NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0276n.06
Case No. 24-3980
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jun 05, 2025 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk SKY SCHELLE, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT CITY OF PIQUA, OHIO, et al. ) COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN ) DISTRICT OF OHIO Defendants-Appellees. ) ) OPINION
Before: McKEAGUE, MURPHY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Sky Schelle worked for the city of Piqua. During a meeting,
Kevin Krenjy—Schelle’s supervisor—made inappropriate comments about another employee who
was not present at the meeting. Schelle reported these comments to Human Resources as potential
sexual harassment. Within a month of the incident, Schelle was notified that his position was
abolished as part of a city reorganization effort to improve efficiency. Schelle brought a Title VII
suit against Piqua and its officials, claiming that his position was abolished in retaliation for
reporting Krenjy’s comments. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment
because Schelle was unable to establish a prima facie case for Title VII retaliation. For the
following reasons, we AFFIRM. No. 24-3980, Schelle v. City of Piqua, et al.
I.
Schelle worked for the city of Piqua as a Storm Water Program Manager from February
2017 to December 2021. Schelle was part of Piqua’s Underground Utilities Department and was
responsible for managing and maintaining the city’s storm water system. He oversaw the
construction and maintenance of storm water infrastructure and ensured that it complied with storm
water permits.
On September 29, 2021, Schelle and three other Piqua employees attended a budget
meeting with Utility Director Kevin Krenjy. During the meeting, the conversation veered into how
Kenton Kiser—a junior city employee within the engineering department—was “rubbing people
raw” by being “overzealous” and “hindering/critiquing” other departments even though Kiser
himself did not have the sufficient “background/exp[erience]” to act that way. Witness Statements,
R. 36-6 at PageID 657. In one instance, Kiser objected to the use of a “Road Closed” sign when
the city was closing a parking lot rather than a road. Schelle Email Statement, R. 26-2 at PageID
184. Responding to this incident and Kiser’s apparent zeal for doing things by the book, Krenjy
commented: “Can you imagine [Kiser] with his girlfriend on a Friday night? They’re going at it
and he stops her to correct her technique. He’s probably got a book he follows and gets it out to
go over the positions so he gets everything just right.” Id.
Schelle did not appreciate the comments. He was “bothered” by the “crude manner” in
which Krenjy “degrade[d]” Kiser, Schelle Dep., R. 26 at PageID 158, and he was concerned that
“as a junior employee that had drawn the ire of a senior staff member . . . [Kiser’s] career growth
and stability in the organization . . . might be jeopardized.” Id. at PageID 157. The next day,
Schelle reported his concerns to Human Resources Director Catherine Bogan.
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Bogan further investigated the matter. She interviewed everyone who was at the meeting.
They characterized the comments as “shop talk” and explained that they did not find the comments
“offensive” or “inappropriate.” Witness Statements, R. 36-6 at PageID 656–57. Bogan then
discussed the matter with City Manager Paul Oberdorfer. Considering that Krenjy did not have a
record of discipline and Schelle was the only person offended—even though the comments were
not directed at him— Bogan and Oberdorfer decided that the comments did not rise to the level of
harassment and agreed that a verbal warning was an appropriate response.
Oberdorfer and Bogan met with Krenjy and explained that while his conduct did not “rise
to the level of harassment, it [was] certainly inappropriate, unprofessional, [and] embarrassing to
[the] leadership team.” Bogan Dep., R. 31 at PageID 358. Krenjy was “remorseful and agreed
[that] his comments were inappropriate and should have been withheld.” Oberdorfer Aff., R. 27-2
at PageID 249. After informing Schelle of the outcome, Bogan closed the matter on October 5,
2021. Schelle also let the matter rest.
Soon after, Schelle noticed some changes. First, Krenjy asked Schelle to copy him on
emails to anyone outside the city, which was not something Schelle had to do in the past. Krenjy
explained that he wanted to stay informed on the projects under him, even if he did not think he
would necessarily respond or act on such emails. Next, Schelle was uninvited from a long-term
budgeting and planning meeting that was scheduled to occur in October. The meeting was on
Schelle’s schedule for several weeks before he was notified that his attendance was no longer
required. Schelle did not dwell on the recission because he “was in the middle of a very complex
project . . . [and] had a lot of other things going on.” Schelle Dep., R. 26 at PageID 160.
On November 1, 2021, Bogan and Oberdorfer informed Schelle that his position as Storm
Water Manager would be abolished as part of a “reorganization” effort to improve “efficien[cy]”
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and “economy” of city operations. Notice of Abolishment, R. 26-3 at PageID 185. Schelle’s
position was scheduled to officially end on December 31, 2021. Id. Schelle asked when the
decision to abolish the position was made; Oberdorfer replied that the information was not
relevant.
Schelle was naturally shocked by the news, in part because he had access to a “pro forma
budget” that Krenjy created in June 2021 depicting Schelle’s name, position, and salary increases
for the next several years. Schelle Dep., R. 26 at PageID 163. Concerned that the reporting of
Krenjy’s comments played a role, Schelle tried to appeal the abolishment of his position. But the
Civil Service Commission denied his request for a hearing. The Commission explained that under
the Piqua City Charter, the only way for a nonunion at-will employee to appeal an adverse
employment decision was to seek a public hearing with the City Manager. Schelle received such
a hearing on December 20, 2021. Schelle did not argue or present any information at the hearing
but sought answers to several questions. In a written response, Oberdorfer explained that Schelle’s
position was abolished as part of a city reorganization effort that began in January 2021 and
continued until December 2021. Schelle’s position was one of nine positions that were removed
“through attrition, layoff, or abolishment” during that time. Section 32 Hearing, R. 27-2 at PageID
252. He further stated that the decision to abolish Schelle’s position was made in May 2021, several
months before Schelle reported Krenjy’s comments to Human Resources. After the hearing,
Oberdorfer upheld the decision to abolish the position.
Schelle initiated this lawsuit. Schelle alleged that defendants—Piqua, Oberdorfer, and
Krenjy—retaliated against him for reporting Krenjy’s comments to Human Resources by
abolishing his position, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Ohio Rev. Code
§ 4112.02(I). Schelle also brought a claim under Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(J) against Krenjy and
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Oberdorfer for aiding, abetting, and inciting the retaliatory firing. He sought damages and
injunctive relief.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. They argued that Schelle did not engage in
protected activity when he reported Krenjy’s comments because it was not objectively reasonable
for Schelle to believe he was opposing unlawful discrimination. And even if Schelle engaged in
protected activity, the defendants argued that Schelle failed to show that his report to Human
Resources caused the abolishment of the position because the decision was made well before the
September meeting.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held
that Schelle did not engage in protected activity and therefore failed to establish a prima facie case
of Title VII retaliation. The district court also held that without any underlying violation, Schelle’s
claim of aiding and abetting retaliation also failed. This appeal followed.
II.
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Nathan v. Great Lakes Water
Auth., 992 F.3d 557, 564 (6th Cir. 2021). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “We affirm a grant of summary judgment where the record
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Ondo v. City of
Cleveland, 795 F.3d 597, 603 (6th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).
III.
On appeal, Schelle argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the
defendants on his Title VII retaliation claim because “a reasonable jury could conclude that [he]
had a good faith belief that the comments he reported were unlawful.” Appellant Br. 13–14. He
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further claims that because he established a Title VII retaliation claim, the district court erred in
granting summary judgment to the defendants on his aiding and abetting claim under Ohio Rev.
Code § 4112.02(J). We address each argument in turn.
A.
Begin with Schelle’s Title VII retaliation claim. Title VII prohibits an employer from,
among other things, discriminating against any individual because of that individual’s sex. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e–2. Workplace sexual harassment constitutes such discrimination “when the
workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive
working environment.” Nathan, 992 F.3d at 564–65 (cleaned up). Furthermore, Title VII prohibits
an employer from retaliating against an employee for opposing such harassment. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a).
When a plaintiff advances circumstantial evidence to support a Title VII retaliation claim,
as Schelle does here, we analyze the claim using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014). Under this framework,
the “[p]laintiff bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.” Id. To meet
this burden, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) the defendant knew
that the plaintiff was exercising his civil rights; (3) the defendant took adverse employment action
against the plaintiff; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action. Morris v. Oldham Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 201 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2000).
If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to the employer “to articulate some legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its actions.” Laster, 746 F.3d at 730. If the employer satisfies this burden,
then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer’s reason for its action
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was not the true reason. Id. The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion throughout this process.
Id.
Here, the district court held that Schelle failed to establish a prima facie case for Title VII
retaliation because he did not engage in protected activity when he reported Krenjy’s comments
to Bogan. We agree. Title VII recognizes two types of protected activity: opposition to potential
Title VII violations and participation in an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
proceeding. Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 469 (6th Cir. 2012).
“[C]omplaining about allegedly unlawful conduct to company management is classic opposition
activity.” Id. Although a plaintiff need not complain about actual Title VII violations to take
advantage of Title VII protections, the plaintiff must still have had “a reasonable and good faith
belief” that the harassing acts he was reporting were Title VII violations. Id. (citation omitted).
Therefore, to establish that Schelle engaged in protected activity, he must have had “a reasonable
and good faith belief” that Krenjy’s comments amounted to sexual harassment sanctionable under
Title VII. Id.
Sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII when it is “sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”1
Nathan, 992 F.3d at 564–65 (citation omitted). When judging whether such an environment exists,
we look to all circumstances “including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden,
1 To successfully bring a Title VII sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that the “harassment complained of was based on sex.” Schlosser v. VRHabilis, 113 F.4th 674, 683 (6th Cir. 2024). We do not hold one way or another on whether Krenjy’s comments were based on Kiser’s sex—something that was not raised by the parties below or discussed at the district court—but proceed to the Title VII retaliation claim merely assuming Krenjy’s comments were based on Kiser’s sex.
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532 U.S. 268, 270–71 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Burnett v. Tyco
Corp., 203 F.3d 980, 982 (6th Cir. 2000).
No reasonable person could have believed that Krenjy’s comments created such an
environment. “[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely
serious)” do not create an abusive work environment. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271 (citation omitted).
This was a one-off incident caused by Krenjy, who did not have a history of inappropriate behavior.
Both Bogan and Oberdorfer were quick to handle the incident. They issued a verbal warning, and
Krenjy was apologetic for his comments. The comments were not physically threatening and were
made in Kiser’s absence. While the comments were unprofessional, they were made in jest; the
others at the meeting laughed, characterized it as “shop talk” and did not find the comments
“offensive” or even “inappropriate.” Witness Statements, R. 36-6 at PageID 656–57. One of the
attendees even said that they would have “follow[ed] the proper protocol” in reporting such
statements if they felt uncomfortable, which they did not. Witness Supplemental Email, R. 27-1 at
PageID 241. Although Kiser was grateful that Schelle stood up for him, Kiser himself wanted the
matter to be a “bygone.” Bogan Dep., R. 31 at PageID 356. There is no indication that the incident
interfered with Kiser’s ability to perform his job, and he continued to work with Krenjy even after
learning of the incident.
These facts do not lend themselves to the conclusion that Krenjy’s comments created an
abusive work environment. Far worse conduct has failed to do so. See, e.g., Morris, 201 F.3d at
790 (male supervisor made sexual advances on plaintiff during her performance evaluation, made
several lewd jokes and isolated comments about her appearance, including calling her “Hot Lips”);
Burnett, 203 F.3d at 981 (male manager placed a pack of cigarettes inside plaintiff’s tank top and
bra strap and made several lewd jokes, including telling plaintiff she had “lost [her] cherry”); Clark
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v. United Parcel Serv., 400 F.3d 341, 351 (6th Cir. 2005) (male supervisor told sexual jokes, twice
placed a vibrating pager against plaintiff’s thigh, and pulled on her overalls after plaintiff
mentioned she was wearing a thong underneath). Accordingly, Schelle did not engage in protected
activity and failed to establish a prima facie Title VII retaliation case.
Schelle’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. Schelle claims he is entitled to Title VII’s
protection from retaliation because he “acted to prevent further escalation of the harassment of his
coworker.” Appellant Br. 13. He argues that employees need not wait to report “an undisputed
incident of inappropriate sexual harassment before it [rises] to the level of ‘severe or pervasive’”
to gain Title VII protections. Appellant Br. 11. In his view, waiting to report only perpetuates
harassment and results in the chilling of those who would otherwise report harassment based on
their organization’s policies. Appellant Br. 12.
But Title VII already takes these considerations into account. The requirement that
harassment must be so “severe or pervasive” leading to “an abusive working environment” forges
“a middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the
conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(1993). And when properly applied, this standard “filter[s] out complaints attacking the ordinary
tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes,
and occasional teasing,” thereby ensuring workplaces can function effectively without the looming
threat of Title VII litigation for everyday disputes. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
788 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In short, Title VII does not impose “a
general civility code for the American workplace.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). And its protections cannot be invoked to police “the conduct of jerks,
bullies, and persecutors” during daily workplace skirmishes. Wasek, 682 F.3d at 467. But Schelle
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asks us to do just that. Although Schelle’s act of standing up for a junior employee was admirable,
Krenjy’s comments were not an “undisputed incident of inappropriate sexual harassment” and no
reasonable person could believe they rose to a level that would fall under Title VII’s ambit.
Appellant Br. 11.
Schelle relies on Fourth Circuit case law to advance his argument that he is entitled to Title
VII protections from retaliation for opposing “a hostile work environment that, although not fully
formed, is in progress.” Id. at 12 (citing Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 282
(4th Cir. 2015) (en banc)). But our decision today aligns with Boyer-Liberto. Prior to Boyer-
Liberto, Fourth Circuit precedent provided that “an isolated incident of harassment [was generally]
insufficient to create a hostile work environment” because the plaintiff could not “have possessed
a reasonable belief that a Title VII violation was in progress,” unless there was evidence “that a
plan was in motion to create such an environment” or “that such an environment was [otherwise]
likely to occur.” Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 282 (quoting Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332,
340 (4th Cir. 2006)). The Boyer-Liberto court, sitting en banc, did away with this standard because
“rather than encourag[ing] the early reporting vital to achieving Title VII’s goal of avoiding harm,”
the standard “deterr[ed] harassment victims from speaking up by depriving them of their statutory
entitlement to protection from retaliation.” Id. at 283. Instead, the Fourth Circuit adopted the
standard that we used here today, which requires the court to focus “on the severity of the
harassment” when evaluating “the reasonableness of an employee’s belief that a hostile
environment is occurring based on an isolated incident.” Id. at 284 (citing Breeden, 532 U.S. at
270–71). And, as already explained, Schelle’s retaliation claim fails under this standard because a
reasonable person could not believe that Krenjy’s comments created an abusive working
environment.
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B.
We next proceed to Schelle’s state law claims. Schelle argues that the district court erred
in granting summary judgment to the defendants on his aiding and abetting claim under Ohio Rev.
Code § 4112.02(J). Much like Title VII, Ohio law makes it an “unlawful discriminatory practice”
if an employer discriminates against a person because of that person’s “race, color, religion, sex,
military status, national origin, disability, age, or ancestry[.]” Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(A). Ohio
law also makes it illegal “[f]or any person to discriminate in any manner against any other person
because that person has opposed any unlawful discriminatory practice[.]” Id. § 4112.02(I). It is
also illegal for “any person to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce” an unlawful discriminatory
practice described in the statute. Id. § 4112.02(J).
Given the similarities between Ohio law and Title VII, Ohio courts have held that “federal
law provides the applicable analysis for reviewing retaliation claims” under Ohio Rev. Code
§ 4112.02(I). Braun v. Ultimate Jetcharters, LLC, 828 F.3d 501, 510 (6th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).
Therefore, we analyze a retaliation claim under Ohio law using the same framework as we do for
a Title VII retaliation claim. Id. And because Schelle failed to establish such a claim under Title
VII, we find no violation of Ohio law either. Without a viable retaliation claim, Schelle’s claim
that Krenjy and Oberdorfer aided and abetted any retaliation under Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(J)
also fails as matter of law. Childs v. Kroger Co., 222 N.E.3d 741, 782–83 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 3,
2023) (collecting cases and holding that a claim for aiding and abetting unlawful discrimination
under Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(J) fails as a matter of law when the plaintiff fails to establish the
underlying discrimination claims).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
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