Skeels v. Snow

127 N.W. 674, 162 Mich. 561, 1910 Mich. LEXIS 1080
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 27, 1910
DocketDocket No. 106
StatusPublished

This text of 127 N.W. 674 (Skeels v. Snow) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Skeels v. Snow, 127 N.W. 674, 162 Mich. 561, 1910 Mich. LEXIS 1080 (Mich. 1910).

Opinion

Moore, J.

This case was tried before the judge who made findings, the essential parts of which are as follows:

“(1) The plaintiff in this cause is a practicing attorney.
“(2) The defendant was a farmer and was on or about January first, A. D. 1905, the owner of (certain lands which are described in detail).
“(3) That on or about said date certain parties for whom one Morton B. Wheeler of Grand Rapids was acting, and with whom said Wheeler was interested, were contemplating the building of a dam on White river, in said county [Oceana], which might necessitate the use of said lands for the purpose of flowage, and it was contemplated and intended by the defendant in this action to [562]*562clear up, if necessary, such defects as there might be in the title to said lands, and to sell or dispose of the same to the said Morton B. Wheeler and his associates.
“ (4) That, for the purpose of enabling said defendant to present a merchantable title to said lands and to procure the sale of the same to said Morton B. Wheeler and his associates, the defendant at about the time stated employed this plaintiff as his attorney in the matter of' making his title in and to said lands merchantable, and to assist the defendant by his advice and services, as such attorney, in disposing of said property to said Wheeler and his associates.
“ (5) For such purpose, at about the time named, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement, which, in substance, was as follows: Said plaintiff was to act for said defendant as his attorney in connection with perfecting the title to said lands, and in assisting said defendant to sell or dispose of the same to said Wheeler and his associates; said defendant agreeing to pay the plaintiff, and the plaintiff agreeing to receive therefor, such reasonable attorney’s fees as the plaintiff might from time to time become entitled to for all of his services, so to be rendered as aforesaid. Said defendant, in addition to the payment of such fees for all such services rendered, was to pay said plaintiff all his expenses and expenditures in connection with such work. In addition to such payment for services so to be rendered, and expenses and expenditures so incurred, said defendant agreed with the plaintiff that in case he, said defendant, should be able to sell to said Wheeler and his associates his rights in said property for the sum of $25,000, defendant would give said plaintiff from the proceeds from said lands the sum of $1,000; that, if such sale should be made for the sum of $16,000, said defendant would give said plaintiff from such proceeds the sum of $500, either of which sums, respectively, was to be given plaintiff only in case such sale should be made in such manner to said Wheeler and his associates, or some other person, and the same was to be completed, and that such sum was to be given said plaintiff only out of the proceeds of the sale of such land.
“(6) It was also understood and agreed between said parties that said defendant was to retain control of all the negotiations connected with such deal and was to determine the price at which such property should be sold, and reserved and retained the right to use all legitimate means [563]*563to obtain as large a price therefrom as possible, said plaintiff only to furnish such assistance therein as he might be requested to furnish.
“(7) Plaintiff has been paid by defendant in full, and something more, for all such services, expenses, and expenditures that he has rendered to, or incurred in connection with, such deal, or pursuant to such agreement.
“(8) On or about the 30th day of September, A. D. 1905, plaintiff and defendant met at the village of Holton in Muskegon county with one Russell Updyke, who was then and there acting with limited authority in behalf of said Morton B. Wheeler and his associates who had authority at that time only to negotiate for an offer by defendant for the purchase of defendant’s rights in the property named, but who did not have authority at that time to close a deal for the purchase thereof, having only the power and right to obtain from defendant a proposition for such sale and purchase, and which it was necessary for him to present and submit to his principal, Morton B. Wheeler, then in the city of Grand Rapids, for acceptance or rejection, at which meeting and interview at Holton aforesaid said defendant did make a proposition to said Russell H. Updyke, the same being oral and not in writing, who received the same for and on behalf of said Wheeler, and who took the same to said Wheeler at Grand Rapids, and presented the same to him on the following day,_ viz., October 1, 1905, at which time said Wheeler rejected such proposition, and, instead thereof, made and instructed said Updyke to make to said defendant a counterproposition, but which counterproposition was» never presented or made to defendant. On Monday, October 2, 1905, this defendant instructed plaintiff herein to withdraw the proposition that had been so made by defendant at Holton on September 30, 1905.
“(9) The proposition made by defendant at Holton was thereupon and on October 2, A. D. 1905, withdrawn after said Morton B. Wheeler had on October 1st determined to and had rejected the proposition made by defendant at Holton on September 30th, and such deal was not closed, nor has there been any such deal closed for the disposal of such property, and defendant is still the owner of such interest therein as he had at the inception of these arrangements.
“ (10) That no change was made at any time in the [564]*564terms of the agreement between plaintiff and defendant made as the court has hereinabove found.
“ Much of the testimony offered in behalf of the plaintiff in this cause was objected to on the part of the defendant, but the same was admitted subject to the objection of said defendant. From all the testimony admitted in said cause, I find the facts as above stated, and I find as conclusions of law:
“ (1) That defendant is not indebted to plaintiff in any sum of money whatsoever.
“(2) That plaintiff has no cause of action against said defendant.
“Let judgment therefore be entered for the defendant, with costs to be taxed.”

A request was made for other and different findings, which request was refused and exceptions taken thereto. The case is brought here by writ of error.

It is the claim of appellant that he is entitled to $800 for services rendered in procuring an arrangement by which Mr. Wheeler was willing to buy the lands for $6,800, and leave thereon a quantity of timber valued at $500. This claim is made upon the theory that, though no sale in fact was made, a sale was prevented by the act of defendant, and that plaintiff is entitled to the $800 the same as though a sale had been made. The record is quite voluminous. We shall state sufficient of it to present the questions involved. The defendant was the owner of certain lands. Mr. Wheeler was engaged in an enterprise which caused him to write defendant in February, 1905, about one of the descriptions, as follows:

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Bluebook (online)
127 N.W. 674, 162 Mich. 561, 1910 Mich. LEXIS 1080, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/skeels-v-snow-mich-1910.