Skylar v. Saul

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedAugust 27, 2019
Docket3:19-cv-01581-MMA-NLS
StatusUnknown

This text of Skylar v. Saul (Skylar v. Saul) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Skylar v. Saul, (S.D. Cal. 2019).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HELEN SKYLAR, Case No.: 19cv1581-NLS

12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 14 ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of the WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; and Social Security Administration, 15 Defendant. (2) DENYING WITHOUT 16 PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 17 FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 18

19 [ECF No. 2]

21 22 Before the Court is Plaintiff Helen Skylar’s complaint seeking judicial review of 23 the Social Security Administration’s decision and motion for leave to proceed in forma 24 pauperis (“IFP”). ECF Nos. 1-2. After due consideration and for the reasons set forth 25 below, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend and DENIES 26 WITHOUT PREJUDICE the motion to proceed IFP. 27 I. Screening Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 28 A complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), is subject 1 to a mandatory and sua sponte review by the Court. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 2 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court must dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails 3 to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a 4 defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Social security appeals 5 are not exempt from this § 1915(e) screening requirement. Hoagland v. Astrue, No. 6 1:12cv00973-SMS, 2012 WL 2521753, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012); see also Calhoun 7 v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting section 1915(e)(2)(B) is 8 “not limited to prisoners”); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1129 (“section 1915(e) applies to all in 9 forma pauperis complaints”). 10 To pass screening, all complaints must contain a “short and plain statement of the 11 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although 12 detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 13 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. 14 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint in a social security appeal is “not exempt 15 from the general rules of civil pleading.” Hoagland, 2012 WL 2521753, at *2. 16 Several courts within the Ninth Circuit have set forth the following basic 17 requirements for complaints to survive the Court’s § 1915(e) screening: 18 First, the plaintiff must establish that she has exhausted her administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and that the civil action was 19 commenced within sixty days after notice of a final decision. Second, the 20 complaint must indicate the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides. Third, the complaint must state the nature of the plaintiff's disability and 21 when the plaintiff claims she became disabled. Fourth, the complaint must 22 contain a plain, short, and concise statement identifying the nature of the plaintiff’s disagreement with the determination made by the Social Security 23 Administration and show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. 24 See, e.g., Montoya v. Colvin, No. 16cv00454-RFB-NJK, 2016 WL 890922, at *2 (D. 25 Nev. Mar. 8, 2016) (collecting cases); Graves v. Colvin, No. 15cv106-RFB-NJK, 2015 26 WL 357121, *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 26, 2015) (same). 27 As for the fourth requirement, “[e]very plaintiff appealing an adverse decision of 28 1 the Commissioner believes that the Commissioner was wrong.” Hoagland, 2012 WL 2 2521753, at *3. Thus, a complaint merely stating that the Commissioner’s decision was 3 wrong or that “merely parrots the standards used in reversing or remanding a case” is 4 insufficient to satisfy a plaintiff’s pleading requirement. See, e.g., Cribbet v. Comm’r 5 of Social Security, No. 12cv1142-BAM 2012 WL 5308044, *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2012); 6 Graves, 2015 WL 357121, at *2. Instead, “[a] complaint appealing the Commissioner’s 7 denial of disability benefits must set forth a brief statement of facts setting forth the 8 reasons why the Commissioner’s decision was wrong.” Hoagland, 2012 WL 2521753, at 9 *2; see also Harris v. Colvin, No. 14cv383-GW (RNB), 2014 WL 1095941, *4 (C.D. 10 Cal. Mar. 17, 2014) (dismissing complaint which it did not “specify . . . the respects in 11 which [the plaintiff] contends that the ALJ’s findings are not supported by substantial 12 evidence and/or that the proper legal standards were not applied”); Gutierrez v. Astrue, 13 No. 11cv454-GSA, 2011 WL 1087261, *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2011) (dismissing 14 complaint which did not “provide[] any substantive reasons” for appealing the ALJ’s 15 decision and did not “identif[y] any errors in [the] decision”). The plaintiff must provide 16 a statement identifying the basis of the plaintiff’s disagreement with 17 the Social Security Administration’s determination and must make a showing that she is 18 entitled to relief, “in sufficient detail such that the Court can understand the legal and/or 19 factual issues in dispute so that it can meaningfully screen the complaint pursuant to 20 § 1915(e).” Graves, 2015 WL 357121, at *2. 21 With these standards in mind, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s complaint and finds that 22 it fails to meet these pleadings requirements. Plaintiff’s complaint recites the legal 23 standards and findings of the ALJ, but fails to provide substantive reasons for why the 24 conclusion was wrong. Plaintiff alleges that “[t]here is no substantial medical or 25 vocational evidence in the record to support” the ALJ’s finding on disability, that “[t]here 26 is no substantial evidence to support” the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could perform 27 substantial gainful activity, and that “[t]he evidence in the record supports only a finding 28 that Plaintiff is disabled.” ECF No. 1 at 2-3. None of these statements provide any 1 factual underpinning as to why the decision was in error. See Harris, 2014 WL 2 1095941, *4; Gutierrez, 2011 WL 1087261, *2. Similarly, Plaintiff also alleges that 3 “[n]ew and material evidence . . . exists and warrants a remand” but fails to identify this 4 alleged evidence. ECF No. 1 at 3. Moreover, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s complaint 5 appears to be a form complaint that has been used in several other cases in this district 6 alone and has been similarly screened out on IFP.1 Accordingly, the Court finds that 7 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for relief and DISMISSES the complaint with 8 leave to amend. Plaintiff may correct the deficiencies in her complaint to comply with 9 the requirements as set forth above, and file an amended complaint on or before 10 September 16, 2019. 11 II. Motion to Proceed IFP 12 It is well-settled that a party need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP. 13 Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948). The 14 determination of indigency falls within the district court’s discretion. See Cal. Men’s 15 Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir.

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Bluebook (online)
Skylar v. Saul, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/skylar-v-saul-casd-2019.