Skaliotis v. R.I. Department of Human Services, 95-2438 (1996)

CourtSuperior Court of Rhode Island
DecidedApril 18, 1996
DocketC.A. No. 95-2438
StatusPublished

This text of Skaliotis v. R.I. Department of Human Services, 95-2438 (1996) (Skaliotis v. R.I. Department of Human Services, 95-2438 (1996)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Skaliotis v. R.I. Department of Human Services, 95-2438 (1996), (R.I. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

DECISION
Before this Court is the appeal of Pericles Skaliotis from a decision of the Department of Human Services, which found him to be ineligible to receive benefits as a Qualified Medicare Beneficiary or a Special Low-Income Medicare Beneficiary. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1993 Reenactment) §42-35-15.

Facts/Travel
Pericles Skaliotis (plaintiff) is a Medicare beneficiary with monthly income of $751. He is married to Phyllis Skaliotis who is younger than 65 and is not blind or otherwise disabled. Phyllis has no income of her own. In June 1994, plaintiff initially applied to the Department of Human Services (DHS) for benefit, and was found eligible as a Qualified Medicare Beneficiary (QMB) through November, 1994. In November, he applied for recertification of his QMB eligibility. DHS sent written notice denying QMB eligibility as his monthly income exceeded DHS's income standard for an individual.

Plaintiff appealed the denial of benefits and a hearing was held on February 2, 1995, and reconvened on March 24, 1995. At the hearing, plaintiff questioned the DHS policy of comparing a married QMB applicant's income to the QMB income standard for an individual.

The DHS hearing officer issued a written decision on April 10, 1995, which upheld the denial of QMB eligibility.

Standard of Review
The review of a decision of the agency by this Court is controlled by R.I.G.L. § 42-35-15(g), which provides for review of a contested agency decision:

(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error of law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact. Costa v. Registry of Motor Vehicles, 543 A.2d 1307, 1309 (R.I. 1988); Carmody v. R.I. Conflict of Interest Commission,509 A.2d 453, 458 (R.I. 1986). Therefore, this Court's review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the Commission's decision. Newport Shipyard v. RhodeIsland Commission for Human Rights, 484 A.2d 893 (R.I. 1984). "Substantial evidence" is that which a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Id. at 897. (quoting Caswell v.George Sherman Sand Gravel Co., 120 R.I. 1981, 424 A.2d 646, 647 (1981)). This is true even in cases where the court, after reviewing the certified record and evidence, might be inclined to view the evidence differently than the agency. Berberian v. Dept.of Employment Security, 414 A.2d 480, 482 (R.I. 1980). This Court will "reverse factual conclusions of administrative agencies only when they are totally devoid of competent evidentiary support in the record." Milardo v. Coastal Resources Management Council,434 A.2d 266, 272 (R.I. 1981). However, questions of law are not binding upon a reviewing court and may be freely reviewed to determine what the law is and its applicability to the facts.Carmody v. R.I. Conflicts of Interests Commission, 509 A.2d at 458.

Qualified Medicare Beneficiary (QMB) and SpecialLow-Income Medicare Beneficiary (SLMB)Programs
The QMB program provides for the payment of Medicare premiums, deductibles, and co-insurance amounts for certain low-income persons. The term "qualified medicare beneficiary" means an individual whose income does not exceed an income level established by the State. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(p)(1)(B). While they do not receive full Medicare coverage, QMB recipients are not required to pay the monthly Medicare Part B premium, the annual Medicare Part B deductible, the Medicare Part A hospital deductible, or the Medicare Part B 20% co-payment for such items as physicians visits, lab tests and other out-patient care. SLMB recipients are not required to pay the monthly Medicare Part B premium. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(p).

The QMB/SLMB statute establishes that the same income determination methodology used to determine SSI eligibility shall be utilized in making QMB/SLMB eligibility determinations. Income standards used for SSI, the maximum monthly income an applicant may receive and still be eligible for benefits, are to be used as

Using the income determination methodology of the Supplemental Security Income Program, DHS must first determine the applicant's countable income. DHS must then measure that income against the applicable standard. "The income level established under paragraph (1)(B) shall be at least the percent provided under subparagraph (B) (but not more than 100 percent) of the official poverty line . . . applicable to a family of the size involved." 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(p)(2)(A). Paragraph B allows that the family income standard for the QMB program is 100 percent of the official poverty line, and the family income standard for the SLMB program is 120 percent.42 U.S.C. § 1396d(p)(2)(B)(iii).

Under the authority of Title XIX of the Social Security Act and R.I. General Laws Chapter 40, the state is empowered to create rules and regulations with regard to these programs.42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.; R.I. Gen. Laws § 40-8-3. In establishing the eligibility guidelines via these rules, however, the state is obligated to follow the methodology of the SSI program. Also under the federal mandate, state eligibility standards must be reasonable. Only resources and income available to the applicant may be considered. § 1396a(a)(17)(B) and (C).

Methodology and Standard for Determining Eligibility
There are different types of income, earned and unearned, and rules for counting each. See, 20 C.F.R.

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Related

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin
444 U.S. 555 (Supreme Court, 1980)
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers
453 U.S. 34 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Milardo v. Coastal Resources Management Council
434 A.2d 266 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1981)
Newport Shipyard, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights
484 A.2d 893 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1984)
Berberian v. Department of Employment Security, Board of Review
414 A.2d 480 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1980)
Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co.
424 A.2d 646 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1981)
Carmody v. Rhode Island Conflict of Interest Commission
509 A.2d 453 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1986)
Bouchard v. Secretary of Health & Human Services
583 F. Supp. 944 (D. Massachusetts, 1984)
Costa v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles
543 A.2d 1307 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1988)
Taft v. Pare
536 A.2d 888 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
Skaliotis v. R.I. Department of Human Services, 95-2438 (1996), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/skaliotis-v-ri-department-of-human-services-95-2438-1996-risuperct-1996.