Ski Roundtop, Inc. v. Hall

401 A.2d 1203, 265 Pa. Super. 266, 1979 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2082
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 12, 1979
Docket932
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 401 A.2d 1203 (Ski Roundtop, Inc. v. Hall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ski Roundtop, Inc. v. Hall, 401 A.2d 1203, 265 Pa. Super. 266, 1979 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2082 (Pa. Ct. App. 1979).

Opinion

SPAETH, Judge:

This is an appeal from an order dismissing appellant’s complaint on the ground that a Pennsylvania court will not take jurisdiction of a case that involves regulating or interfering with the internal management or affairs of a foreign corporation. Plum v. Tampax, Inc., 399 Pa. 553, 160 A.2d *269 549 (1960); Kahn v. American Cone & Pretzel Co., 365 Pa. 161, 74 A.2d 160 (1950); Hopkins v. Great Western Fuse Co., 343 Pa. 438, 22 A.2d 717 (1941). In stating the case we shall, as we must, Upholsterers’ International Union v. United Furniture Workers, 356 Pa. 469, 52 A.2d 217 (1947), take the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true.

Appellant, a Pennsylvania corporation, is a minority shareholder in Ski Yellowstone, Inc., a Montana corporation with its principal executive offices in Pennsylvania. Appellant’s complaint comprises both derivative 1 and individual causes of action. Yellowstone is a nominal defendant; the other defendants are various officers and board members of Yellowstone, all residents of Pennsylvania.

Count I alleges violations of the Pennsylvania Securities Act of 1972, Dec. 5, 1972, P.L. 1280, No. 284, § 101 et seq., 70 P.S. § 1-101 et seq. 2 The facts alleged are as follows.

Prior to July 16, 1976, Yellowstone was considering selling notes convertible into Yellowstone common stock at $.20 per share. In order to defeat this proposal, however, appellee John P. Hall circulated the false information that

a. Mr. Geier’s [not further identified] demanded employment contract would be substantially more expensive to Yellowstone [more expensive than what is unclear].
*270 b. Changes in the Board of Directors and Officers would not detrimentally affect the other shareholders and that basically the officers remained unchanged.
Complaint at paragraph 18.

Though the complaint says these were only part of the misrepresentations made in connection with the defeat of the $.20 per share proposal, no other misrepresentation is alleged.

The Yellowstone board abandoned the $.20 per share proposal, but then considered a sale of common stock at $.10 per share. Hall opposed this proposal also, and it was defeated. However, a proposal to sell stock at $.05 per share (the “Series C offer”) was approved, thé approval specifying a minimum number of shares to be sold to make the offer effective, and setting various dates for installment payments of the purchase price. Hall subscribed to a large number of shares, but at the last moment he withdrew his subscription with the result that the Series C offer was threatened by undersubscription. Later Hall agreed to purchase enough shares to make the offer effective, and thereby he became the majority shareholder. At a special meeting of shareholders on November 5, 1976, Hall as majority shareholder was able to have the board of directors reconstituted and two directors elected. 3 The new board then voted to postpone the first installment payment for Series C purchasers.

The next day, November 6, the board authorized the sale of more shares at $.05 each (the “Series D offer”), and specified that proceeds from the Series C and Series D offers should be used to fund primary and secondary budgets, respectively. The shareholders ratified the board’s actions, though appellant and other minority shareholders voted against ratification. Appellant asserts that Hall had falsely *271 “represented to Yellowstone, the Board of Directors and Shareholders that it was necessary for Yellowstone to offer the Series ‘D’ issue.” Complaint at paragraphs 38, 56.

By December 23, insufficient subscriptions to the Series D offer had been received. The board therefore increased the number of shares authorized to be sold, lowered the price to $.01 per share, extended the payment schedule for Series D purchasers, and indefinitely postponed the installment payments due in the Series C offer. At a special meeting of shareholders on January 7, 1977, these actions were ratified.

Appellant alleges that, in addition to the misrepresentations already mentioned, Hall failed to disclose the following: that he had a scheme to take over Yellowstone and to defraud it by purchasing stock for inadequate consideration; that he had voted against the $.10 per share proposal in order to force a lower price pursuant to this takeover plan; and that he had intended to postpone the installment due dates.

Count II, in assumpsit, is based on the breach by Hall (and by any other appellees who subscribed to the Series C offer) of the agreement to pay for the shares according to the original terms of the offer.

Count III, in trespass, alleges that appellees breached their fiduciary duty to Yellowstone by the acts described in Count I; by making reckless investments; by bungling an opportunity to buy a tract of land under favorable circumstances; and by selling shares in the Series C and D offers for less than true value.

Count IV incorporates the allegations of Counts I and III, and charges common law fraud.

Count V is an individual (i. e., not derivative) claim for breach of fiduciary duty to appellant as minority shareholder, in that appellees favored Hall’s interests above appellant’s; diluted the value of its investments, and therefore appellant’s equity, by the various stock sales and payment postponements; and violated various corporate by-laws relating to shareholders’ rights.

*272 The remedy requested on each count is damages.

The question whether these allegations involve the internal management of a corporation is not a question of whether the lower court had jurisdiction, but whether the court should have exercised the jurisdiction that it had. Plum v. Tampax, Inc., supra; Wettengel v. Robinson, 288 Pa. 362, 136 A. 673 (1927). The general proposition that a court will not take jurisdiction of a case that involves regulating or interfering with the internal management of a corporation is based on a number of considerations: the recognition of the fact that the court may lack power to enforce its decree, Moore v. Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People, 425 Pa. 204, 229 A.2d 477 (1967); a reluctance to interpret the laws of another state, Thompson v. Southern Connellsville Coke Co., 269 Pa. 500, 112 A. 533 (1921); a reluctance to get involved where the differences between the parties are merely a matter of business judgment, Plum v. Tampax, supra; Thompson v. Southern Connellsville Coke Co., supra; McCloskey v. Snowden, 212 Pa. 249, 61 A.

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Bluebook (online)
401 A.2d 1203, 265 Pa. Super. 266, 1979 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2082, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ski-roundtop-inc-v-hall-pasuperct-1979.