S.L. Garrity v. PPL Corp.

CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 23, 2023
Docket272 M.D. 2019
StatusPublished

This text of S.L. Garrity v. PPL Corp. (S.L. Garrity v. PPL Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
S.L. Garrity v. PPL Corp., (Pa. Ct. App. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Stacy L. Garrity, : in her official capacity as the : Treasurer of the Commonwealth, : Plaintiff : No. 272 M.D. 2019 : v. : Argued: June 23, 2022 : PPL Corporation, : Defendant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: June 23, 2023

Presently before the Court in our original jurisdiction is the application for partial summary relief in the nature of a motion for judgment on pleadings (Application) filed by Plaintiff, Stacy L. Garrity, in her official capacity as the Treasurer of the Commonwealth (Treasurer), in connection with a complaint against defendant PPL Corporation (PPL). Through the Application, Treasurer seeks a determination from this Court declaring, as a matter of law, that Treasurer, in performing an audit of the records of an unclaimed securities property holder (here, PPL), has the statutory authority under Article XIII.1 of The Fiscal Code, known as the Disposition of Abandoned and Unclaimed Property Act (DAUPA),1 and Article XVI

1 Article XIII.1 was added to The Fiscal Code, Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 343, as amended, 72 P.S. §§ 1-1805, by section 5 of the Act of December 9, 1982, P.L. 1057, 72 P.S. §§ 1301.1-1301.29. of The Fiscal Code, 72 P.S. §§ 1601-1602, to: (1) direct a holder’s2 production of shareholder records in electronic format; (2) perform accuracy tests and cross-checks to verify the accuracy of records produced by a holder; and, further, (3) utilize this statutory power despite PPL’s claim that it is preempted by federal law. In addition, Treasurer requests that the Court dismiss PPL’s Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth New Matters in their entirety, which, in notable part, are inexorably intertwined with Treasurer’s above-mentioned requests for determinations as a matter of law. Upon review, we grant Treasurer’s Application, with specific qualifications, as more fully set forth below.

I. Factual and Procedural History The factual and procedural history of this case has been thoroughly detailed in our previous decision, Torsella v. PPL Corporation (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 272 M.D. 2019, filed July 20, 2021) (en banc) (unreported),3 and is incorporated herein by reference. Briefly, Treasurer filed a complaint asking this Court to order PPL to produce information and documents that Treasurer requested from PPL in a March 13, 2019 subpoena (Subpoena), contending that the information and documents that PPL submitted did not fully comply with the request,

by producing heavily edited, redacted, and incomplete records concerning PPL’s shareholders and by proposing an onsite visual view of PPL’s unredacted, unedited original data that spans 1,000 or more pages, at PPL’s offices,

2 DAUPA defines “holder” in relevant part, as “a person obligated to hold for the account of or delivery or pay to the owner property which is subject to this article and shall include any person in possession of property subject to this article belonging to another . . . .” Section 1301.1 of DAUPA, 72 P.S. § 1301.1.

3 At the time the complaint was filed, Joseph M. Torsella was the Treasurer. Subsequently, Stacy Garrity was elected Treasurer at the November 3, 2020 general election and was sworn into office on January 19, 2021.

2 using a PPL computer terminal and the limited software that PPL intended to make available. According to Treasurer, instead of producing copies of its original data, which includes names, addresses and related information and which PPL possesses in readily-transferable format, PPL created new documents that replaced the name and other identifying information associated with an account with an ACCTKEY placeholder. PPL also withheld information that PPL believed related to individual shareholders with addresses in states that are not participating in the audit. Given how PPL produced the requested data, Kelmar[ Associates, Treasurer’s designee to conduct, on Treasurer’s behalf, an unclaimed property audit of PPL’s shareholder records,] was unable to run analytics to cross-check the accuracy of PPL’s data.

Id., slip op. at 8 (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted; emphasis added). On July 1, 2020, PPL filed revised preliminary objections to the complaint, asserting that the complaint was legally deficient on a variety of grounds. “PPL first argue[d] that Treasurer does not have the authority to compel PPL to produce its shareholders’ [personally identifiable information (PII)], and it has already fully complied with DAUPA by producing electronic records having some of the data Treasurer requested, and by allowing Treasurer to review the full records, including PII, at PPL’s corporate office.” Torsella, slip op. at 11. “Second, PPL contend[ed] that the law does not entitle Treasurer to verify the accuracy of PPL’s shareholder records using software analytics.” Id. “Third, PPL submit[ted] that Treasurer is attempting, through [her] [c]omplaint, to enforce the Subpoena, but the Subpoena is improper because it is not limited in scope and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome, as electronically producing its shareholders’ PII exposes those shareholders to needless risk.” Id. at 11-12.

3 In Torsella, a five-judge, en banc panel of this Court overruled PPL’s preliminary objections, addressing three issues: (1) “[w]hether Treasurer has [f]ailed to [s]tate a [c]laim [b]ecause Treasurer is not [a]uthorized to [c]ompel the [e]lectronic [p]roduction of PPL’s [s]hareholder [r]ecords”; (2) “[w]hether Treasurer has [f]ailed to [s]tate a [c]laim [b]ecause Treasurer is not [a]uthorized to [v]erify the [a]ccuracy of PPL’s [s]hareholder [r]ecords [u]sing [s]oftware [a]nalytics”; and (3) “[w]hether Treasurer has [f]ailed to [s]tate a [c]laim [b]ecause Treasurer may not [c]ompel PPL to [p]roduce its [s]hareholders’ PII.” See id., slip op. at 12, 20, and 28. With regard to the first issue, this Court cited what we referred to as “DAUPA’s Examination Provisions,” 72 P.S. § 1301.23(b)-(c),4 and “The Fiscal Code’s Examination and Adjustment Provision,” 72 P.S. § 1602(a). Based on the plain language of these statutes, and reading them in pari materia, we concluded that they

4 This provision, in relevant part, reads as follows:

(b) . . . Treasurer, at reasonable times and upon reasonable notice, may examine the records of any person or agent thereof to determine whether the person has complied with this article. The administrator may conduct the examination even if the person believes it is not in possession of any property that must be reported, paid or delivered under this article . . . . Treasurer may contract with any other person to conduct the examination on behalf of . . . Treasurer, the selection of whom shall not be questioned.

(c) . . . Treasurer at reasonable times may examine the records of an agent, including a dividend disbursing agent or transfer agent, of a business association or financial association that is the holder of property presumed abandoned if the administrator has given the notice required by subsection (b) to both the association or organization and the agent at least 90 days before the examination.

Section 1301.23(b)-(c) of DAUPA, 72 P.S. § 1301.23(b)-(c) (emphasis added). Pursuant to subsection (d), any work papers that Treasurer has “obtained or compiled” during the course of an examination “are confidential and are not public records . . . .” 72 P.S. § 1301.23(d).

4 “empower[] Treasurer to examine PPL’s shareholder records” and “clearly give[] Treasurer the power to compel the exhibition or delivery of records . . . .” Torsella, slip op. at 18-19 (emphasis in original).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
S.L. Garrity v. PPL Corp., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sl-garrity-v-ppl-corp-pacommwct-2023.