J-A18032-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ELIZABETH A. SKINNER IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant
v.
JAMES T. SKINNER
Appellee No. 2091 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Order Entered October 30, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Domestic Relations at No(s): 01886 SA 2006
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., WECHT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED AUGUST 26, 2014
Court of Common Pleas of York County assessing her earning capacity to be
$147,410.00. Upon review, we affirm.
The facts and procedural history of this appeal are extensive and may
be summarized as follows: Father is retired from the military and is
currently employed as an ROTC instructor at York City High School. The
Mother is a physician with Well-Span Health, where she receives an annual
salary of $65,000.00 to work part-time.
Mother and Father were married on September 9, 2000. One child J-A18032-14
was nine years old and in fourth grade. The parties separated in February of
2006, and divorced on July 14, 2009.
The court entered an initial support order on September 21, 2006,
directing Father to pay Mother child support and alimony pendent lite
rt entered a second support order on June 4, 2007,
following a de novo support hearing at which the trial court determined
Mother had an earning capacity of $85,000.00 per year.
Following a de novo hearing on December 8, 2009, the court entered a
modified support order on February 17, 2010, directing Father to pay child
support and APL. On March 11, 2010, the court modified this order by
APL payment to $401.00 per month to reflect the -upon
50/50 custody arrangement.
Both parties appealed the March 11, 2010 order. The Superior Court
upheld the decision of the trial court in a memorandum opinion on January
12, 2011, determining that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
-
of the parties. Skinner v. Skinner, No. 440 MDA 2010 and No. 501 MDA
2010, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed January 12, 2011). At the
time, Mother was the primary caretaker of the child and the child attended a
half-day kindergarten program.
On May 6, 2013, Father filed a petition to modify the support order.
Father also filed a petition for an amendment of APL on May 8, 2013. A
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support conference occurred on June 24, 2013, and on July 24, 2013, the
capacity. The conference officer assessed a full-time earning capacity for
Mother of approximately $135,000.00. Mother requested a de novo hearing
on August 5, 2013. The case was scheduled as a special support hearing
due to the complexity of the matter and was heard before the court on
October 15, 2013. On October 30, 2013, the trial court issued an order
holding Mother to a full-time earning capacity of $147,410.00 per year and
terminating APL. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Mother raises four issues:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by overriding and/or misapplying the law allowing Father to request modification of support with a substantial change in circumstances on the same issues as previously decided by the trial court on February 17, 2010, and upheld by the Superior Court on January 12, 2011, in violation of collateral estoppel.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by overriding and/or misapplying the law by imputing an earning capacity on plaintiff that is greater than one full-time position and is
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by overriding and/or misapplying the law by imputing an inflated earning capacity on Mother without adequate support on the record.
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by overriding - time earning capacity by using a straight hourly rate when plaintiff is not paid hourly, and cannot get paid the amount set by the trial court simply by working 40 hours per week.
-3- J-A18032-14
Our standard and scope of review for an order of child support is well
settled:
When evaluating a support order, this Court may only reverse
sustained on any valid ground. We will not interfere with the broad discretion afforded the trial court absent an abuse of the discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the support order. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law, or the judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, discretion has been abused. In addition, we note
of child support is to promote the c
Kimock v. Jones, 47 A.3d 850, 854 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted).
Mother first argues that the trial court violated the doctrine of
collateral estoppel when it permitted Father to request a modification of the
support order because the issue had been previously litigated. It is well
established that the doctrine of collateral estoppel will bar review of an issue
only when the following four criteria are met:
[1] The issue decided in a prior action must be identical to one presented in a later action; [2] the prior action must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits; [3] the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the prior action, or in privity with a party to the prior action; and [4] the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.
Ewing v. Ewing, 843 A.2d 1282, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2004). Furthermore, we
observe that in Pennsylvania, child support orders are always modifiable if a
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party can show a change of circumstances. See Nicholson v. Combs, 703
A.2d 407 (Pa. Super. 1997).
There is no dispute that three of the four elements in the above test
for collateral estoppel are met in this matter. The earlier action resulted in a
final judgment on the merits; Father was a party to the prior action; and
Father had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior action.
Whether collateral estoppel applies to bar review in this case ultimately turns
on whether the issues presented in the two actions are identical.
that Mother should be held to an earning capacity of $85,000.00 per year
because, at that particular time, Mother was the primary custodial parent of
a kindergarten-aged child. In the present matter, Mother and Father equally
share physical custody of their child, who is now five years older and in the
fourth grade. The issues in the two cases, while similar, are not identical.
Because Father has demonstrated a change of circumstances that alters the
issues at bar, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply here. See
id.
dete
incomes and earning capaciti Mackay v. Mackay, 984
A.2d 529, 537 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 4322(a)).
-5- J-A18032-14
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1910.16(d)(4), addressing earning
capacities, provides as follows:
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
J-A18032-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ELIZABETH A. SKINNER IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant
v.
JAMES T. SKINNER
Appellee No. 2091 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Order Entered October 30, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Domestic Relations at No(s): 01886 SA 2006
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., WECHT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED AUGUST 26, 2014
Court of Common Pleas of York County assessing her earning capacity to be
$147,410.00. Upon review, we affirm.
The facts and procedural history of this appeal are extensive and may
be summarized as follows: Father is retired from the military and is
currently employed as an ROTC instructor at York City High School. The
Mother is a physician with Well-Span Health, where she receives an annual
salary of $65,000.00 to work part-time.
Mother and Father were married on September 9, 2000. One child J-A18032-14
was nine years old and in fourth grade. The parties separated in February of
2006, and divorced on July 14, 2009.
The court entered an initial support order on September 21, 2006,
directing Father to pay Mother child support and alimony pendent lite
rt entered a second support order on June 4, 2007,
following a de novo support hearing at which the trial court determined
Mother had an earning capacity of $85,000.00 per year.
Following a de novo hearing on December 8, 2009, the court entered a
modified support order on February 17, 2010, directing Father to pay child
support and APL. On March 11, 2010, the court modified this order by
APL payment to $401.00 per month to reflect the -upon
50/50 custody arrangement.
Both parties appealed the March 11, 2010 order. The Superior Court
upheld the decision of the trial court in a memorandum opinion on January
12, 2011, determining that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
-
of the parties. Skinner v. Skinner, No. 440 MDA 2010 and No. 501 MDA
2010, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed January 12, 2011). At the
time, Mother was the primary caretaker of the child and the child attended a
half-day kindergarten program.
On May 6, 2013, Father filed a petition to modify the support order.
Father also filed a petition for an amendment of APL on May 8, 2013. A
-2- J-A18032-14
support conference occurred on June 24, 2013, and on July 24, 2013, the
capacity. The conference officer assessed a full-time earning capacity for
Mother of approximately $135,000.00. Mother requested a de novo hearing
on August 5, 2013. The case was scheduled as a special support hearing
due to the complexity of the matter and was heard before the court on
October 15, 2013. On October 30, 2013, the trial court issued an order
holding Mother to a full-time earning capacity of $147,410.00 per year and
terminating APL. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Mother raises four issues:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by overriding and/or misapplying the law allowing Father to request modification of support with a substantial change in circumstances on the same issues as previously decided by the trial court on February 17, 2010, and upheld by the Superior Court on January 12, 2011, in violation of collateral estoppel.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by overriding and/or misapplying the law by imputing an earning capacity on plaintiff that is greater than one full-time position and is
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by overriding and/or misapplying the law by imputing an inflated earning capacity on Mother without adequate support on the record.
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by overriding - time earning capacity by using a straight hourly rate when plaintiff is not paid hourly, and cannot get paid the amount set by the trial court simply by working 40 hours per week.
-3- J-A18032-14
Our standard and scope of review for an order of child support is well
settled:
When evaluating a support order, this Court may only reverse
sustained on any valid ground. We will not interfere with the broad discretion afforded the trial court absent an abuse of the discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the support order. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law, or the judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, discretion has been abused. In addition, we note
of child support is to promote the c
Kimock v. Jones, 47 A.3d 850, 854 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted).
Mother first argues that the trial court violated the doctrine of
collateral estoppel when it permitted Father to request a modification of the
support order because the issue had been previously litigated. It is well
established that the doctrine of collateral estoppel will bar review of an issue
only when the following four criteria are met:
[1] The issue decided in a prior action must be identical to one presented in a later action; [2] the prior action must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits; [3] the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the prior action, or in privity with a party to the prior action; and [4] the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.
Ewing v. Ewing, 843 A.2d 1282, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2004). Furthermore, we
observe that in Pennsylvania, child support orders are always modifiable if a
-4- J-A18032-14
party can show a change of circumstances. See Nicholson v. Combs, 703
A.2d 407 (Pa. Super. 1997).
There is no dispute that three of the four elements in the above test
for collateral estoppel are met in this matter. The earlier action resulted in a
final judgment on the merits; Father was a party to the prior action; and
Father had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior action.
Whether collateral estoppel applies to bar review in this case ultimately turns
on whether the issues presented in the two actions are identical.
that Mother should be held to an earning capacity of $85,000.00 per year
because, at that particular time, Mother was the primary custodial parent of
a kindergarten-aged child. In the present matter, Mother and Father equally
share physical custody of their child, who is now five years older and in the
fourth grade. The issues in the two cases, while similar, are not identical.
Because Father has demonstrated a change of circumstances that alters the
issues at bar, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply here. See
id.
dete
incomes and earning capaciti Mackay v. Mackay, 984
A.2d 529, 537 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 4322(a)).
-5- J-A18032-14
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1910.16(d)(4), addressing earning
capacities, provides as follows:
If the trier of fact determines that a party to a support action has willfully failed to obtain or maintain appropriate employment, the trier of fact may impute to that party an Age, education, training, health, work experience, earnings history and child care responsibilities are factors which shall be considered in determining earning capacity. In order for an earning capacity to be assessed, the trier of fact must state reasons for the assessment in writing or on the record. Generally, the trier of fact should not impute an earning capacity that is greater than the amount the party would earn from one full-time position. Determination of what constitutes a reasonable work regimen depends upon all relevant circumstances including the choice of jobs available within a particular occupation, working hours, working conditions and whether a party has exerted substantial good faith efforts to find employment.
Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(4) (emphasis added). This Court defines earning
that amount which the person could realistically earn under the
circumstances, considering his or her age, health, mental and physical
Mackay, 984 A.2d at 537 (citing Gephert v.
Gephert, 764 A.2d 613, 615 (Pa. Super. 2000)). We further note that,
The trial court, as the finder of fact, is entitled to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses. A support order will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court failed to consider properly the requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure Governing Actions for Support, Pa.R.C.P. 1910.1 et seq., or abused its discretion in applying these Rules.
Krankowski v. O'Neil, 928 A.2d 284, 286-87 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation
omitted).
-6- J-A18032-14
At the support hearing on October 15, 2013, Mother presented a
vocational expert who testified about her earning capacity. The expert
year based on her current employment contract. N.T. Hearing, 10/15/13, at
16. The expert further testified that Mother could realistically earn
$140,460.00 based on her education and regional opportunities. Id. at 31.
Id. at
32.
Mother requested that the trial court use an hourly wage to determine
her earning capacity. The trial court found this to be an appropriate
ility given 1 Accordingly, the trial court
2 Moreover, the trial court determined a ____________________________________________
1 Mother is a board-certified physician who has continuing education credits and years of experience. According to the chart attached to the expert report, the expert suggested the trial court hold Mother to an hourly wage slightly above that of a Physician Assistant. Trial Court Opinion, 12/30/13, at 3. 2
2013. The total, $221,115.00 was divided by three to calculate her average annual income of $73,705.00. The court divided this amount by 52 weeks, and the weekly wage was then divided by 20, the number of hours Mother
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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part-time earning capacity was no longer appropriate given the change in
circumstances:
Child is now in fourth (4th) grade, and the parties equally share
support Child on a part- on the quality of care for Child or need to provide care for Child . . . Mother is no longer the primary physical caretaker as she was at the time of the last hearing on December 8, 2009.
changed, and this court must consider the significant changes.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/28/12, at 6.
The trial court, as finder of fact, weighed the evidence and assessed
age, education, training, work experience, earnings history and child care
responsibilities as required by Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(4), and rejected the
capacity, the trial court held Mother to an amount that she could realistically
earn under the present circumstances.3 Mackay, supra. Because this
_______________________ (Footnote Continued)
over the past three years. The trial court deemed this number appropriate to calculate what Mother could realistically earn if she worked a full-time
by 40 hours resulted in a weekly wage of $2,834.80 and a yearly total of approximately $147,410.00. Trial Court Opinion, 12/30/13, at 3. 3 Of note, mother presented no evidence that she could not obtain full time employment. Her choice to work part time does not constrain the trial court or this Court to accept that choice as evidence of her earning capacity.
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not second-
capacity. Id. at 533.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 8/26/2014
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