Skouras v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Second Circuit

Skouras v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

188 F.2d 831, 40 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 491, 1951 U.S. App. LEXIS 3948

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedApril 30, 1951

Docket176, Docket 21787

StatusPublished

Cited by10 cases

This text of 188 F.2d 831 (Skouras v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Skouras v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 188 F.2d 831, 40 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 491, 1951 U.S. App. LEXIS 3948 (2d Cir. 1951).

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Opinion

FRANK, Circuit Judge.

The question here is whether the donees’ power to destroy a joint assignment with right of survivorship gave the donor an exclusion from the gift tax. The Supreme Court has held that when unanimous action of the donees is necessary to such destruction then the interests of several donees are “future interests,” and the donor is not entitled to the exclusion under 26 U.S.C.A. § 1003(b). See Ryerson v. United States, 312 U.S. 405, 61 S.Ct. 656, 85 L.Ed. 917; United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 61 S.Ct. 659, 85 L.Ed. 913. The taxpayer contends 1 that unanimous consent was here not necessary, because each of the donees had the immediate individual power to bring about an individual severance of the joint assignments and thus to obtain at once his share of the cash surren *832 der value of the policies. We assume, arguendo, that this would be true, absent a contrary intention of the donor. But here the Tax Court found that the donor intended that joint action was necessary for such a severance, and we think the evidence amply sustains that finding.

Affirmed.

1

. He relies on such cases as Matter of McKelway, 221 N.Y. 15, 19, 116 N.E. 348, L.R.A.1917E, 1143, and Doker v. Edmans, 204 App.Div. 223, 197 N.Y.S. 857; cf. United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 370, 59 S.Ct. 551, 83 L.Ed. 763.

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FRANK, Circuit Judge.

The question here is whether the donees’ power to destroy a joint assignment with right of survivorship gave the donor an exclusion from the gift tax. The Supreme Court has held that when unanimous action of the donees is necessary to such destruction then the interests of several donees are “future interests,” and the donor is not entitled to the exclusion under 26 U.S.C.A. § 1003(b). See Ryerson v. United States, 312 U.S. 405, 61 S.Ct. 656, 85 L.Ed. 917; United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 61 S.Ct. 659, 85 L.Ed. 913. The taxpayer contends 1 that unanimous consent was here not necessary, because each of the donees had the immediate individual power to bring about an individual severance of the joint assignments and thus to obtain at once his share of the cash surren *832 der value of the policies. We assume, arguendo, that this would be true, absent a contrary intention of the donor. But here the Tax Court found that the donor intended that joint action was necessary for such a severance, and we think the evidence amply sustains that finding.

Affirmed.

1

. He relies on such cases as Matter of McKelway, 221 N.Y. 15, 19, 116 N.E. 348, L.R.A.1917E, 1143, and Doker v. Edmans, 204 App.Div. 223, 197 N.Y.S. 857; cf. United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 370, 59 S.Ct. 551, 83 L.Ed. 763.

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188 F.2d 831, 40 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 491, 1951 U.S. App. LEXIS 3948, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/skouras-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca2-1951.

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