In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00213-CR
SKYLER CANNON, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. CC-2024-CR-1842, Honorable Tom Brummett, Presiding
July 15, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
Appellant, Skyler Cannon, appeals from her jury conviction for criminal trespass of
a habitation. 1 In one issue, she contends the evidence is legally insufficient to prove she
intentionally and knowingly remained in the habitation of another without effective consent
after receiving notice to depart. We affirm.
1 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.05. BACKGROUND
On January 7, 2024, Appellant was a guest at an Extended Stay America hotel in
Lubbock. The charging information alleged that she remained in the habitation of Lorenzo
Martinez III, the hotel’s assistant general manager, without effective consent after
receiving notice to depart.
Two calls to 911 shaped the day’s events. Hotel management placed the first call
at 12:44 p.m.; Lubbock police officers Lloyd Rampy and Everett Stamps arrived at 1:04
p.m. According to Officer Stamps, the officers acted as mediators between Appellant and
hotel management. The resolution reached was that Appellant would have thirty minutes
to gather her belongings and leave. The officers’ call sheet reflected that additional time
might be needed because Appellant had a large quantity of belongings. The first officers
cleared the scene at 2:01 p.m.
Hotel management called for police again approximately thirty minutes later after
Appellant remained on the premises. Officers Justin Rindlisbacher and Geoffrey Sharp
responded at 4:18 p.m. They knocked on Appellant’s door for approximately twenty
minutes, heard music playing inside, knocked during breaks in the music, and received
no response. Hotel management then provided a master key. When the officers entered,
Appellant was still in the room, and items remained throughout the kitchenette and living
area. Officer Sharp arrested Appellant for criminal trespass.
Roshan Bhakta, the hotel’s general manager, testified that Martinez was the
assistant general manager and had authority over the property. Martinez himself did not
testify.
2 Appellant testified in her own defense. She acknowledged that Martinez told her
she could not renew her stay and that she understood she needed to leave. She
contended that Martinez had entered her room while she was undressed and in bed, that
the exchange left her upset, that the elevator was not working, and that she had the
belongings one might expect in a studio apartment. Appellant testified that she believed
the first officers understood she would need more than thirty minutes and that she was
packing when the second officers arrived. On cross-examination, Appellant admitted
telling officers that she did not have to answer and that they could “knock the door down.”
The jury found Appellant guilty. The trial court assessed punishment at two days
of confinement, with credit for time served.
ANALYSIS
In her sole issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her
criminal trespass conviction. Appellant contends the State failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Appellant intentionally remained at the hotel without consent to do
so. We disagree.
Our sufficiency determination is directed by the familiar standard of Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979). We view all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–
19; Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This standard gives full
play to the trier of fact’s responsibility of resolving conflicts in testimony, weighing
evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper,
3 214 S.W.3d at 13 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19). The trier of fact is the sole judge
of the credibility of witnesses and the weight, if any, given to their testimony. Brooks v.
State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). Where the record
supports conflicting inferences, we presume the jury resolved them in favor of the verdict
and defer to that resolution. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). Sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the elements as defined by a
hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997).
A person commits criminal trespass if the person enters or remains on the property
of another without effective consent and either had notice that entry was forbidden or
received notice to depart and failed to do so. TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.05(a); Martin v. State,
No. 07-11-00102-CR, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 2587, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 30,
2012, no pet.). The offense is a Class A misdemeanor when committed in a habitation.
TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.05(d)(3)(A).
Appellant does not dispute that the events occurred on the date alleged or that she
was still in the hotel room when Officers Rindlisbacher and Sharp entered. She contends
that the record shows she had been given time to pack and was in the process of leaving
when she was arrested. But our task is not to decide whether a rational juror could have
believed her account of the events, but whether the record compelled the jury to do so.
Appellant’s testimony acknowledged that she could not extend her stay and that
she needed to leave the hotel. Officer Stamps corroborated that account, describing the
resolution after the first police response as Appellant packing up and going. Even
4 accepting that Appellant was given time to gather her property, the jury could find she
had been told to leave and that Appellant knew it.
Under Section 30.05, “remaining” on the premises occurs when the defendant
stays any length of time after notice to depart. Hernandez v. State, 783 S.W.2d 764, 765
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, no pet.). How long a defendant may reasonably remain
to gather her belongings is a fact question for the jury. Here, the timeline permitted the
jury to find that any temporary permission to remain for packing had ended before the
second officers arrived. The first 911 call came at 12:44 p.m., officers arrived shortly after
1:00 p.m., and the call cleared at 2:01 p.m. Hotel management called again at 2:32 p.m.,
but Officers Rindlisbacher and Sharp did not reach the property until 4:18 p.m. By then,
more than three hours had passed since police first responded to the hotel, yet Appellant
remained. Even crediting the first officers’ observation that Appellant might need more
than thirty minutes to pack, the jury could find that her continued presence hours later
exceeded any accommodation she had been given.
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In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00213-CR
SKYLER CANNON, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. CC-2024-CR-1842, Honorable Tom Brummett, Presiding
July 15, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
Appellant, Skyler Cannon, appeals from her jury conviction for criminal trespass of
a habitation. 1 In one issue, she contends the evidence is legally insufficient to prove she
intentionally and knowingly remained in the habitation of another without effective consent
after receiving notice to depart. We affirm.
1 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.05. BACKGROUND
On January 7, 2024, Appellant was a guest at an Extended Stay America hotel in
Lubbock. The charging information alleged that she remained in the habitation of Lorenzo
Martinez III, the hotel’s assistant general manager, without effective consent after
receiving notice to depart.
Two calls to 911 shaped the day’s events. Hotel management placed the first call
at 12:44 p.m.; Lubbock police officers Lloyd Rampy and Everett Stamps arrived at 1:04
p.m. According to Officer Stamps, the officers acted as mediators between Appellant and
hotel management. The resolution reached was that Appellant would have thirty minutes
to gather her belongings and leave. The officers’ call sheet reflected that additional time
might be needed because Appellant had a large quantity of belongings. The first officers
cleared the scene at 2:01 p.m.
Hotel management called for police again approximately thirty minutes later after
Appellant remained on the premises. Officers Justin Rindlisbacher and Geoffrey Sharp
responded at 4:18 p.m. They knocked on Appellant’s door for approximately twenty
minutes, heard music playing inside, knocked during breaks in the music, and received
no response. Hotel management then provided a master key. When the officers entered,
Appellant was still in the room, and items remained throughout the kitchenette and living
area. Officer Sharp arrested Appellant for criminal trespass.
Roshan Bhakta, the hotel’s general manager, testified that Martinez was the
assistant general manager and had authority over the property. Martinez himself did not
testify.
2 Appellant testified in her own defense. She acknowledged that Martinez told her
she could not renew her stay and that she understood she needed to leave. She
contended that Martinez had entered her room while she was undressed and in bed, that
the exchange left her upset, that the elevator was not working, and that she had the
belongings one might expect in a studio apartment. Appellant testified that she believed
the first officers understood she would need more than thirty minutes and that she was
packing when the second officers arrived. On cross-examination, Appellant admitted
telling officers that she did not have to answer and that they could “knock the door down.”
The jury found Appellant guilty. The trial court assessed punishment at two days
of confinement, with credit for time served.
ANALYSIS
In her sole issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her
criminal trespass conviction. Appellant contends the State failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Appellant intentionally remained at the hotel without consent to do
so. We disagree.
Our sufficiency determination is directed by the familiar standard of Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979). We view all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–
19; Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This standard gives full
play to the trier of fact’s responsibility of resolving conflicts in testimony, weighing
evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper,
3 214 S.W.3d at 13 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19). The trier of fact is the sole judge
of the credibility of witnesses and the weight, if any, given to their testimony. Brooks v.
State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). Where the record
supports conflicting inferences, we presume the jury resolved them in favor of the verdict
and defer to that resolution. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). Sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the elements as defined by a
hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997).
A person commits criminal trespass if the person enters or remains on the property
of another without effective consent and either had notice that entry was forbidden or
received notice to depart and failed to do so. TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.05(a); Martin v. State,
No. 07-11-00102-CR, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 2587, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 30,
2012, no pet.). The offense is a Class A misdemeanor when committed in a habitation.
TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.05(d)(3)(A).
Appellant does not dispute that the events occurred on the date alleged or that she
was still in the hotel room when Officers Rindlisbacher and Sharp entered. She contends
that the record shows she had been given time to pack and was in the process of leaving
when she was arrested. But our task is not to decide whether a rational juror could have
believed her account of the events, but whether the record compelled the jury to do so.
Appellant’s testimony acknowledged that she could not extend her stay and that
she needed to leave the hotel. Officer Stamps corroborated that account, describing the
resolution after the first police response as Appellant packing up and going. Even
4 accepting that Appellant was given time to gather her property, the jury could find she
had been told to leave and that Appellant knew it.
Under Section 30.05, “remaining” on the premises occurs when the defendant
stays any length of time after notice to depart. Hernandez v. State, 783 S.W.2d 764, 765
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, no pet.). How long a defendant may reasonably remain
to gather her belongings is a fact question for the jury. Here, the timeline permitted the
jury to find that any temporary permission to remain for packing had ended before the
second officers arrived. The first 911 call came at 12:44 p.m., officers arrived shortly after
1:00 p.m., and the call cleared at 2:01 p.m. Hotel management called again at 2:32 p.m.,
but Officers Rindlisbacher and Sharp did not reach the property until 4:18 p.m. By then,
more than three hours had passed since police first responded to the hotel, yet Appellant
remained. Even crediting the first officers’ observation that Appellant might need more
than thirty minutes to pack, the jury could find that her continued presence hours later
exceeded any accommodation she had been given.
Appellant’s intent and knowledge may also be inferred from circumstantial
evidence, including her acts, words, and conduct. Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The jury heard that Appellant remained in the room for hours
after being told to leave, did not respond to officers who knocked for approximately twenty
minutes, and told them she did not have to answer and that they could knock the door
down. From this evidence, the jury could find that Appellant knew she had been told to
5 leave, knew management and officers were at her door to enforce that instruction, and
nevertheless refused to do so. 2
We overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled Appellant’s issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Lawrence M. Doss Justice
Do not publish.
2 Martinez’s absence from trial does not disturb this conclusion. Bhakta testified that he was the hotel’s general manager and that Martinez had authority over the property. Appellant herself identified Martinez as the manager who told her she could not renew her stay. This permits a rational conclusion that Martinez, as the hotel’s agent, had a greater right to possession of the room than Appellant. 6