly established law.
None of the cases cited by the district court establish the unlawfulness of the officers’
conduct here. See Est. of Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Gelhaus, 871 F.3d 998, 1017–18
(9th Cir. 2017), Est. of Aguirre, 29 F.4th at 629, and George, 736 F.3d at 839. In
Estate of Lopez, officers shot and killed an 13-year-old boy “while on routine patrol”
and not in response to a crime or reports of erratic behavior, even though the officers
3 25-4537 knew there was a possibility that the child was carrying a toy gun, and the boy never
raised the barrel of the toy gun “at any point to a position that posed any threat” to
officers. 871 F.3d at 1004, 1010–11. In Aguirre, officers shot and killed a person
who wielded a bat fifteen feet away without warning, all while the person made no
efforts to evade arrest and had his back toward the officers. 29 F.4th at 626, 628.
The record showed that the person was not threatening bystanders or advancing
toward officers when he was killed. Id. at 628. And in George, officers shot an
elderly man who relied on a walker, who was not actively resisting arrest or
committing a crime, and who had his gun trained on the ground. 736 F.3d at 838–
39.
Plaintiff-Appellees also contend that Curnow ex rel. Curnow v. Ridgecrest
Police, 952 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1991) and Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir.
1997) create clearly established law. In Curnow, officers shot a suspect who did not
initially reach for a nearby gun for merely holding an alleged domestic-violence
victim on his lap. 952 F.2d at 323. Further, the suspect was shot in the back at first
and only later grabbed an unloaded gun by its muzzle while attempting to escape.
Id. And in Harris, in response to the Ruby Ridge assault, federal agents changed the
rules of engagement to allow the shooting and killing of “any armed adult observed
in the vicinity” of the cabin. 126 F.3d at 1202 (emphasis in original). A federal
agent then shot a suspect who was running away and made “no threatening
4 25-4537 movement of any kind.” Id. at 1203.
None of those cases set clearly established law for the facts here, which
involved an hours-long manhunt of a suspect who (1) was accused of dangerous
crimes—armed robbery and molesting his niece, (2) was armed with his gun drawn
much of the time, (3) was reasonably suspected to have shot and killed a police dog
during the manhunt, and (4) faced repeated warnings to drop his weapon while
running towards a home that officers reasonably believed to be occupied. Officers
are thus entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff-Appellees’ Fourth Amendment
claims.
3. The district court did not consider whether Defendant-Appellants are
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 15 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
S.L., a minor by and through the Guardian No. 25-4537 Ad Litem Kristine Llamas Leyva, D.C. No. individually and as successor-in-interest to 5:24-cv-00249-CAS-SP Johnny Ray Llamas, deceased; V.L., by and through the Guardian Ad Litem Amber Snetsinger, individually and as successor-in- MEMORANDUM* interest to Johnny Ray Llamas, deceased; CAROLYN CAMPBELL, Individually,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE; SHAWN HUBACHEK; JIMMIE MCGUIRE,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 21, 2026 Pasadena, California
Before: LEE, BUMATAY, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellants County of Riverside, Shawn Hubachek, and Jimmie
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. McGuire appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the
collateral order doctrine, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528–30 (1985), and
review the district court’s denial of qualified immunity de novo, Peck v. Montoya,
51 F.4th 877, 884 (9th Cir. 2022). We reverse in part and remand.
1. Plaintiff-Appellees first argue that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal
because Defendant-Appellants only challenge the district court’s determinations of
disputed facts. Plaintiff-Appellees are correct that “any decision by the district court
that the parties’ evidence presents genuine issues of material fact is categorically
unreviewable on interlocutory appeal.” George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 834 (9th
Cir. 2013). But “[w]e ‘undoubtedly’ have jurisdiction to consider the district court’s
denial of qualified immunity,” and Defendant-Appellants’ “defense-friendly
presentation of the facts does not deprive us of jurisdiction.” Est. of Aguirre v. Cnty.
of Riverside, 29 F.4th 624, 627 (9th Cir. 2022). Thus, we may exercise jurisdiction
only “[t]o the extent the district court’s order denies summary judgment on purely
legal issues.” Foster v. City of Indio, 908 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2018).
2. Defendant-Appellants argue that the district court erred in denying them
qualified immunity on Plaintiff-Appellees’ Fourth Amendment claims. The doctrine
of qualified immunity protects government officials from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability
“unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the
2 25-4537 unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.” District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018) (simplified). We may address the
prongs of qualified immunity in either order, and officers are entitled to qualified
immunity if either prong is not satisfied. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
241–43 (2009).
“To find that a right is clearly established, courts generally need to identify a
case where an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to have
violated the Constitution.” Zorn v. Linton, 146 S. Ct. 926, 930 (2026) (simplified).
A right is only clearly established when it is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable
official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right” and
“existing precedent . . . place[s] the constitutional question beyond debate.” Id.
(simplified). This “demanding” requirement “protects ‘all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law[.]’” Smith v. Agdeppa, 81 F.4th
994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63).
We hold that the officers’ conduct did not violate clearly established law.
None of the cases cited by the district court establish the unlawfulness of the officers’
conduct here. See Est. of Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Gelhaus, 871 F.3d 998, 1017–18
(9th Cir. 2017), Est. of Aguirre, 29 F.4th at 629, and George, 736 F.3d at 839. In
Estate of Lopez, officers shot and killed an 13-year-old boy “while on routine patrol”
and not in response to a crime or reports of erratic behavior, even though the officers
3 25-4537 knew there was a possibility that the child was carrying a toy gun, and the boy never
raised the barrel of the toy gun “at any point to a position that posed any threat” to
officers. 871 F.3d at 1004, 1010–11. In Aguirre, officers shot and killed a person
who wielded a bat fifteen feet away without warning, all while the person made no
efforts to evade arrest and had his back toward the officers. 29 F.4th at 626, 628.
The record showed that the person was not threatening bystanders or advancing
toward officers when he was killed. Id. at 628. And in George, officers shot an
elderly man who relied on a walker, who was not actively resisting arrest or
committing a crime, and who had his gun trained on the ground. 736 F.3d at 838–
39.
Plaintiff-Appellees also contend that Curnow ex rel. Curnow v. Ridgecrest
Police, 952 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1991) and Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir.
1997) create clearly established law. In Curnow, officers shot a suspect who did not
initially reach for a nearby gun for merely holding an alleged domestic-violence
victim on his lap. 952 F.2d at 323. Further, the suspect was shot in the back at first
and only later grabbed an unloaded gun by its muzzle while attempting to escape.
Id. And in Harris, in response to the Ruby Ridge assault, federal agents changed the
rules of engagement to allow the shooting and killing of “any armed adult observed
in the vicinity” of the cabin. 126 F.3d at 1202 (emphasis in original). A federal
agent then shot a suspect who was running away and made “no threatening
4 25-4537 movement of any kind.” Id. at 1203.
None of those cases set clearly established law for the facts here, which
involved an hours-long manhunt of a suspect who (1) was accused of dangerous
crimes—armed robbery and molesting his niece, (2) was armed with his gun drawn
much of the time, (3) was reasonably suspected to have shot and killed a police dog
during the manhunt, and (4) faced repeated warnings to drop his weapon while
running towards a home that officers reasonably believed to be occupied. Officers
are thus entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff-Appellees’ Fourth Amendment
claims.
3. The district court did not consider whether Defendant-Appellants are
entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff-Appellees’ Fourteenth Amendment
claims. Even if a Fourteenth Amendment violation occurred, “qualified immunity
nevertheless applies unless the violation was clearly established.” Nicholson v. City
of Los Angeles, 935 F.3d 685, 695 (9th Cir. 2019). And when “no analogous case
existed at the time of the shooting,” a district court errs in denying officers qualified
immunity for the claim. Id. On remand, Plaintiff-Appellees must identify authority
that rendered the contours of the substantive due process right at issue “sufficiently
definite that any reasonable official in the defendant[s’] shoes would have
understood [they were] violating it.” See id. We remand the claims to determine
whether qualified immunity applies.
5 25-4537 4. We do not reach the parties’ state-law claims and remand to the district
court to determine its jurisdiction to review them after consideration of the
Fourteenth Amendment claims.
REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
6 25-4537