Skeffington v. Daniel
This text of 89 S.E. 458 (Skeffington v. Daniel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
1. Under the ruling in Bush v. McCarty Co., 127 Ga. 308 (56 S. E. 430, 9 Ann. Cas. 240), the word “creditors,” as employed in the Civil Code, § 3163, is not limited to persons who were creditors of a partnership at the time of its dissolution, but a person who had previously sold goods and given credit to the firm during its continuance is within its meaning, and actual notice must be given to such a person as a creditor.
2. Where the evidence failed to show affirmatively that the plaintiff had ever been a creditor of the partnership prior,to its dissolution, actual personal notice of such dissolution by the withdrawal of one of the members of the firm is not indispensable to the discharge of the retiring partner from liability on an account for goods purchased. “A customer of this kind is entitled only to such notice as should be given to ‘the world’ of the dissolution.” Askew v. Silman, 95 Ga. 678 (22 S. E. 573).
3. Conceding that various circumstances in proof, coupled with the admission in the plea filed by the continuing partner, as to the existence of the debt to the plaintiff, were sufficient to show a delivery of the fruit for the value of which the suit was instituted, the evidence was insufficient to charge the retiring partner with liability. The court therefore erred in refusing a nonsuit when the motion therefor was made, and in directing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
Judgment reversed'.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
89 S.E. 458, 18 Ga. App. 262, 1916 Ga. App. LEXIS 270, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/skeffington-v-daniel-gactapp-1916.